Office of the Historian

Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, Miscellaneous Series, “Conferences on Formosa”

No. 368
Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President

top secret
Washington, October 29, 1954—3:30 p.m.

Present:

  • The Secretary of State
  • The Under Secretary of Defense
  • Assistant Secretary Robertson
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur
  • Mr. Robert Bowie
  • Admiral Radford
  • General Ridgway
  • General White
  • Admiral Duncan
  • General Shepherd
  • Colonel Goodpaster

1. Mr. Dulles stated the meeting’s purpose was to hear views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the proposals for a security treaty with Formosa and for a UN resolution regarding off-shore islands. He started with a full chronological account and explanation of the development of these two proposals, including his initial discussions with the President in Denver, Secretary Robertson’s conferences with the Generalissimo, Mr. Dulles’ discussions with New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and extending to the present status of action. He stressed the need for a legal basis in treaty form to support any U.S. military action to defend Formosa, and cited the advantages of UN action with respect to the off-shore islands. Mr. Robertson indicated that while the Generalissimo’s attitude during the conferences ended as one of reluctant, tentative concurrence, there are signs that he is becoming increasingly opposed to the proposals.

In the discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, main points in substance as follows were raised:

A.
Admiral Radford said the JCS have been using national policy papers as their starting point. Their premise has been that the U.S. would defend Formosa if attacked. If this is untrue, a most serious military situation is indicated, since Formosa is a key link in U.S. military plans and dispositions. The JCS have been basing dispositions on the statements as to vital areas in NSC papers, and if these are not valid, a dangerous situation exists. Mr. Dulles indicated that the reason why treaties are needed is to reduce this uncertainty. In the present case the treaty is to cover the Formosa “gap” in the designation of areas vital to the U.S.
B.
Admiral Radford stated that if it were known that the U.S. would not support the Chinese Nationalists in defending the offshore islands, the Communists could quickly seize them. Mr. Dulles considered that, when the threat first arose, world opinion would have opposed U.S. aid in the defense of the islands, but that by taking the question into the UN we place ourselves in position to reconsider the matter in the event of Chinese Communist defiance without so adverse an impact on world opinion.
C.
Admiral Radford referred to the statement in the memorandum by the Secretary of State circulated at the NSC 28 October meeting,1 that in the event of Communist action in defiance of the proposed UN resolution, the U.S. might then agree to the Chinese Nationals operating from Formosa as a base; there is no mention of the U.S. doing so. Mr. Dulles indicated that this implication was not intended, and that he was in agreement with adding a provision that perhaps the U.S. as well would operate from Formosa as a base in such circumstances.
D.
Admiral Duncan indicated that the actions proposed might remove a significant amount of pressure and doubt from the Chinese Communists as to U.S. intentions and actions in the area. He thought these actions would aid the Chinese Communists materially, and that they might well accept the UN resolution. General White supported Admiral Duncan’s view as to removing Communist uncertainty. Mr. Dulles acknowledged these points, but cited the difficulty of keeping the enemy guessing in view of the policy we have in fact adopted concerning defense of the off-shore islands. He thought it might be better to “cover” this area with the mantle of the United Nations.
E.
Admiral Duncan asked if the treaty could be placed in effect, dropping the resolution. Mr. Dulles stated the area covered could not be defined without making it known that the islands were outside it.
F.
General Shepherd supported Admirals Radford and Duncan and indicated a view that the off-shore islands would probably be quickly lost to the Chinese Communists when they see that the U.S. would not support the Nationalists there.

Secretary Anderson indicated that even though there might be doubt about an adequate legal basis for defense of Formosa, the necessity for the President as Commander-in-Chief to protect the U.S. forces in the Far East, and their supply lines, might impel action if Formosa were attacked.

Secretary Dulles indicated that if Formosa were attacked in the near future, he would support the present orders to the Seventh Fleet, but stated that in proposing the treaty he was thinking of the long pull.

In closing, Secretary Dulles thanked the Joint Chiefs for their views. They had indicated that their views were not final or fully developed, because they had not had the essential information previously. Secretary Dulles agreed to provide copies of the proposals to the Chiefs.2 Certain of the Chiefs left individual memoranda with the Secretary.3 Also left was a statement by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,4 which had not been acted on by the JCS.

A. J. Goodpaster

Colonel CE U S Army
  1. Document 365.↩
  2. Copies of documents pertaining to the proposed UN resolution were sent to Radford with a covering memorandum from Walter K. Scott on Nov. 1; see footnote 3, Document 336.↩
  3. The only such memorandum found in Department of State files is the memorandum infra.↩
  4. Document 370.↩