795.00/5–2652

Draft Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark)1

top secret

Eyes only for Clark.

Part I.

1. Careful consideration is being given here to next step in armistice negotiations. As we see situation here following factors must be included among those to be considered.

A.
We continue to have strong domestic and international support, notably including India, for the principle of non-forcible repatriation of POWs;
B.
However, we must frankly recognize that recent events on Koje Island have seriously undermined previous confidence in our handling of POWs and validity results screening; on one hand there is concern over inability thus far screen pro-Commie camps and thus number non-repatriates too low, and on other hand that pressure factors were permitted to operate on individual POWs in anti-Commie camps so that number of non-repatriates too high;
C.
Prior to recent events on Koje Island all of our principal allies strongly urged that our offer of impartial rescreening after armistice be modified so as to permit such rescreening prior to armistice subject to prior agreement by each side to abide by the results. We rejected such suggestions at that time on grounds (1) not likely to be any more acceptable to Commies than screening after armistice, (2) obvious disadvantages to UNC compared to screening after armistice, and (3) we would not regard such a proposal as a substantive change in April 28 [Page 245] UNC package proposal so that if negotiations on that proposal indicated timing of screening was only major point at issue we would at that time consider pre-armistice screening;
D.
Subsequently Allies have strongly renewed pressure for some type of rescreening, principally a UNC offer of impartial rescreening prior to an armistice with Commie observation and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results;
E.
Regardless of the logic and reasonableness of our position on impartial rescreening following an armistice, our principal Allies would not now support a unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations, at least until after an offer of rescreening prior to an armistice has been made in some way and rejected by Commies;
F.
A unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC would give Soviets basis for exploiting subsequent situation as a “breaking off negotiations” by UNC in face Commie willingness and desire continue talks and UNC unwillingness to face facts “exposed” by incidents on Koje Islands. Such attacks could at this time do much to exploit wavering opinions among our friends and Allies;
G.
A unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC, particularly without solid support from our principal Allies, would give Soviets basis for moving negotiations to Security Council (which Soviets chair during June) on grounds deadlock at Panmunjom, and opportunity in Security Council to link other questions with Korean settlement, thereby beclouding Korean issues and confusing and dividing general support we now have on fundamental positions re Korea;
H.
Additionally, there have been some still entirely inconclusive indications received through diplomatic channels that Chinese might seek a resolution of the POW question and have indicated principal difficulty may be lowness of UNC figure on repatriates, a figure of 100,000 possibly being a basis for resolution this issue, and question of Chinese POWs being relatively more important than NKPOWs. This is known to several Governments and may be expected eventually to become generally known.

Part II.

1.
Therefore, while a unilateral indefinite suspension of the negotiations in the face of continued Commie intransigence may serve additionally to impress Commies with firmness of our position, if such suspension were accompanied by evidences of Allied disunity, the opposite effect might result. Thus, while sympathetic with extremely trying and difficult situation faced by UNC Del, do not consider here that time now propitious for a unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC.
2.
However, as stated in JCS [909747]2 no objection is perceived to holding meetings only every three or four days if by agreement of Dels. Additionally, even if Commies do not agree, no objection perceived here to UNC Del occasionally indicating without explanation its inability to meet for two or three days so that UNC Del is not placed [Page 246] in position of being continuously responsive to Commie importunities for meetings.

Part III.

1.

In considering what additional measures can be taken to restore confidence in and unqualified support for our position on POWs, two possible courses of action are being examined here. It is considered that the course of action adopted should, in itself, contribute whatever may be possible toward the achieving of an armistice without any concession of our basic principles, obtain maximum effectiveness from the unilateral indefinite suspension if all other efforts fail, and assure maximum support for the US if an armistice is not ultimately achieved.

The two possible courses of action are:

(a)
An offer to the Commies of an immediate impartial rescreening of non-repatriates prior to an armistice, with Commie observation, and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results;
(b)
An immediate rescreening of all POWs by or under the observation of a group of countries not participating in the hostilities in Korea (such as Switzerland, Sweden and India), such screening to be carried out at the unilateral initiative of the UNC and without any invitation for Commie observation.

2.
In order to minimize any erroneous implications that UNC was willing to compromise its basic principles on non-forcible repatriation, and to maximize possibilities Commie acceptance, the offer mentioned in para 1 (a) above could originate as a mediation proposal from some third country which could test Chinese Commie reactions to it. If rejected by the Commies, the fact of the offer, Chinese rejection and US acceptance could be made public to the great advantage of the US. If accepted in principle by the Chinese it would, of course, be necessary that it subsequently be introduced into the negotiations at Panmunjom for confirmation and agreement on details. Alternatively or subsequently, the offer could be introduced by the UNC Del at Panmunjom within the context of UNC refutation Commie allegations on coercion and forceful retention non-repatriates. In this connection we note with approval that in several recent restatements of UNC position on POWsUNC Del has omitted reference to timing of impartial rescreening proposal.
3.
While there are obvious and serious disadvantages to rescreening prior to an armistice as compared with rescreening subsequent to an armistice, we do not consider that those disadvantages are so serious as to outweigh advantage of achieving an armistice. Additionally, if, as would be necessary, both sides would agree to abide by results, essential difference from post armistice screening should not be great and in negotiations on details it might be possible so to maneuver agreement that difference was more apparent than real.
4.
If Commies continue to remain entirely intransigent on subject forcible repatriation the line of action set forth in para 1 (b) above could only serve purpose of restoring confidence in results UNC screening and complete reasonableness of UNC posture on POW question. If basis of Commie disagreement on POW question is now large proportion of non-repatriates, particularly among Chinese, line of action set forth in para 1 (b) could contribute to achievement of an armistice only if results of such rescreening were likely to be more favorable to Commies. It would therefore be important that we have the best estimate of the situation in this regard it is possible for you to make.

Part IV.

1. Request your comments on Parts II and III.

  1. This version was originally drafted by Young on May 22, 1952, and given to Johnson that evening. Johnson made substantial revisions and also sent Young’s draft to Matthews, Hickerson, Bohlen, Sargeant, and Nitze with a request for their comments. This draft of May 26 was the product of their suggestions. The May 22 draft and the comments thereon are included in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 73 and 74. The May 26 draft was then submitted to the JCS. After many subsequent revisions this draft was sent as telegram JCS 910484, June 5, p. 310. For information on the various revisions, see footnote 6, p. 261 and memoranda of discussion, pp. 256 and 295.
  2. Dated May 26, not printed (795.00/5–3152).