Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 338: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)¹

top secret
niact

Pusan, June 16, 1952—5 p.m.

DIP 342. Rptd Gen Van Fleet. Dept for info. Reur CX 50221, June 15.²

1. I recognize statements made by you and Gen Van Fleet have supported US and UN positions as presented by polit reps. I recognize also validity your stand, supported by State and Defense Depts, that this is still diplomatic phase and shld be handled through dipl channels as mil opinions [operations?] not yet directly affected.

2. As I tried to point out in Embtel 1371, June 14³ serious misconception of views of Gen Van Fleet and yourself has unfortunately been created in Rhee’s mind. This may be intentional distortion fabricated for his own purposes but I think it more likely in view peculiar lapses his memory lately that he is actually convinced your interest so remote that he in effect need not worry on that score.

3. I feel there is imminent possibility of further deterioration in situation, e.g., more arrests, dissolution of Assembly, public disorders, or even breakdown in Rhee’s health, leading to great confusion and possible takeover by Yi Pom Suk. (Rhee has been under terrific strain and shows signs physical and mental weakening.) Therefore to prepare for such eventualities I suggested advisability mtg with you (thinking you were still in Korea) and Gen Van Fleet and UNCURK to discuss possible courses should we precipitously be forced to go beyond diplomatic phase. I still believe we shld do so at your earliest convenience.

4. As to my point (3) in Embtel 1371, I had no intention bringing you and Gen Van Fleet into active participation “with the political reps in the application of pressure brought to bear on Rhee”. I suggested joint appeal to Rhee, mainly for the purpose of straightening out in his mind (preferably in presence of Yi Pom Suk) the misconception referred to in para 2 above. I still am convinced that even slight moderation at this time in Rhee’s adamant stand would go great deal towards making compromise possible. I am further convinced that such an appeal from you and/or Gen Van Fleet will have much more effect, at this stage, than anything I or UNCURK may do. Its effect on Rhee’s decisions and on those of his chief henchman may spell the difference between success or failure in our efforts to get an acceptable solution.

5. I had opportunity to discuss these matters briefly with Gen Van Fleet today. He told me of your heavy schedule and commitments this week and I now suggest that appeal to Rhee be made by Gen Van Fleet alone and without any publicity. It would be in same friendly, personal vein that Van Fleet uses so well with the old man. The lines I hope he might follow would be approx as fols:

a. Outline mil situation.

b. Appeal for use of Rhee’s great influence and unique leadership towards bringing unity among Koreans. He cld do so if he wld.

c. Point out that US had always looked to Rhee for leadership …⁴ in spite of Rhee’s idea that we are against him … that US still looks to continuation of Rhee’s constructive leadership now and in future.

d. Express concern that numerous anti-foreign gestures (posters, handbills, speeches) appearing past week may have harmful effect on UN forces.

e. Refer to impressions gained in previous interviews (May 27 and June 2)⁵ that all wld be straightened out within few weeks. Point out that crisis continues without showing signs of abating or solution.

f. Point out that mil operations are adversely effected not only by direct effects on disposition of troops and public disorders but by other indirect developments. Continuing rumors and partial info reaching the ROK Army will not be helpful to its morale. Internatl reactions, both in the press and in official quarters, have already been such as to affect internatl good will towards ROK Govt. Effects on further mil contributions by foreign nations cannot be estimated at this stage but unless quick solution is reached in way that will be acceptable to foreign public opinion, foreign support for war effort and for Korean security forces in future is bound to be affected.

6. I hope you will approve this suggestion. The need to discuss the matters mentioned in para 3 above still remains urgent and I hope you will authorize Gen Van Fleet and/or Maj Gen Herren to discuss them with UNCURK and myself if you yourself are unavailable.

Muccio

1. This telegram was repeated for information to the Department of State as telegram 1382. The source text is the copy from the Department of State files.
2. In this telegram to the JCS, Clark stated that he did not believe he or Van Fleet should actively participate in pressing Rhee and until the situation deteriorated to the point where military operations might be placed in jeopardy, he felt that no direct threat of UNC military actions should be made or implied (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413). A separate note, Johnson to Allison, was attached to the Department file copy of telegram 1382 from Pusan which referred to this cable by Clark; it read: “There is also a tel[egram] from Clark (Emmons has) to JCS saying he doesn’t want to get mixed up in this. I’ve tried unsuccessfully to get Frank Nash. I think he must be disabused of [the] idea that Rhee is not deriving much encouragement from his (Clark’s) apparent aloofness. I asked Emmons to draft and show to you [a] tel[egram] that we think Defense shld send in reply to Clark’s incoming.”
3. Supra.
4. The ellipses in this paragraph appeared in the source text.
5. For reports of these meetings between Clark and Rhee, see telegrams 1170 from Pusan, May 27, and 1243 from Pusan, June 3, pp. 252 and 287, respectively.