Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting ¹

top secret

Washington , May 21, 1952—11 a.m.

Prison Camp Incidents

General Collins: The report on the incidents in the camp in Koje will be arriving by courier. We have a summary from Clark. Action will have to be taken by the Army and the press release will come from the Secretary of Defense’s office.

Mr. Matthews: We were not raising any question as to the responsibility for dealing with the officers. That is certainly the Army’s responsibility.

General Collins: If the Secretary of Defense takes the recommendation I will make as to the statement on this matter, we can get our people to work on it right away. The Secretary of Defense will probably show you the release.

Mr. Sargeant: I talked with the Defense people yesterday about the questions that are likely to be addressed to General Ridgway while he is here in Washington. I have given Clayton Fritchey the information we have picked up in domestic and foreign press reports.

The kind of thing we have spotted is a need for more positive information that will carry the ring of credibility with respect to our good treatment of the prisoners. So far the information has been largely negative.

Second, I gather from the queries we have had that there is a question of a Congressional inquiry and the possibility of resolutions, et cetera. There may be a need of a comprehensive report of how the Commies treat their POWs.

Third, I am happy that the negotiators are beginning to do more and more about propaganda in Panmunjom. I think they should concentrate on a few points—the impartial screening, the desperate attempts to obscure the results of the UN screening and their vulnerability on the Geneva Convention. We must stick to simple points and brief the U.S. press.

General Collins: This raises the question of whether the machinery we now have is adequate. This isn’t really the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs who are only supposed to give strategic guidance. We should not really give propaganda and press guidance.

I have set up such an agency in the Army. I don’t think the JCS should be in on it.

Admiral Fechteler: I agree 100 percent.

General Collins: We have responsibilities as the individual Chiefs of services, but these matters really don’t fall on the JCS. The coordination should be between the Secretary of Defense and the State Department.

Mr. Johnson: Is there a channel from the Secretary of Defense to the field?

General Collins: The JCS can transmit messages but we do not have to assume responsibility for all of them. Many of the things we send out are Government decisions.

Admiral Fechteler: You can go back even earlier. The Joint Chiefs individually have never agreed on the principle of no forcible repatriation. I know I haven’t and I don’t think Van [Vandenberg] has either.

Mr. Matthews: I know you have never agreed, but at the White House meeting² Van did not press the point.

General Collins: I don’t think that is an issue here now. I was raising the question of propaganda and psychological warfare guidance.

Continuation of Meetings in Panmunjom

Mr. Matthews: I gather we will soon have a question of whether we will go on with the meetings in Panmunjom.

General Collins: That is a matter we should take up here.

Mr. Pace is getting in this morning. I am prepared to give him a recommendation on what should be done with respect to the Koje-do incident. When we advise Clark of the action to take, we think he should make a statement. Clark had planned by this time to go to Korea and talk to Van Fleet but he is now going to wait for our advice.

I believe Ridgway had sided with Joy in feeling we should say we should have no more meetings until the Communists have something to say about the package proposal.

Mr. Matthews: We thought last week wasn’t a very good time to break off the meetings, but I gather the question is coming up again.

General Collins: Clark hasn’t come in with anything new, so all we have is Ridgway’s recommendation.³

Mr. Hickerson: It may be useful to lay some considerations on the table. Our Allies may well feel that if we terminate the meetings we are really issuing an ultimatum. Also, you will recall that the Australians proposed we have an impartial screening prior to an armistice.⁴ We talked about a different twist on that last week in the form of a proposal to let the Commies see that there was no forcible retention.⁵ By that means you would avoid a re-screening.

Mr. Matthews: It’s a 90 percent chance the Commies would turn it down. If they did not, I can see some difficulties.

General Collins: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: We were also wondering whether you could taper off in the meetings.

Mr. Nitze: It seems to me that any statement to the effect that we are not going to talk is very important.

General Collins: I would suggest that State frame such a statement and then discuss it with the Secretary of Defense. This really isn’t a JCS matter.

Mr. Matthews: Do you mean the statement? I take it you do feel the question of continuing the meetings is a matter for JCS consideration?

General Collins: Well, it is really a question for the Government.

Mr. Hickerson: Yes, it is partially a JCS responsibility.

There may also be room for seeing whether there is anything you can do without an armistice—maybe an exchange of the wounded. There are indications both ways on whether the Commies want an armistice. There are some indications from the Indians⁶ that they do but the Indians aren’t too reliable.

