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  4. Document 139

795.00/5–2652

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) 1

top secret
[ Washington ,] May 26, 1952.

Subject:

  • Further Steps Regarding the Present Korean Situation.

There is attached an analysis in outline form2 of further steps to bring about an armistice agreement without resort to hostilities. After [Page 243] considerable discussion and thinking about all of the possible moves and counter moves, I am left with the strong impression that precipitate closing down of the armistice negotiations would not serve our national interest at this time, and that all of the many possible devices of breaking the POW impasse would be too difficult or uncertain to risk trying at this stage. The conclusions of NA from this analysis are as follows:

1.
There are many arguments for sticking to the April 28 proposals in spite of the world-wide impact of Koje-do. After all, the reaction of Koje-do will be temporary, and we have only been in the present stage of negotiations for a month; that may be a short time in the Communist way of doing things. Therefore, we must not be too hasty in seeking an escape; nor must we permit any impression of uncertainty on our part. We must convince the Communists that we intend to stand firm.3
2.
For the next few weeks4 we must use the sessions at Panmunjom to explain and elaborate our proposal on post-armistice rescreening. We should refer to it as a repatriation process and the UNC Delegation should attempt to draw out the Communists’ comments on it.5
3.
It is imperative that we undertake to provide the UNC Delegation with more prepared instructions from time to time both on the handling of the repatriation process as well as on overall propaganda requirements.6
4.
After a study of all possible ways of breaking the impasse on the POW issue, it is clear that intercession of a third party, such as the Government of India, would increase the chances of reaching agreement on any one. It is impossible at Panmunjom to get information from the Communist representatives on various possibilities and to exchange ideas with them as to how this matter could be worked out. The sessions at Panmunjom have ceased to be a negotiation. We must seek to develop a channel to Peking through which we can obtain Communist reaction to our current proposals as well as technical suggestions from Peking on how to solve the dilemma.7
5.
As well as stand on our present position, we should develop a hard hitting propaganda program that exploits the obvious Communist vulnerabilities on the POW issue. Since Communist propaganda now has overtones which transcend the Korean situation and since the solution of the Korean conflict is in turn related to other issues in the US–USSR [Page 244] conflict, our propaganda should turn its full weight on the vicious campaign that Moscow is now pushing to extremes.8
6.
In the meantime, we should explore with our Allies and with certain governments not actively participating in the Korean affair, various ways of breaking the jam on the POW issue. At the appropriate time in the negotiations and following adequate sounding out of Peking, the UNC Delegation could then propose pre-armistice review of the repatriation problem or an international screening of the non-repatriates.9

  1. This memorandum was also addressed to Johnson.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. The following marginal notations appeared next to this paragraph: “O.K. (with some reservations)” in Allison’s handwriting; “Agree” in Johnson’s.↩
  4. The phrase “next few weeks” was underlined and Allison noted on the margin the following: “Probably too long”.↩
  5. Johnson noted in the margin next to this paragraph the following: “Trying do this”.↩
  6. The following marginal notations appeared next to this paragraph: “Agree” (Allison), “Being done” (Johnson).↩
  7. The following appeared next to this paragraph: “Agree” (Allison), “Now trying to get Gov’t agreement on this” (Johnson).↩
  8. The following appeared next to this paragraph: “Agree” (Allison), “Trying do this” (Johnson).↩
  9. The following appeared next to this paragraph: “Agree” (Allison), “Trying do this” (Johnson).↩