Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75
Notes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, May 22, 1952, 9:30 a.m.1
Korean Military Situation
1. Mr. Armstrong stated that there was nothing to report on the Korean military situation.
Communist Propaganda Activities
2. Mr. Harvey2 reported that the Communists continue to concentrate their propaganda efforts on the Koje incident.3 They are using this [Page 224] incident to support their claims of atrocities and our use of germ warfare. However, there is no indication that the situation in Korea is about to collapse.
[Here follows a brief report on Communist propaganda activity with respect to Germany.]
Korean Truce Negotiations
4. Mr. Sargeant stated that he felt the Chinese Communists were making every effort to force us to break off truce negotiations. He pointed out that the American public is becoming impatient with the negotiations. We have indicated that we are prepared to talk further, but the Communists have seized upon the Koje incident and have played it in such a way that we are in a bad propaganda position. Mr. Sargeant stated that he had polled the public affairs officers in the Department, and they have agreed with him that we would lose, propaganda-wise, if the truce negotiations were suspended in the foreseeable future. The Communists would make every effort to convince the peoples around the world that we broke off the negotiations. Mr. Sargeant stated that public opinion is bringing pressures to bear on the Government for a break-off of negotiations but, from a propaganda point of view, yielding to this pressure would be unfortunate. We must first gain the initiative and make it very clear that we have explored all means for a settlement. In any event, we should not break off negotiations before July, if this is possible from a policy point of view.
5. Mr. Allison stated that Mr. Sargeant’s views should be given very serious consideration. Our Allies in Korea are against a break-off. Mr. Eden would like a rescreening of the POW’s by neutral countries.4 There are many arguments against Mr. Eden’s suggestions, but we might have to yield to them. We could propose this rescreening process with the understanding that the Communists would accept the results, which, of course, they would not do. Mr. Allison stated that Mr. Hume Wrong is concerned about the possibility of a break-off and feels that we should rescreen the prisoners.5 He suggested that the International Red Cross be utilized in this respect. Mr. Allison suggested that we consider a panel of countries such as India, Sweden and Switzerland, and let them rescreen through a unilateral proposal which we would make. This action would suspend the negotiations for a while. Mr. Allison agreed that we needed a new ingredient in the present situation if we could expect to announce effectively suspension of the talks.
6. The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Lovett had previously objected to efforts along this line because he felt it might appear that we are [Page 225] breaking our position under Communist pressure. However, the Secretary felt that Mr. Lovett might go along with this new approach if a statement were carefully prepared and studied by him. Mr. Bohlen asked why the International Red Cross could not be utilized rather than a group of neutral countries. Mr. Hickerson explained that the International Red Cross would not agree to rescreen the prisoners unless the Communists agreed to this proposal. The Secretary felt that we could not continue the talks as they were going at the present time and some new element had to be added. Mr. Bohlen stated that we have never had and probably never would have, a good moment to break off negotiations. He felt that there was a danger in our position if we were afraid to break off negotiations. He suggested that we should arrange for a recess with a definite time limit to reconvene and reject the Communist position that we are breaking off negotiations. Mr. Allison emphasized that many doubts have been raised because of the Koje incident. Mr. Bohlen felt that this rescreening process would be a good effort and would provide us with an opportunity to suspend talks for a while.
7. The Secretary felt that there were two basic problems which must be kept separate. First, we must give consideration to the problem of whether breaking off or postponing negotiations is an impossible approach. He agreed that it was not impossible to take this line. The second problem is how to correct our position on the POW repatriation issue, which has been undermined by the recent series of events. The Secretary felt that this situation must be corrected as soon as possible. Mr. Jessup suggested that if we adopt the position that the prisoners should be rescreened by a neutral commission, he thought it would be to our advantage that these countries be solicited by a neutral, such as the Secretary General of the UN. Mr. Hickerson felt that this would be possible to arrange.
8. Mr. Bohlen stated that this problem was discussed generally with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about ten days ago.6 Mr. Matthews added that in discussions with the Joint Chiefs, they felt that the propaganda problem involved in the prisoner of war issue is an important one, but is not one for the exclusive attention of the Joint Chiefs. The Chiefs suggested that an ad hoc committee be appointed to study this problem and General Balmer has been selected to represent the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Johnson will represent the State Department. This group will meet today.
9. In conclusion, the Secretary urged that Mr. Hickerson and others make every effort to get a position on this problem. He indicated further that he might discuss this matter with the President today.
[Here follows discussion of matters other than Korea.]
- The Secretary of State chaired this large staff meeting, at which 23 other Department officials were present, including Allison, Armstrong, Bohlen, Hickerson, Jessup, Matthews, McFall, Miller, Riddleberger, Sargeant, and Thorp. This document was circulated as SMN–34.↩
- Mose L. Harvey, Chief of the Division of Research for the USSR and Eastern Europe.↩
- For information on the Koje-do incident, see footnote 2, p. 195.↩
- Eden’s request was reported in a memorandum of conversation, by Johnson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).↩
- Wrong’s concern was reported in a memorandum of conversation, by Hickerson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).↩
- The question of rescreening by a commission of neutral nations was discussed at a Department of State-JCS meeting of May 14; see p. 196.↩