795.00/5–2152: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State
priority
188. Personal for Secretary, eyes only. Since arrival here I have become acutely aware of the impasse in truce talks at Panmunjom and the general effect in this area which seems obviously adverse to our best interests. Clark and I have had several informal talks1 about the position and the growing conviction of many here that the mechanical continuance of the daily sessions is a serious tactical error. I share that opinion knowing that there are important reasons which require US to demonstrate every willingness to terminate Korean affair by negotiation if possible.
This question is outside my official jurisdiction but perhaps you would not find it amiss if I mention to you personally my opinion. It would seem evident that some flexibility of maneuver in UN approach is urgently necessary. This could take the form of adjournment of daily meetings until Commies state readiness to talk substantively, or at least of finding pretext for UN reps not attending meetings at caprice our opponents. We should create doubt in adversaries’ minds that we are under compulsion to submit to their daily vituperation.
Our present method savors of the mechanical regulatory of Goering’s air attacks on London in September 1940 which always followed the same pattern and which resulted in a small number of Spitfires destroying most of the German bomber force.
I know it is superficial for me, at this early date, to describe sentiment in this area but from what little I have learned thus far the lengthy monotony of our tactics in these negots does not enhance our prestige in Japan or strengthen our position. The effect in Japan seems to be a certain contemptuous ridicule in our regard and a sentiment that we must be very weak indeed to submit to enemy’s tactics according to his choosing. It is of course difficult for Japs to understand why powerful UN nations, especially US, which defeated Jap should be at a standstill in an area where Japs succeeded in dominating situation single handed over so many years.
[Page 213]I believe that we should cancel and postpone meetings from time to time perhaps on ground that further study of certain phases is required, or that we are not convinced Commies are in earnest, or that they are clearly not prepared to negotiate in good faith.
- For Murphy’s personal account of these discussions, see his Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 432.↩