General Collins: The Commies would tell the Indians that anyway.

Mr. Matthews: I think this is something you can’t proceed far on now. You have not had Clark’s recommendation.

General Collins: I’d like to tell Brad [Bradley] that this public relations thing ought to be held on another level. The other Chiefs I think agree. I think we ought to set up some other form of organization—maybe an ad hoc organization.

Mr. Matthews: It is important there should be a channel.

Mr. Johnson: We would welcome a channel on these matters.

General Collins: We will try to discuss it with the Secretary of Defense today. What would be your view on a proper channel? Would you favor some group?

Mr. Matthews: I think so, at least while this thing is so hot.

General Collins: I think it would be advisable. Someone like Frank Nash and maybe Fritchey and the State representatives, and maybe a representative of Dr. Allen’s PSB.

Mr. Matthews: You are in touch with Fritchey, aren’t you Howland?

Mr. Sargeant: Yes, daily.

Mr. Nitze: I think this is basically a substantive matter with psychological overtones. It must be handled as a matter of policy between the Secretary of Defense and the State Department and appropriate representatives from the JCS. This thing will have many repercussions for you.

[Here follows a short discussion of the inadvisability of the Washington-based NATO Standing Group joining the Mediterranean Command and the Middle East question.]

Course of Action in Korea

Mr. Johnson: There is some feeling on our part that NSC 118/2⁷ as now formulated does not adequately deal with the possible future eventualities in Korea.

Admiral Wooldridge: The NSC put it back in the Senior Staff and I understand the thing is remaining dormant. I understood we were waiting for something further from State. It went up to the Council as a split paper.

Mr. Bohlen: There was only a split on one point.

Admiral Wooldridge: The Senior Staff was to await a study on naval blockade.

Mr. Bohlen: That has just been completed. I understand the Council approved all of the paper but the one point of disagreement on naval blockade.

Mr. Gleason: That is correct.

Mr. Bohlen: What Johnny is talking about relates to situations that are not fully covered in the paper. What is not covered is the situation of just having the thing peter out in Korea. We are covered if the enemy attacks or builds up an air offensive. I don’t know what you can say about the petering out because I understand we have no military plans to initiate an offensive.

General Collins: If there were any change in the Government objective we would have something to work on. If the objective is to maintain the status quo we would just maintain it. If the objective is to change the situation, it ought to be raised in the NSC.

Mr. Nitze: It is clear that it would be desirable to get our troops out of Korea, so we ought to explore the possibility of finding ways of doing this.

Mr. Johnson: There is also the possibility of getting an exchange of prisoners without an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: I don’t understand that point. If you had an exchange of prisoners you would have an armistice. The only thing I see is the possibility of declaring a de facto armistice on our side and threatening the greater sanction if they do anything to us.

Mr. Nitze: There aren’t many alternatives.

Mr. Bohlen: That’s right. It’s because of the situation.

General Collins: If we announced an armistice unilaterally we would have to stop bombing. That is impossible.

Mr. Bohlen: Exactly. That is the difficulty.

Mr. Nitze: It isn’t quite as simple as that. If you were able to get your troops out then you might stop the bombing.

General Collins: While the training of South Koreans is moving ahead, if we pull out the morale would be terrible and Syngman Rhee would blow up.

Mr. Nitze: You would have to go on bombing while you get your troops out.

General Collins: But suppose Rhee says that if we pull out they will go off on their own?

Mr. Nitze: There is a real problem, but I think we ought to go around the problem again. Staying forever in Korea has disadvantages. Taking wider action does also. So you have to weigh these things.

Mr. Johnson: You have Rhee’s request for a security guarantee. If you want to withdraw, such guarantee might ease the problem.

General Collins: Frankly, I don’t see any immediate hope of withdrawing forces.

Mr. Nitze: Looking six months or a year ahead, there may be possibilities. I agree there are no immediate prospects.

General Collins: We might get a division back to Japan. We ought to examine the possibility of getting other forces in.

Mr. Hickerson: There are some possibilities—perhaps a division from Brazil, maybe some from Pakistan and a battalion from Israel.

General Collins: At what cost?

Mr. Hickerson: Well, the cost would be considerable. We might even get some Indians. Maybe that is going too far, Doc. Mr. Matthews: That’s too far for me.

General Collins: Our bargaining position would be immediately weakened if we unilaterally pulled our troops out.

Mr. Nitze: Oh, of course.

