Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)¹

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, June 25, 1952—3:50 p.m.

JCS 912098. From JCS. Reur CX 50416² and Muccio’s 1395.³ CINCUNC pass to Muccio.

Part I. As Def and State now view polit sit created by Rhee, two different gen lines of development appear possible.

1. First, there may not be any sudden or critical development requiring, on purely mil grounds, direct intervention, or providing adequate justification for direct intervention upon polit grounds. This appears to be present sit in which only feasible action appears to be intensification of polit measures. Ur suggestions wld be most helpful as to what addl dipl and mil representation cld be applied to whatever degree possible to resolve polit crisis.

2. Second, sit may deteriorate to point where, in order prevent interference with UN mil opns, direct intervention in sit cannot be avoided. As this action may be forced upon us suddenly by one or more incidents, Depts desire you confer with each other earliest in order develop and submit to Wash for approval detailed polit and mil plan accordingly. Depts concur that premature disclosure of existence such plan cld be extremely embarrassing to United States Govt, therefore, UNCURK participation in ur planning shld be to extent to which you mutually determine to be necessary.

Part II. To facilitate ur planning folg guidance is furnished:

3. It is hoped that necessity for implementation of plan can be foreseen sufficiently in advance to permit implementation to be on decision by highest govtal authy. However, in event of sudden outbreak of violence, civil disorder or an emerg necessitating immed action, CINCUNC will be authorized to implement the plan without further authy, reporting his action expeditiously.

4. Under less emerg conditions the plan shld contemplate action along folg lines:

a. If circumstances permit, UNCURK, Emb and CINCUNC shld present appropriate demand that Rhee or other responsible official take such immed action as, in judgment of UNCURK, Emb and CINCUNC, is required to restore sit.

b. If circumstances do not permit making foregoing demand or if requested action is not immediately taken by ROK Govt, CINCUNC, preferably at UNCURKs request shld recommend to United States Govt that intervention be authorized.

5. On authorization by United States Govt to intervene as exec agt for UN, CINCUNC shld take action along folg lines:

a. Direct ROKA Ch of Staff to assume cmd of all ROKA Forces, quasi mil forces and such elements of natl or local police as CINCUNC may deem necessary, and thereafter to administer and direct martial rule in Pusan area. As matter of policy utilization of UN troops other than Korean shld be avoided or minimized to greatest extent possible.

b. Administration of martial rule shld be such as to preserve to maximum possible extent authy and functioning of an ROK Govt organization as a symbol of ROK sovereignty. Orders issued to ROKA Ch of Staff under these circumstances shld be of such nature as to envisage local martial rule in Pusan area, supplemented by ROK civil govt agencies which are capable of continued functioning. These orders shld clearly provide for preservation of constitutional govt and early restoration of civil power where such power is necessarily suspended. Appropriate individuals and organizations of ROK Govt shld be given full protection and, as soon as order is restored, they shld be encouraged to take such action as necessary to effect continuation of normal functioning of constitutional govt.

c. While foregoing contemplates use of ROK forces only, and while that is desirable from viewpoint of world opinion, there is no restriction on use of other UN forces shld sit require.

6. Re this request appraisal as to dependability of ROKA Ch of Staff, and ROKA forces, under these conditions, particularly shld Rhee as an anticipatory measure, rescind his order of 14 Jul 50 which placed ROKA under CINCUNCs cmd.

7. In implementation of foregoing there shld be maximum coordinaton between CINCUNC, UNCURK and American Amb.

8. Request ur comments.

1. A draft of this telegram prepared in the Department of State as guidance for Ambassador Muccio is in FE files, lot 55 D 128, attached to a memorandum by Young to Johnson, dated June 25, 1952. At the suggestion of Collins, State agreed that the telegram could be sent to Clark, as well, as a joint State–Defense telegram.

   The text of JCS 912098 was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 25, after which Bradley secured the informal approval of Secretary of Defense Lovett. President Truman approved the text with the addition of the words “as exec agt for UN” in the first sentence of paragraph 5; it was transmitted as a JCS telegram. (JCS 1776/298, June 25; JCS files)

2. In telegram CX 50416, Clark to Muccio, June 18, 1952, Clark regretted that his schedule precluded meeting with Muccio and UNCURK. Clark had no objection to Van Fleet making a further representation to Rhee. Clark noted, however, that he had not yet received policy direction from the JCS on the issue of intervention in ROK politics. When he did, he or Van Fleet would be willing to meet with Muccio and UNCURK to discuss courses of action beyond the diplomatic stage (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).
3. Dated June 18, p. 341.