611.93/10–2954
No. 370
Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
United States Policies in Relation to China (Chinats and Chicoms)
References:
- a. J.C.S. 1992/382
- b. J.C.S. 2101/110
- c. J.C.S. 2118/611
- 1.
- The comments contained in the following paragraphs are based upon a brief examination of the paper read by the Secretary of State at the NSC meeting on 28 October 1954.
- 2.
- Current U.S. policy applicable to Communist China and the
Soviet bloc in general provides, in part, that the U.S.:
“Undertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist control over any areas of the free world/’ (Subparagraph 43. c., NSC 162/2)…2
“… take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair Soviet relations with Communist China, complicate control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.” (Subparagraph 44. b., NSC 162/2)…
[Page 820]“… seek, by means short of war to reduce the relative power position of Communist China in Asia.” (Paragraph 4, NSC 166/1) …
- 3.
- As a general observation, it is considered that the proposals in the State paper are not in consonance with the foregoing provisions and if adopted would, in effect, fundamentally alter current U.S. policy.
- 4.
- Consummation of a security treaty in conjunction with the other actions proposed in the paper would, in effect, terminate the role of the ChiNats as a counter-revolutionary force. It would serve to restrict ChiNat military action solely to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and would remove from its forces any incentive deriving from the hope of a return to the mainland.
- 5.
- By limiting the application of the defense arrangements to the territory of Formosa and the Pescadores, there would be a strong implication that the ChiNat Government has no residual responsibility or authority with respect to the mainland—a tacit admission that the ChiNats could no longer lay claim to being the legitimate government of all China. This in turn could be construed as an acknowledgment that the Chinese Communist Government is the legitimate government of mainland China.
- 6.
- It is doubtful that any treaty embodying restrictions which would in effect deny the possibility of return to the Chinese mainland would be acceptable to the ChiNat Government.
- 7.
- If the paper is intended to be the submission of the Secretary of State pursuant to NSC action taken at the meeting on 18 August 1954, regarding NSC 5429/1, it is considered that it fails to provide the broad basis of an over-all policy with respect to Communist China or Formosa. Particularly lacking is any statement of objectives, either long or short range, which could serve as a guide in the application of the courses of action recommended.