General Collins: We are going ahead with the training of South Koreans. From an equipment standpoint, Ridgway feels, and I agree, that until you get the Japanese police forces developed you should not increase the number of South Koreans to be trained. When the Japs can take over the responsibility for the security of Japan I would recommend pulling our two divisions out of Japan. We always get back to the problem of equipment.

Mr. Nitze: Domestic production looks somewhat better now.

General Collins: Yes, if this House limitation on expenditures does not stick. It appears that the Senate will knock it out.

As to what we do if the armistice negotiations collapse, I thought aside from the NSC, Mr. Lovett had said at the Armed Forces Policy Council⁸ meetings that he would like a review.

General Cabell: The JSPC is studying that.

General Collins: Can’t we give them a deadline for the study from the military point of view?

Mr. Matthews: That would be very helpful.

General Collins: I should think we could get something in ten days or maybe a week. I think the State Department should do a somewhat similar thing. Then, Slim [Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge], if the NSC Senior Staff can take prompt action on the blockade issue we would be pretty far along.

Admiral Wooldridge: Yes, we ought to take a careful look at the paper.

General Collins: I think the NSC should go ahead with its consideration.

Mr. Bohlen: I take it you mean on the point where the views were split.

Admiral Wooldridge: I think we should consider all of it. I don’t think the Council approved the paper; I think it was left in suspense.

Mr. Bohlen: When we get what you are doing and what we are doing you will have a basis for consideration.

General Cabell: Our difficulty in the JSPC is that we don’t know what the stated ends are that we want to accomplish. The JSPC normally makes plans to achieve stated ends.

Mr. Nitze: You can’t have much judgment about national policy until you know what you can do.

Admiral Fechteler: From the military point of view the only thing that makes sense is to put enough in to beat hell out of the Commies. We did it once.

General Collins: At West Point the President seemed to indicate that we had achieved our objective.⁹ If that is the position, the military will say we can hold where we are.

Mr. Hickerson: There are two objectives—to repel the aggression and restore peace and security in the area. We have done the first but not the second. The problem is where you get the forces.

General Collins: We can just sit.

Admiral Fechteler: We can do more than that.

General Collins: We can do more if the restrictions don’t apply. If the decision is to drive the Commies out you would need very large forces. To have a JSPC estimate they would have to take two or three assumptions. One would be driving the Commies out, another would be maintaining the status quo.

General Bolte: They have such a working paper in draft.

General Cabell: There could be a third assumption—the forces necessary to apply pressure for an armistice but not enough to drive them out.

General Collins: An economic and naval blockade might be enough of a squeeze to get an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: In other words, you can use the greater sanction to get an armistice rather than only if you don’t get one.

General Collins: What about the CIA estimate on a blockade?¹⁰

Mr. Nitze: We have received that. (Mr. Nitze then summarized the contents of the estimate.)

General Collins: We have already explored those things pretty thoroughly in the Southeast Asia paper.¹¹

1. A note on the title page read: “State draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the Chiefs of Staff, General Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended; Vice Chiefs General Twining and Admiral Duncan also participated. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense and Gleason represented the National Security Council. In all 21 persons attended.

2. Presumably the reference is to the meeting at the White House on Feb. 27, 1952; for a report of the discussion at that meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, Feb. 27, p. 68.
3. Clark did, however, concur with the view of Joy that the negotiations at Panmunjom should be unilaterally suspended until the Communists accepted the “package proposal”; see footnote 3, p. 194.
4. This proposal was reported in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 3, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–352).
5. See the memorandum of discussion, May 14, p. 196.
6. The indications under reference are described in telegram 4282 from New Delhi, May 17, p. 206.
7. For text of NSC 118/2, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382.
8. The Council was comprised of the Secretary of Defense, as chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations. It advised the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.
9. The reference was to Truman’s statements on Korea in his “Address at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the United States Military Academy,” May 20, 1952. For a text of this address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953, pp. 348–353.
10. The reference was to SE-27, entitled “Probable Effects of Various Courses of Action With Respect to Communist China,” completed on June 5, 1952, which set out to analyze, among other things, the effectiveness of a naval blockade of the People’s Republic of China. The conclusion of the paper was that while this blockade would subject the People’s Republic of China to considerable economic strain, there would be no significant reduction in China’s military capabilities or in the stability of the regime. For text of this intelligence paper, see volume xiv .
11. The reference was to NSC 124, Feb. 13, 1952; for text, see volume xii, Part 1.