Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G. 5/4–2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, April 21, 1954—10 a.m.

3972. Repeated information Saigon 458. Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Relations with Associated States, took occasion of call by Ambassador Heath¹ to deliver himself of impassioned review of Indochina scene, highlights of which follow:

1. Indochina question is now uppermost in Frenchman’s mind having replaced EDC.

2. No single French military authority remains including General Ely, who still holds out hope for victory in IC without foreign military intervention on behalf French Union.

3. For moment Geneva is center of French hopes and until it fails public mind is not receptive to suggestion of US intervention.

4. Jacquet expects Geneva to fail as do his colleagues.

5. Ministerial group within Cabinet supporting decision adhere to present Laniel Indochina policy (i.e., prosecute war until peace can be negotiated on honorable terms) consists of Bidault, Pleven, Laniel and Jacquet. Reynaud in special category of favoring negotiations on less stringent terms.

6. This group on thinner and thinner ground. They committing political suicide in sponsoring policies in face unpopularity of war.

7. Notwithstanding knowledge this fact they willing continue take risk even after Geneva fails if prospect eventual victory in Indochina exists, which does not now.

8. Only means provide this prospect is through US intervention.

Should take form US naval and air participation. If it did, French public opinion trend toward withdrawal would be reversed and would then favor continuation France’s effort in form ground forces (supported US naval and air forces).

9. Statement of US intervention must be forthcoming as soon as IC phase Geneva breaks down.

10. US decision, disapproving “Radford plan for intervention of 300 US planes” came as a great shock and disappointment to Cabinet.

11. Jacquet and Maurice Schumann expect to alternate as head French delegation Geneva after Bidault leaves. Reynaud no longer considered in running because policies conflict with those of Bidault and others and rank of Vice Premier would cause difficulties with others.

12. Re Viet-nam participation at Geneva he thought highly of the Chauvel plan accord Associated States and Viet Minh special position. They would sit at “small tables” and be brought into discussions at big table as presence was required but never both Viet Minh and Associated States at same time. Would neither be observers nor full participants. Chauvel plan would solve dilemma of having States present without Viet Minh. Full Viet Minh participation would be disastrous for the Viet-nam government as regards public opinion at home.²

13. Franco-Vietnamese negotiations would be concluded this afternoon on mutually satisfactory basis. They provide for two conventions requested by Vietnamese and revisions of French constitution required (presumably a reduction of the authority of the High Council of the French Union.) Treaties would not be signed immediately for it is wished to have signature coincide with that of other conventions to be concluded.³

14. Bao Dai arriving Paris tomorrow. Will consult with Bidault and Jacquet on Geneva and will presumably set forth position on Viet-nam participation.

15. There was no question of change of French policy vis-à-vis Bao Dai who more essential to their purposes now than ever.

16. URAS (Jacquet’s party) declined resign or overthrow government last week because they did not wish be accused having done so just before Geneva conference. If Laniel government were overthrown beforehand Geneva would be “disaster” from French standpoint.

17. Chances for survival of Laniel government poor for URAS and other dissident Cabinet Ministers could exercise power overthrow government at any time they choose after Assembly reconvenes. Government will probably be overthrown on EDC and not on Indochina issue, Fate of Dien-Bien-Phu would affect these events only slightly, but results at Geneva during the first week of conference, prior to reconvening of the Assembly, will have strong bearing.

18. Within Cabinet group supporting Laniel in present “continue the war” policy in Indochina, Pleven is now growing lukewarm, while Laniel, Bidault and Jacquet hold their ground.

If URAS resigns from government and whether or not it is overthrown as result, Jacquet will be obliged to follow his group in resigning.

Jacquet loaned us recent report on military prospects in Indochina which is intended only for circulation within French Government. Résumé being cabled separately.⁴

Significant that “united action” was never mentioned during conversations, all references to possible future outside military participation in Indochina conflict being to US.

Dillon

1. Ambassador Heath was in Paris for discussions with U.S. and French officials. Heath had been designated a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Conference, which opened on Apr. 26.
2. For documentation on the issue of participation at the Geneva Conference, see vol. xvi, pp. 414 ff.
3. On Apr. 28, France and the State of Vietnam issued a joint declaration at Paris affirming their agreement to regulate their mutual relations on the basis of two treaties, one providing for total independence for Vietnam, the other defining the terms of their association within the French Union. For text, see L’Année Politique, 1954, P569; for a translation, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, p. 245. The treaties were not initialed until June and were never ratified.
4. Infra.