795.00/5–2252

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) 1

top secret

Subject:

  • Suspension of Korean Armistice Negotiations

After much thought on the subject I have come to the strong conclusion that we should not yet agree to any indefinite suspension of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

The principal advantage of suspension would be that it might in some small degree additionally impress the Communists with the firmness of our position. A subsidiary reason is that it would deny to the Communists a propaganda forum of which they seem to be able to make somewhat better use than our delegation. However, recently our delegation has been doing better in the propaganda aspects than in the past. There is also the argument that by supinely attending fruitless meetings at Communist instigation we lose respect and prestige.

Opposed to the foregoing are the following factors:

1.
By unilaterally suspending meetings we are doing exactly what the Communists have apparently been attempting to goad us into doing.
2.
However skillfully we handle a unilateral suspension, the Communists will unquestionably exploit the action in their propaganda as a unilateral breaking off of negotiations by the UNC, UNC unwillingness to negotiate in the face of Communist willingness to continue the talks, UNC unwillingness to face the “facts” concerning the screening of prisoners of war as exposed by the DoddColson incident; and, in general, heavily exploit the action to the propaganda disadvantage of the UNC, particularly among wavering opinion which has no clear-cut conception of the issues involved.
3.
There appears to be little or no domestic pressure for suspension of the talks.
4.
There will be strong international opposition to the suspension of the talks even among our key Allies. All personnel in the Department concerned with public relations and our overseas information program are of the opinion that unilateral suspension by the UNC at this time will operate to our strong propaganda disadvantage in international public opinion.
5.
Unilateral suspension at this time will, with the obvious deadlock created thereby, probably enable the Soviet Union to attract considerable support for moving the negotiations in some way to the Security Council during the month of June while Malik is president of the Security Council.
6.
Because of the great confusion created by the DoddColson incident and other information regarding conditions in POW camps that is gradually coming out, the Soviets are now in a position to exploit to the maximum doubts regarding our stand on the POW issue.

[Page 222]

The release of the Dodd report together with some disciplinary action against Dodd and Colson 2 can by no means wholly correct this situation. It will merely mean that the officer who was in charge of the screening upon which our present stand on POWs is based has been shown to be incompetent. In time the suspicion will inevitably arise that if the pro-Communist camps were out of control and were able with impunity to terrorize anti-Communist prisoners in our midst, the same situation might well have existed in the anti-Communist camps, and that therefore the results of the screening may well lack validity. While our proposal of impartial rescreening following an armistice is a logical answer to such charges, there will be an increasing suspicion among reluctant adherents to our position that an entirely objective screening by competent personnel might have produced results sufficiently different to have obtained Communist agreement to an armistice. We can expect that in time the figure of 100,000 mentioned in the conversation between Madame Pandit and Chou En-lai 3 will become known, as well as the figure of 83,0004 which the UNC apparently even now would be able to return.

As an example, whereas the UK Government had complete Parliamentary support for its stand with us on the POW issue prior to the DoddColson incident, since that time there have been increasing questions and evident doubts. Yesterday the UK Embassy informed me of a message from Eden 5 expressing his great concern over this development and strongly urging that a rescreening of the prisoners be carried out in order to restore confidence in our position.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that our present position is entirely reasonable and logical, I am completely convinced that there is so much confusion on the subject that only a bold and clear-cut move on our part can restore domestic and international confidence in our position [Page 223] and assure the maximum of international support if an armistice is not obtained.

As I see it, the action to be taken must be either a clear-cut offer in the armistice negotiations to carry out an impartial rescreening of the prisoners with Communist observation prior to the armistice conditioned upon Communist agreement to abide by the results, or an international rescreening, preferably with some Asian participation, in such a manner that there would be maximum confidence in the results.

I believe that apart from all other considerations the US Government in its own interest should, in the absence of any rescreening, conduct a thorough investigation, possibly with the participation of some of our Allies, into the previous screening carried out under the supervision of General Dodd. This issue is too vital to the future of our country to permit considerations of the amour propre of the Army to stand in the way of doing what is required by the circumstances. We should not lose sight of the basic fact that, however logical our present position may be, the issue of peace in Korea or possibly greatly enlarged hostilities for ourselves and our Allies does in a large degree hang upon our acceptance of the results of a highly complex and delicate operation carried out by an officer whose competence in related matters has since been brought into serious question.

If you concur I strongly suggest that if at all possible we thoroughly discuss this matter with the Secretary, prior to his departure.6

  1. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Bohlen, Allison, Nitze, Hickerson, and Sargeant.
  2. At Clark’s recommendation, Dodd and Colson were reduced in grade to colonel (Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 48). On May 22, Clark sent the JCS a proposed text of a narrative account for release in Tokyo of the series of violent incidents in the prisoner of war camps leading up to and including the Dodd seizure. Clark requested JCS concurrence with its release or comments upon it; Clark to JCS, CX 68845, May 22, 1952, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 63).

    Clark’s report on the Koje-do incident, presumably the “Dodd Report”, reached Washington on the morning of May 23, 1952. It was not released to the press, but Secretary of the Army Pace released the text of a letter of that date to Senator Richard B. Russell, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, constituting the Army’s report on the Koje-do incident and the disciplinary action taken against Dodd and Colson. Secretary Pace and Army Chief of Staff Collins met in closed session with the members of the Committee for 2½ hours on May 23, 1952. (New York Times, May 24, 1952, p. 1)

  3. For a report of this conversation, see telegram 4282 from New Delhi, May 17, p. 206.
  4. The figure of 83,000 was obtained by adding the number of prisoners and civilian internees screened who stated their wish to return and the number of personnel at Kojedo who refused screening. For the exact figures, see Clark to JCS, telegram CX 68567, May 16, p. 204.
  5. The message under reference was reported in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).
  6. See footnote 1, p. 227.

    A note typed at the bottom of the source text read as follows: “This was dictated prior to knowing of the results of the meeting with the Secretary this morning, but is distributed as a possible basis for the paper which the Secretary desires to have for discussion with the President.” For a report of the meeting with the Secretary of State, see infra .