Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G. 5/4–1754

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State

confidential

[Washington,] April 17, 1954.

You will have seen from Saturday’s¹ papers that a high Government official was credited with a statement that the U.S. should send troops into Indochina if the French withdrew. The speaker was the Vice President and the audience was the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The speech and the question and answers which followed were off the record but the confidence was broken by someone.²

Tickers from London and Paris attributed the remarks to the Vice President.³

Sherman Adams called General Smith on this this morning. As a result, the General talked to the Vice President and suggested that we put out a brief interpretative statement. He then sent me up to work out such a statement with the Vice President, a copy of which is attached. The plan is for the Department to issue it this afternoon. We will send copies to the White House for Sherman Adams and for transmission to Jim Hagerty in Augusta.⁴ It will also be telegraphed to interested posts.

[Annex]

Draft State Department Press Release⁵

[Washington,] April 17, 1954.

Certain remarks with regard to U.S. policy toward Indo-China have been attributed to a high government official. The contents of the speech referred to and questions and answers which followed were off-the-record but a complete report of the speech has been made available to the State Department.

The speech enunciated no new United States policy with regard to Indo-China. It expressed full agreement with and support for the policy with respect to Indo-China previously enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State.

That policy was authoritatively set forth by the Secretary of State in his speech of March 29, 1954, in which he said: “Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today.”

In regard to a hypothetical question as to whether United States forces should be sent to Indo-China in the event of French withdrawal, the high government official categorically rejected the premise of possible French withdrawal. Insofar as the use of U.S. forces in Indo-China was concerned, he was stating a course of possible action which he was personally prepared to support under a highly unlikely hypothesis.

The answer to the question correctly emphasized the fact that the interests of the United States and other free nations are vitally involved with the interests of France and the Associated States in resisting Communist domination of Indo-China.

1. Apr. 17.
2. The speech was reported in the New York Times of Apr. 17, 1954. The New York Times of Apr. 18 contained a digest of the comments by the Vice President. No text of the speech has been found. For Nixon’s account, see Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pp. 152–153.
3. Telegram 3944 from Paris, Apr. 19, read as follows: “Press Paris has thus far tended to treat Nixon statement Indochina April 16 as representing only a more explicit definition of policy already outlined by US Government to effect if situation deteriorates Indochina, US would not hesitate intervene with troops. Press generally tends cast statement on troop intervention in latter vein rather than in terms hypothesis if France should decide to withdraw from Indochina. So far, non-Communist press reaction tends treat this as nothing more than it thought US had already indicated that it was prepared to do if military situation Indochina worsened.” (751G.00/4–1954)

4. Press Secretary Hagerty was with the President who was vacationing at Augusta, Georgia. Hagerty’s diary entry for Apr. 17 read in part as follows: “Talked to President in the morning about Nixon speech, and he asked me to get in touch with Bedell Smith and have State Department put out statement on hypothetical question without cutting ground from under Nixon.… State Department called me while at dinner and read text of statement which in effect pointed out that Nixon was answering hypothetical question but that United States never expected French to pull out of Indochina. They issued their statement Saturday night for Sunday morning papers.” (Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers)

   On the afternoon of Apr. 19, Secretary Dulles talked to the Vice President by telephone. The record of their conversation read in part as follows: “The VP returned the Sec.’s call. The Sec. said he saw he got his name in the paper, and the VP said he did not intend to.… Nixon said in his speech he endorsed everything the Sec. had done, but that didn’t make the headlines. The Sec. said he told newsmen in Augusta that it was an off-the-record reply to a hypothetical question, and the Sec. said he did not care to answer it himself. He said the President was not disturbed. Nixon said he did not want to upset what the Sec. was doing. The Sec. said the result might be on the plus side, and referred to (Nixon made the reference) to the reaction in the French papers. He said the editors themselves as an audience reacted very favorably.… Nixon referred again to his statement and said the purpose of his answer was to say if the only way to hold Indochina was to go in, we might have to.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

   In discussing the Nixon speech later the same day with Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Secretary Dulles is recorded as saying that he was strongly opposed to getting American soldiers bogged down in Asia, that there were other things that could be done that were better. The incident of the Nixon speech was unfortunate, but would blow over. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

5. This statement was delivered to correspondents by Jameson Parker, Department of State Press Officer, on Apr. 17. The text was printed in the Department of State Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 623–624. The text published in the Bulletin was identical to the version printed here except for minor drafting changes and the bracketed insertion of “Vice President Nixon” at the end of the first sentence, indicating that he was the official under reference.