795B.00/6–2852: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State
priority
1470. Rptd info CINCUNC as DIP 396 by other means. Lloyd’s nine-point program1 very good indication our present aims involving compromise settlement which would give Rhee opportunity remain in power (with certain restrictions on use that power) and at same time go long way to restore independence to National Assembly. However, I feel strongly it would not be desirable or feasible right now to present demands in virtual ultimatum.
To submit strong demands this nature requires decision time has come to force showdown and readiness to follow up any refusal with necessary force. In view of additional time afforded by extension President’s term, postponement of election and indications compromise settlement may be possible without UN intervention, I wld not advise calling for showdown now. Need could arise suddenly, as dramatically illustrated by assassination attempt June 25, and we should be prepared for all eventualities (see ourtel 1395 June 18).2 Need quite possibly will not arise if Rhee can manipulate things in way to achieve his goal without having to resort to new actions that world opinion cannot possibly condone. It looks more and more as though he may accomplish this by establishing ascendancy over Natl Assembly and securing his re-election either by present Assembly or direct election after amendment adopted. (I will discuss this situation and comment on Point 7 in Lloyd’s proposal in separate message).3
There is another aspect of ultimatum that I think requires careful consideration in connection any plan for intervention. Intervention by armed (ROK) forces would have to be executed with utmost speed and [Page 362] precision, very first move being if Rhee and his present friends had sufficient warning (1) to issue emotional nationalistic appeal to country through their nationwide political apparatus, (2) to call on police and army to rally to Rhee’s support or (3) to flee from Pusan. Ultimatum might give just such signal.
In my view, if time comes for intervention, ample grounds will exist without need to spell them out in last minute attempt at suasion (indeed case can be made that sufficient grounds already exist). Rhee knows perfectly well what we want and basic points have been presented to him in numerous official representations and through informal channels. Emb and UNCURK shall miss no occasion add to list during period ahead. Presentation of package demands, with intimation we prepared follow through, not likely in my view to lead to capitulation on his part but wild outburst and attempt to resist to last, which at that stage could seriously complicate operation which ought to be fairly simple.
As far as Lloyd’s specific points concerned I have little comment, except to stress importance of 7 (in accompanying tel). Nine points are reasonable but in dealing with Rhee, that does not mean they are susceptible of negotiation. There would definitely be no useful purpose served by putting them up to him as normal diplomatic representation. He would be expected in such circumstances to equivocate or otherwise refuse to take action “for time being” on two, three, four, six and seven. He would say he had long ago agreed to number one but nothing he could do to get Assembly’s approval. He could with honesty claim number eight already in effect and further that he was doing his best to meet number nine. He might also agree to number five, assuming this meant casual type UNCURK observation of popular election of Pres. End result would be merely make him more furious than ever with foreign interference.
As far as attitude Assembly opposition concerned they could be expected buy all nine points without delay, but in this situation and by very nature of the demands Rhee is main stumbling block.