Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/6–2052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon¹

top secret

Washington, June 20, 1952—9:13 p.m.

2014. For Chief of Mission. Further to Deptel 7404, June 17, re Letourneau talks, fol is summary of subjs covered other than that of additional aid outlined in reftel:

(1) Mil Operations. Let stated two VM divs have been put out of action since Feb fol Hoa Binh withdrawal which was voluntary operation carried out for strategic purposes rather than enforced evacuation. Deliveries under US mil aid program satisfactory in the main since de Lattre conversations last Sep. Details being worked out with Pentagon. Outlook favorable.

(2) Natl Armies. Development of natl armies proceeding favorably if more slowly than originally hoped. To date there are 52 battalions of which 40 are Vietnamese, 6 Cambodian and 6 Laos. Of 52, 21 have practically no Fr officers; limited numbers in others being steadily reduced. Under present training program mil schools are turning out 400 regular and approx 400 reserve (candidate) officers each year. By 1955, when Fr state natl armies development program will have been completed, 1400 regular native officers and 1600 reserves, or total of 3,000 will have been graduated from officer schools. There are now 1549 officers. Total goal for 1955 is 5,000. Thus gap of 400 odd still remaining. Re NCOs, present schools are training 1450 NCOs per annum. At present time there are 5600. As 20,000 are needed by 1955 deficit still exists in present planning. Let stated problem of developing natl armies rests in inability recruit suitable officer candidates rather than in financial or training difficulties as heretofore. He stated present officer training program is maximum which can be carried out under present scale graduation secondary schools in AS. He reported problem in recruiting specialists for armies such as doctors and dentists.

(3) Polit. Let reported that school for training Viet civil servants, to which he attaches great importance in light lack of admin personnel, will be opened in Oct 1952. Claims progress has been eminently satis considering only three years of independence.

(4) New Vietnamese Govt. Let spoke of strength and weakness of Huu govt in terms similar to that reported by Saigon. He felt Huu had made more progress than is usually credited to him. On other hand Tam has great strength and as staunch enemy of Commies cld be expected to further war effort by considerable degree. Let particularly encouraged by Tam‘s declaration intention to estab a natl budget immed. He spoke sparingly of Natl Assembly and seemed uncertain as to desirability but termed it purely Vietnamese problem. He was sure that Tam wld succeed in broadening base his cabinet in due course. Budgetary difficulties in Vietnam were outlined in detail. Fr believes future under Tam holds prospect for improvement.

(5) Bao Dai. Let emphasized strongly that Bao Dai is only strong man in Vietnam other than Ho Chi Minh. He has confidence of great numbers of people and is only man who can consolidate varying opinions. He stated “nothing can be done in Vietnam without Bao Dai“. If the Chief of State has a lesser concept of the responsibilities he holds than we wld desire we must adjust ourselves to this fact and recognize the basic consideration that changes can only be brought about through his authority.

(6) Laos and Cambodia. Polit conditions in Laos were glossed over with only slight comment. Let feels present system of constitutional monarchy is most desirable one; that Laotians are honest, straight-forward people who can be counted on even if they must continue to receive help indefinitely. Be recent cabinet crisis in Cambodia, Let stated it had been expected for some time and that on the whole it was a good thing. He thought that one of their serious problems was that king was uninformed about gen conditions in the country and that democratic party was not strong enough to take action against either the VM or the Cambodian dissidents. He thought situation bore watching but was on the whole not alarming.

(7) Fr Policy Toward IC. Let stated that he believed a mil decision in Vietnam was impossible until an overall settlement was reached. He stated that if a defeat of the VM were in view the Chi Commies wld probably pour in enough additional equipment to keep them going. If the war were one simply between Ho and Bao Dai it wld be quite simple to settle, but it is not that and matters are not in Ho‘s hands. In Let’s opinion Ho had little if any authority in important decisions and knows now that he is a Soviet satellite.

Let statements in this re were reviewed at subsequent sessions when it became more clear that he in no sense meant that there shld be any decrease in the mil effort in IC because of fear that it wld only bring about a comparable increase in Chi Commie intervention, but rather that any settlement of the IC war wld depend upon the overall settlement in the Far East.

Let termed the Fr aim as to protect the independence and freedom of the AS by bringing about a larger responsibility for the states themselves in carrying the burden of battle. That this is being accomplished is demonstrated by the fact that Fr casualties in 1946 were 88% of the total, and indigenous 9%. While in 1951 Fr were 17% and indigenous 52%. It was stated that Fr gains achieved cld only be maintained if strong admin were established within the states themselves.

