695A.0024/6–2852: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State
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1474. For Armstrong eyes only. Re Deptel 946, June 12 and 992, June 23.1 Fol from Manhard:
Highlights interviews Chinese POW leaders Koje-do June 20–24 fol. All comments POW opinion unless otherwise indicated.
Approximately two-thirds pro-repatriation Chinese were tattooed against will. POW estimates vary from 2,800 to 3,200, by [but] observation indicates over 1,500.
Main immediate factors influencing choice against repatriation include (1) info blockade by POW trusties preventing most POW’s from hearing broadcasts and reading orientation bulletins with result many POW’s not sure polling directly connected with POW exchange, (2) partially successful deception by POW trusties that polling was only test to distinguish pro-Communists for later punishment and execution by UN authorities, without choice to return mainland, (3) physical terror including organized murders, beatings, threats, before and even during polling process.
Claimed higher casualties than camp records which show 5 killed in 72 and 2 in 86, many badly beaten during Operation Scatter [garbled group] minimized fear of reprisal by mainland authorities after return, but emphasized that cumulative effect of pro-Nationalists political indoctrination by CI and E. Sun Chen Kuan believes many CCP members now among anti-repatriation group will eventually attempt escape [Page 361] if given better opportunity such as release from close confinement in connection with transfer to Formosa. Many pro-repatriation Chinese POW’s assert American chaplain and his Korean assistant played major role in deterring Chinese from choosing repatriation between first and second polling in 72 and possibly in 86. Sun maintained that major reason for 1,200 of 1,400 from work detail in compound 70 choosing repatriation was the weakness of pro-Nationalist POW leadership that group and lack physical violence. He assumed compound 70 politically typical of majority Chinese POW’s.
Interview notes and personal observations airpouched DRF today.
- In these telegrams, the Department of State dealt with the mechanics of and method of reporting Manhard’s interviews with top Chinese Communist POW leaders at Koje-do (695A.0024/6–1252 and 695A.0024/6–2352, respectively).↩