Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/4–2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, April 21, 1954—5 p.m.

3986. Repeated information Saigon 462. Limit distribution. Following is summary paper on military situation Indochina given Embassy to read April 20 by Jacquet:¹

Although on March 1, French command Indochina retained freedom of action, in containing peripheral initiatives Viet Minh, necessary to acknowledge (a) deterioration (pourissement) in Tonkin delta where French Union forces cannot oppose Viet Minh control over greater part delta; (b) deterioration (pourissement) in Kontum and Pleiku plateau regions; and (c) worsening in general situation Cochin China due political rivalries between confessional sects and Vietnamese Government. In view proximity rains making large-scale maneuvers impossible and Geneva conference, Viet Minh has directed ¾ its battle corps (i.e., 40 its best battalions and almost all its artillery division) against Dien Bien Phu with view regaining freedom action for its battle corps by elimination French Union forces there.

1. Fall Dien Bien Phu will have serious military, psychological and political consequences.

(a) On military plane, fall Dien Bien Phu means loss to expeditionary corps of 15 Franco-Vietnamese battalions, and these battalions among best troops Indochina—parachutists, legionnaires, North Africans. Prestige that would be (rained by Viet Minh as result victory would minimize implication Viet Minh losses which are important by virtue their number (Viet Minh losses totalled 12000 on April 4) and because they involve best units Viet Minh battle corps. It is likely that if victorious Viet Minh would be able to reconstitute its battle corps without difficulty for next campaign.

(b) Re psychological consequences, possible that morale our expeditionary corps be affected and cohesion and development national armies Associated States would be compromised. Probably that extension deterioration (pourissement) in depth in Tonkin delta and on surface in Laos would be amplified in such way that military operations adversary would be greatly facilitated.

(c) On local political plane it would be more difficult still to expect a rallying of forces of country around Vietnamese Government, and additionally, military success Viet Minh would surely be exploited Geneva. However, necessary note that resistance by defenders Dien Bien Phu would diminish in part serious consequences and eventual fall that point.

2. If Franco-Vietnamese victory Dien Bien Phu, consequences different.

(a) Viet Minh will have great difficulties in reconstituting its battle corps.

(b) Psychological repercussions in Tonkin and Laos would favor Franco-Vietnamese, “attentistes” would range themselves more willingly on side Bao Dai Government; and France will possess more effective means press Vietnamese Government to intensify its war effort.

(c) On general political plane, France and Associated States Would be able present themselves at Geneva with proof Viet Minh military operations not paying off.

3. Regardless outcome battle, necessary France make up losses but this effort will depend on one hand on development and value armies Associated States and on other on increase in assistance China is in position furnish Viet Minh. Re development armies. Associated States, which conditions execution Navarre plan, certain difficulties have arisen. Vietnamese Government has shown a lack of authority and will in taking necessary war measures, and those it has taken have remained “dead letter”. French Government has decided recently confront Vietnamese Government with its responsibilities as to war effort and Prime Minister has addressed to Buu Loc letter informing him that if Vietnamese Government did not keep its engagements French Government would be obliged reconsider its position.² As for Chinese matériel aid Viet Minh, this has developed considerably since November 1953 “we are certain that, in addition war matériel furnished, some Chinese advisers exist at all levels Viet Minh command to regimental level and that batteries ORDA-directed artillery (DCA) in action at Dien Bien Phu have been engaged by their Chinese artillerymen”. All this leads supposition that it is necessary prepare face next October large Viet Minh units equipped with organic artillery, anti-aircraft equipment superior to that at present, and possibility of aerial intervention by adversary.

4. Re French effort, Government has taken initiative sending at once two battalions parachutists and of preparing mobile group and armored unit (groupement blinde) which will be available soon. (Re latter, annex to paper states decision in principle to prepare movement within three months one mobile group of three battalions; three squadrons tanks; and one squadron armored reconnaissance cars.) But it is likely this effort will not suffice and that it will be necessary to study in what measure the expeditionary corps ought to be reinforced in order permit high command carry out mission. The nature and [of] this effort cannot be calculated before end present campaign; however, it appears necessary look toward air reinforcement not only with view giving maximum mobility strategic reserves but to face any eventual aerial intervention by adversary.

Dillon

1. See telegram 3972 from Paris, Apr. 21, supra.
2. Regarding the communication under reference, see telegram 1944 from Saigon, Apr. 9, p. 1295.