795.00/5–3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

CX 68858. Re JCS 909104.1

[Page 220]
1.
In view of ref msg, the procedure contemplated in para 5, our CX 685672 is being held in abeyance. We recognize the advantages of complete screening as a device that fully substantiates our position on refusing to use force to return any POW or CI to Communist control, and the desirability of this position from a public relations point of view. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of individuals in the unscreened compounds who might be waiting for an opportunity to escape from the violent control of the Communist leaders. The small number of POWs to date who have turned in as a result of the announcement made to POWs, contained in para 2, CX 68567, it is believed, does not approach the number who would forcibly oppose repatriation.
2.
In the light of recent developments at Koje-Do, particularly the action contemplated to gain complete and uncontested control as approved by you in JCS 909231,3 it is possible that, after uncontested control has been secured and the population of compounds reduced to a manageable size, screening can be conducted without difficulty. Should such a situation develop we could adopt a satisfactory screening procedure that would give us our final figure and rosters. What effect this delay will have on negotiations is difficult to assess, but it appears to be unavoidable if individual screening is to be completed without force.
3.
I am concerned over the publicity aspects of the screening program to date. Most of the details of the method, the procedures, and the objectivity are well known to the press here. The failure to screen a large number of POWs, other than by an announcement, and the reason for not doing so at this time are understood by the press. If we should attempt to justify the announcement of 13 May (as reported in para 2, CX 68567) as a true screening, our stand on no forced repatriation may be compromised. In view of the publicity that has already been given on the current situation at Koje-Do, the introduction of additional US troops, and the emphasis being placed on control measures, I feel that a press release on the question of further screening is neither necessary nor desirable at this time.
4.
Once full control has been established, I will be able to make a firm recommendation on the feasibility of screening those compounds which to date have not been screened.
  1. Dated May 17, p. 208.
  2. Dated May 16, p. 204.
  3. Dated May 19, p. 210.