He spoke of Fr’s role in multipartite boards as based on necessity of maintaining a balance between Laos and Cambodia on one side and Vietnam on the other and in fact between each of the states and the other two.

Re Fr admin Let assured us that once war was over it wld be possible to examine new basis of Fr Union relationship. (Let stated at Press Club lunch that Fr Union is no prison and AS wld in future be free to leave.²) He did not in any sense mean by this that basic accords wld be amended but that increasingly liberal interpretation wld be given them and precise provision of existing agreements such as Pau Accords cld be reexamined and changed at will. He devoted some time to explaining difficulties of dealing with such subjects in Fr and pointed out that Mar 8 agreements were only ones ratified or for that matter submitted to Assembly. Others had not been and cld not be under present circumstances.

In reply to Asst Secy Allison‘s questions re possible modifications he made it clear that Fr wld adhere to ltr of the law for the present but wld not close door to possible future adjustments. In ans to further US questions he explained at some length present jurisdiction of Fr over internal affairs of the three states. With re to preferential commercial status for Fr and three states he stated that Fr interests wld of course be maintained but there was no intention to preclude states carrying on trade with outside world. Trade with Jap was particularly desirable. Assoc States cld freely negot trade agreements with countries of choice.

(8) Pub Relations. US pointed out failure to publicize facts of IC operation in Fr and AS as well as outside world. Let readily agreed to this and gave us assurances of attn to this matter including fact that US participation amounting to nearly one-third of total cost wld be publicized. Let spoke of futility of convincing Asians that they were independent as long as white man remains and danger of underestimating gravity of econ, social and polit problems they face as sovereign people.

(9) Ultimate Solution to IC Question. Let expanded his original point that overall polit settlement in East Asia was only possible solution to IC question. He was not at all pessimistic and believed that strength we are now demonstrating in IC absolute prerequisite to success of eventual negot overall settlement. He did not claim that VM cld be totally eradicated as a mil or guerrilla force but that best that cld be hoped for was that they wld be driven into hills in relatively unproductive areas while some time later Viet admin wld be strong enough to organize such areas freed by Fr Union and later natl army troops. He reiterated de Lattreisms to the effect that only Vietnamese cld pacify natives.

(10) Negot with Ho Chi Minh. In ans to US question Let stated emphatically that negot with Ho was out of question if only on grounds that it wld jeopardize security of Fr Union troops. His presentation in this respect was strong and Dept gained impression that even if an attempt had been made to contact Ho or his representatives (which we seriously doubt) it had failed and that there was no longer any question so far as Fr are concerned of a bilateral peace negot. Let stated that a settlement for IC cld only be envisaged as a part of gen East Asian settlement including Korea. He added furthermore that no negot of any kind wld be initiated without prior notice to US. Let believes that Soviet objective is to obligate the Fr to maintain part of their forces outside of Europe and that if the VM suffered serious defeat Chi wld reinforce them if only to keep the Fr engaged in FE. This was all the more reason why the natl armies remained our prime objective.

(11) Mil Aid. At his conf with officials of Defense on June 16 Let raised three main points. The first was need for increased transport aircraft to enable additional paratroop operations to be made. He specifically requested C-119 type planes. Defense responded to the effect that they did not recommend that type for use in IC because of the greatly increased demands they wld create for maintenance and flying crews. The question wld be further studied by technicians of both sides. Secondly, Let stated that there was a requirement for jet airplanes in IC, particularly in the event of an invasion. In the absence of an invasion need less urgent, but since time wld not permit them to be sent after an invasion were launched and serve a useful purpose they shld be on hand pending such an eventuality. Defense responded that jet planes were on the FY 53 program. The third point concerned the supply of spare parts. Let stated that many vehicles and planes were unable to operate due to the lack of a few critical spare parts. Defense responded that almost all of the spares were now being shipped and that the situation shld be eased thereby.

Defense summarized the end-item program deliveries and Let expressed satisfaction with the timing and contents of the expected deliveries. Prior mtgs at the staff level resulted in an exchange of info which left little for discussion by Let at this conf.

Summary of entire conversations being pouched.

Acheson

1. Drafted by William M. Gibson of PSA. Transmitted by air to Paris and London for information.
2. Reference is to an address delivered by Letourneau before the Overseas Press Club in Washington on June 17.