795B.00/6–2852: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State
priority
1471. Rptd info CINCUNC DIP 397 by other means. ReEmbtel 1470, June 28.1 As indicated reftel there is good possibility Rhee will win out without having to resort to or being faced with measures or situations which wld invite UN intervention. It is therefore important [Page 363] to take stock of situation we wld be confronted with in those circumstances.
Since Rhee probably will maintain martial law and proceed with trials of arrested Assemblymen up to moment of victory, we will have hard time regarding his victory as having taken place in manner acceptable to free world. We will also have to face up to other unpleasant realities, e.g., it will be harder to obtain support in the future for mil and econ programs in Korea; many moderate Koreans will be disillusioned and less inclined step forward and prestige of US/UN will be at low ebb in Korea and restraining influence vitiated; if ROK Govt still dominated by group now in saddle they will lead country still farther from democratic path, resort to police power and intimidation and ignore counsel of moderation.
Key to problem will be calibre of group around Rhee (See Lloyd’s point number 7 Deptel 1005, June 25, rptd Tokyo as 662.2) If Yi Pom-Suk–Louise Yim–Ahn Ho-Sang–Yun Chi-Yun–Gen Won crowd, who are now in inner circles, remain in positions of influence, possibilities for anything approaching decent govt, efficient econ admin, and so forth, would be virtually hopeless. On other hand there is group of more moderate Koreans who have shown administrative ability and considerable honesty and integrity on previous occasions who are not embroiled in present conflict and who might be willing take over key posts if Rhee threw out present incumbents. They are now to great extent disillusioned and bitter, but being fundamentally men of good will they might be expected answer call help make best of bad situation.
Importance principal advisers around Rhee will probably be greater in future than in past since, as I have reported, Rhee showing signs of weakening under hurly-burly and stress present crisis. Doctor tells me his physical condition good for man his age, but I have in mind mental deterioration, frequent lapses memory, and impression he gives on his bad days being uncertain, groping, friendless, suspicious (of everyone), and senile. In short more and more he likely be used by scheming group around him. It is not that he has full confidence in them. Indeed, he does not. (He has used same group before and cast them aside and may do so again when he feels they no longer useful). Danger lies in what they are doing and may do in future without his knowledge or approval while still retaining positions of power or influence. As they become entrenched their power may become so great that very difficult to remove.
I have had some small success sowing seeds Rhee’s mind that Yi Pom-Suk and company dangerous for him, for Korea and for UN, Several [Page 364] members UNCURK have taken similar line. Not sure whether Dept has opportunities talk same direction but might bear this in mind when meeting members Korean Emb or newsmen. I feel problem one to watch and keep after but not much we can overtly do about it at this moment. Yi has lots of rope and may hang himself before it is over.