740.5/4–2254: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State1
niact
Dulte 2. Eyes only for the President, Acting Secretary, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford. Ambassador Dillon and I have just finished a conversation with Bidault on EDC and Indochina. Bidault was alone except that General Ely was present during part of the conversation regarding Indochina.
[Here follows a summary of discussion regarding the European Defense Community.]
Regarding Indochina, Bidault said he had just spoken with Laniel and had suggested that Laniel might wish to see me. However, Laniel had preferred that Bidault represent him in this matter. Bidault expressed the opinion, which Ely confirmed, that the situation in Dien Bien Phu was now virtually hopeless. He stated that situation was complicated by disagreements and recriminations as between the generals. Ely expressed the view that break out was impracticable, involving abandonment of wounded and equipment. Bidault and Ely suggested that nothing could save the situation except perhaps “massive” air intervention which the US would have to supply. I said our information was that there were already more planes there than could be handled by crews and technicians, but Ely denied this situation was as bad as I seemed to think. Bidault suggested there should be emergency consultation between Navarre and US military commanders on spot, and indicated that while he had been opposed to internationalizing the war, he would favor it now with US if it would save Dien Bien Phu. He recalled that I had said that I thought US participation was impracticable without UK participation, but Bidault said this would not amount to much anyway and urged that our government should give the most serious consideration to armed intervention promptly as the only way to save the situation.
Ely left at the conclusion of this phase of the conversation, which then turned to organization of defense coalition. Bidault indicated that if Dien Bien Phu fell, he doubted whether there would be any French interest in this. I urged that this was essential to give some cards to work with at Geneva so as to have a chance of obtaining acceptable peace. However, if Dien Bien Phu fell, Bidault doubted that coalition would be looked upon by French nation as designed to accomplish [Page 1362] peace at Geneva but rather as designed to keep France in the fighting in southeast Asia. His impression was that if Dien Bien Phu fell, the French would want to pull out entirely from southeast Asia, and assume no continuing commitments and the rest of us would have to get along without France in this area.
My comments and evaluation will follow.
- Secretary Dulles was in Paris from Apr. 21–24, meeting with French and British officials regarding Indochina and the impending Geneva Conference. He also participated in a one-day meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Apr. 23, and engaged in conversations on the question of the European Defense Community. For documentation on the discussions held with respect to EDC, see volume v.↩