611.95A241/6–1852
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)
Subject:
- Panikkar’s Discussion with Chou En-lai on the question of Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
Participants:
- Mr. D. A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director
Mr. Greenhill came in on another matter and then asked whether Mr. Allison or Mr. Johnson could see him since he had some news of importance concerning Panikkar’s discussion with Chou En-lai on the repatriation of prisoners of war. Since neither Mr. Allison nor Mr. Johnson was available, he gave the information to me, leaving with me the brief summary of the Chinese position which was attached to the memorandum to Mr. Allison on this subject of June 18,1 and a copy of which is attached to the original of this memorandum of conversation.2
[Page 341]Mr. Greenhill said that according to the reports he had received Panikkar had had a new conversation of over two hours on June 15 with Chou En-lai about the armistice negotiations. In the course of this conversation, Chou En-lai had finally outlined two possible lines for breaking the deadlock over repatriation of prisoners of war. They preferred the first alternative, which involved a settlement on the basis of 90,000 Koreans and 20,000 Chinese, although Panikkar reported his impression that they might settle for 100,000 if the total included 20,000 Chinese. The second alternative includes an acceptance of the principle of the Geneva Convention as being applicable and an agreement that prima facie all prisoners of war desire repatriation. However, any who showed a disinclination could be brought to Panmunjom, but not under military escort, and could be interviewed there by neutral personnel from the four neutral states agreed upon and from the Red Cross. The Chinese and North Korean Governments would abide by the views expressed at this interview. Chou En-lai appeared to place special importance upon the lack of military escort.
The Indian Government in commenting, said that the second alternative seemed to rest upon the assumption that only those who were against repatriation after being free from military control and the influence of Kuomintang and Syngman Rhee agents should be interviewed by an independent body. The British Foreign Office had been told that Nehru was inclined to prefer the first alternative, although he foresaw that there might be some difficulties, in which case the second alternative seemed to provide a possibility for satisfactory solution.
The Foreign Office is inclined to be somewhat skeptical about this proposal. … However, they believed that it should be very carefully considered and that we should consult together as to possible action. Sir Christopher Steel is to come in to see Mr. Allison at 4:30 on June 19 to get our preliminary reaction.3