795B.00/6–1852: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State
priority
1395. Rptd CINCUNC Tokyo (personal for Clark) and EUSAK Advance personal for Van Fleet and Deputy CG EUSAK Gen Herren as DIP 349.
Emb, as well as UNCURK, has been taking every possible opportunity to persuade Pres Rhee and several key polit leaders on both sides of the controversy to get together and come up with some solution to the present impasse that wld be plausible in the eyes of the free world. We [Page 342] have been very patient. Under existing conditions we can hardly expect at best a compromise solution arrived at in a manner that will stand up to too close scrutiny. The line between what we can condone and what we cannot accept may be difficult to draw.
One of the principal stumbling blocks appears to be Rhee’s phobia against the US and UN for having “thwarted his revolution”. This has made him all the more stubborn as he is loath to take any action that might imply that he has not been 100 percent right from the start. Another element of difficulty is Rhee’s feeling that the mil (UNC), even if not approving of all he is doing, are not sufficiently interested to take a stand against him unless his actions seriously undermine the military situation. Then there is Rhee’s deeply ingrained personal characteristic as a fighter who hates compromising. As long as he feels he can get what he wants without compromise he will be inclined stand pat.
As for his opposition there are difficulties there too since many of them feel compromise leaving Rhee in power, even if it included written restrictions in his power, wld be tantamount to capitulation. Substantial opposition groups have of course been encouraged by world opinion and they have interpreted action of US/UN reps here as an indication that intervention is possible. These elements appear to be more interested in convincing US/UN of need for intervention, with consequent benefit for themselves, than in working with fellow Koreans towards a compromise.
I am guided by my instructions and my conviction that no action in the nature of intervention shld be taken except under explicit orders from Washington. Furthermore, it is essential up to the very moment of intervention, if that becomes necessary, that all US/UN elements here shld scrupulously avoid any indication that the US/UN at present comtemplating such action. Both the Emb and UNCURK shld keep their principals fully and currently informed of developments. We shld watch developments closely, keeping eye out particularly for anyone who is apt to come to the fore in any upheaval. Calibre of leadership that emerges is of utmost importance. The reps of the unified command of the 17 nations having forces in Korea meet regularly in Washington and are constantly informed of the polit situation in Korea.
As I see it intervention wld have to be seriously considered if one of fol developments occurred: (1) An irrevocable polit act, such as dissolution of assembly, further mass arrests of assemblymen, etc.; (2) In event Pres Rhee suddenly incapacitated, physically or mentally; (3) In event Lee Bum Suk started moving in to take over control by force with police and youth corps; (4) In event of interference with ROKA, or; (5) Outbreak of serious violence. In case violence breaks out UNC must be in position to take necessary measures instantaneously. In other cases matter cld be referred Washington for decision.
[Page 343]If intervention decided upon it wld be essential that the necessary steps be taken in the name of the UN and on the basis of a carefully laid out program that could be put into effect at a moment’s notice. Action would be implemented under specific instructions to CINCUNC from Unified Command, followed by orders from CINCUNC to the UN field commander, who in turn would have all measures taken by the ROK army through the chief of staff. If we are forced to intervene, it is essential that action be prompt and decisive to forestall the likelihood of armed conflict breaking out between the army, police and/or youth corps goon squads and before Pres Rhee or persons acting in his name can make a nationalistic emotional appeal to the Korean people against the US/UN.
I consider it essential that the polit and mil authorities have complete understanding of the objectives to be achieved and the tactics to be employed and therefore again suggest early mtg recommended mytel 1382 of June 16.1