Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

695.0029/5–2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)¹

secret

[Washington,] May 26, 1952.²

Subject:

• Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants:

• Mr. Tomlinson, UK Embassy
• Mr. Johnson, FE
• Mr. Henkin, UNP

Mr. Tomlinson called to give me the substance of a telegram from the Foreign Office, reporting further on discussions between the UK and the Indian Governments. In a telegram to Mr. Eden, Selwyn Lloyd reported a further visit from the Indian High Commissioner in London. The High Commissioner stated that he had recommended to Mr. Nehru the formula which he and Mr. Eden had tentatively agreed upon.³ He asked whether Mr. Nehru would be prepared to have Ambassador Panikkar propose this formula to the Chinese Communists as the best formula which the Indian Government could propose to the UK. He would not indicate that the British had seen this formula.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that the proposed procedure seemed excellent and that I hoped it might bring fruit. I pointed out, however, that in my previous conversation I had given Mr. Tomlinson my preliminary reactions but that I had assumed that there would be additional opportunity for study and comment upon the formula. Mr. Tomlinson replied that the formula was not in any sense “frozen”, and it would not be communicated to the Communists immediately. Nehru’s reaction to the UK High Commissioner’s recommendation would undoubtedly be communicated to the British and there would be further opportunity to comment on the formula.

I then suggested that the introductory portion of the formula, as presently drafted, might be construed as an invitation to the Communists to hold back some of the 12,000 UN prisoners of war whom they had agreed to return. Mr. Tomlinson agreed that this point had some merit, and after discussion we suggested that the relevant portion might be revised to read “for ascertaining the views of all prisoners captured in the Korean conflict about repatriation.” I also expressed to Mr. Tomlinson our difficulty with the phrase in paragraph (A) providing that “all prisoners should be set at liberty.” I pointed out that, particularly in regard to the Chinese, they would have to be maintained in some refugee status and probably kept in camps until a place were found for them to go. Also, in view of our rescreening offer, it would be necessary to keep all POWs who refused repatriation in one place so that they would be available for interviews. I suggested, therefore, that instead of the phrase indicated the formula should read “All prisoners should be released from POW status and permitted to go to any destination of their own choice available to them.” Finally, I suggested that the formula might be strengthened by the addition of a point “(F)”, emphasizing that none of the POWs, either those repatriated or those who refused repatriation, would be allowed to take up arms again in Korea. I pointed out that this was already provided in the draft armistice agreement to which both sides had agreed. Mr. Tomlinson agreed that the point would be helpful and it was decided to propose the following wording: “No prisoner shall again bear arms in the Korean conflict.”

I told Mr. Tomlinson that these suggestions were still not final, but I would confirm them later by telephone. (Later in the day, May 26th, I called Mr. Tomlinson and informed him that these suggestions were being proposed to the Secretary, who would probably discuss them with Mr. Eden.⁴)

Mr. Tomlinson also reported that the Foreign Office was informed that on May 20th the Indian Government received a communication from its Ambassador in Peiping which indicated that in the Chinese view there is a sharp distinction between Chinese and North Korean POWs. The Koreans were in civil war and therefore, so long as the Koreans remained in some part of Korea, they were, in a sense, not being denied repatriation. The Chinese could not agree, however, to the retention of a single Chinese.⁵ The Indian reaction to this communication, as reported to the Foreign Office, was that it must be viewed with caution. It noted that this would narrow the problem, since only some 15,000 persons would be involved, but they recognized that the difficulty of principle remained unresolved. Mr. Eden, upon being informed of this communication, commented that it must be viewed with caution, but that if accurate it might be interesting as evidence of a desire to reach some compromise. I noted that the communication did not make clear whether the Chinese had in fact stated this position to Panikkar or whether Panikkar himself was exploring for a possible solution. I emphasized, of course, that the question of principle applies equally to the Chinese.

Mr. Tomlinson also read to me a critical telegram from the Foreign Office. The telegram stated that the Foreign Office had been led to believe that all the prisoners of war had been screened and that a statement to this effect had been made to Parliament. They were dismayed, therefore, to learn that this was not, in fact, the case. The Foreign Office stressed the great importance which Parliament attaches to the accuracy of statements made to it by members of the Government. I reminded Mr. Tomlinson that he had been informed, and that he had in fact indicated that he had told the Foreign Office. Perhaps we should have emphasized more frequently the fact that certain compounds could not be screened and that the 70,000 estimate was based in part on a guess as to the attitudes of these POWs. It had never been intended, however, to deny or to conceal this fact, and we had been under the impression that the UK and the other Governments understood this situation.

1. This memorandum was drafted by Henkin.
2. This memorandum was dictated on May 27.
3. The formula under reference was set forth in the British telegram handed to Johnson; see the memorandum by Matthews, May 22, p. 227.
4. At a meeting in Paris on May 26 between Acheson and Eden, the Foreign Ministers discussed, inter alia, the Indian presentation to the Chinese of the formula worked out with the British. Eden reported that the preliminary Chinese reaction was not unfavorable, but that they had raised the issue of a reciprocal visit of POWs refusing repatriation. Acheson stated that this demand would meet with strong opposition in Washington. In light of this reaction, Eden observed that the Indians should be discouraged from pushing the formula in Peking. In any case, Eden expressed pessimism over Indian efforts ever coming to anything. At this point, Acheson related current relevant thinking in Washington: an ICRC rescreening with Communist observers and a clear agreement by both sides to accept the results of that rescreening. He added, however, that the Communists were not likely to accept this solution. Therefore, the UNC would unilaterally arrange a recheck by a neutral such as Sweden or Switzerland. Adding that this course of action was not yet finally determined as the U.S. Government position, Acheson concluded that the important thing was to reestablish the moral position undermined by the riots in the prison camps. (Minutes of Bipartite Foreign Ministers meeting with the British, May 26, 1952, 9:45 p.m., lot 59 D 95, CF 110, “SCEM Minutes and Memoranda of Conv”)
5. In telegram 4371 from New Delhi, dated May 23, 1952, not printed, Bowles reported that Bajpai had informed him of similar indications from Peking. (693.95B24/5–2352)