Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.93/10–2954

No. 369
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)

top secret

Washington, 29 October 1954.

Comments by Admiral Arthur Radford, U.S. Navy, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Report by the Secretary of State on U.S. Policies in Relation to China.

1. In submitting my comments on the State Department paper on the Far East which was distributed at the meeting of the NSC held on 28 October 1954,¹ I am particularly conscious of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff act as military advisers on matters of U.S. national policy. In other words, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a duty to advise on U.S. national policy or on changes in U.S. national policy when in their opinion such policies have a military implication which is related to the military security of the United States.

2. The current basic national security policy as expressed in NSC 162/2 contains in paragraph 44 the following:

“44. a. Measures to impose pressures on the Soviet bloc should take into account the desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated settlements.

b. Accordingly, the United States should take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair Soviet relations with Communist China, complicate control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.”

I feel that broadly speaking the State Department draft on Far Eastern policy will bring about a change in the above quoted national policy.

3. No one could take exception to a literal interpretation of the statement made in paragraph 2 on page 1 of the State Department paper, but it would appear that this paragraph if taken without further explanation is in reality a change in our national policy vis-à-vis the Communist threat.

4. In regard to the readjustment of national policies recommended on pages 4 to 7 of the basic paper, my comments are as follows:

a. On the negotiation of a Mutual Security Treaty with the Chinese Nationalists. It is my opinion that there are many pros and cons to this question, but if the Chinese Nationalists prefer a Mutual Security Treaty to the present rather indefinite status, I would recommend that one be negotiated.

b. I assume that the conditions outlined in paragraph 2 on page 5 would be generally accepted by the Chinese Nationalists.

c. In regard to paragraph 3 on page 6, I feel that the action in the United Nations Security Council outlined herein should be undertaken only if such action is agreeable to the Chinese Nationalists and my reasoning in this instance stems from the fact that a disagreement with the Chinese Nationalists on this procedure might have serious effects on the status of Formosa and the U.S. position in the Far East generally. In other words, unless the Chinese Nationalists whole-heartedly agreed to this procedure we would be faced with the possibility of discussions in the U.N. which would indicate to the world at large a basic disagreement with the Chinese Nationalists of such magnitude as to seriously and further jeopardize the standing of the Chinese Nationalist regime before the rest of the world. If on the other hand, the National Security Council action proposed in this paragraph has as its ultimate aim the creation of a situation which will lay the groundwork for U.N. acceptance of U.S. or allied assistance to the Nationalist Chinese in holding the offshore islands, (as I understood this action was originally designed to do) then I would favor it. The last sentence in this paragraph seems to negate the President’s statement in January 1953 in regard to the deneutralization of Formosa and certainly might be difficult to explain publicly.

5. In conclusion, I feel that the State Department paper on Far East policies which is the subject of these comments in reality involves grave and basic changes in our overall national policies vis-à-vis not only Communist China but the whole Communist bloc. If it is adopted as national policy, the military implications will be serious, particularly in the Far East. It is my opinion that we are laying the groundwork for the ultimate loss to Communism of our present allies in Formosa and of course the loss of that island as a link in our present security chain. Such a loss would be extremely serious from a military point of view. Our base in Okinawa would be outflanked and the Philippines would again be jeopardized by enemy strength on the island of Formosa.

6. The implications in the last part of the paper of a further relaxation of the trade embargo against Communist China are also serious from a military point of view. The build up of Chinese industrial strength, which is possible if the embargo is relaxed, is extremely serious. We should not lose sight of the fact that Japan would ultimately do a great deal of business with Communist China, and would inevitably be involved in closer relations with the Communist interests in the Far East. Any United States policy which involves the risk of loss of Japan to Communism, (I think this paper lays the groundwork for such a situation in the future), is so inimical to U.S. interests in the Far East that it should receive most careful consideration. Japan is the real prize in the Far East for which the Communists are reaching. Should they obtain Japan, the United States would have little prospect or ability to hold any military position of strength in that part of the world.

7. In two places this paper indicates that the Chinese Nationalists might hold the offshore islands without U.S. military support. Attention is invited to the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have unanimously agreed that the Chinese Nationalists could not hold the offshore islands without U.S. military support. Limiting U.S. support to matériel support is tantamount to setting the stage for the loss of those islands.

1. Document 365.