751G.00/4–954
The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
Dear Cabot: In response to your telegram 603 of April 9,2 I should like to give you some of our thinking regarding the role of the United Nations in what has come to be known as “united action” with respect to Indochina. Our thinking regarding the United Nations aspects is entirely exploratory. You will understand that any conclusions are of necessity contingent upon decisions on our general policy in South East Asia. This means that even at this time I am in no position to give you more than a few ideas indicating the direction of our thinking.
Our general objective which the Secretary has been discussing with our allies is the formation of a collective defense association within the framework of the United Nations Charter. This association would be based on the determination of the participants to prevent the spread of the Soviet and Chinese Communist system to South East Asia and to assure peace and security in the area.
The negotiation for such a collective defense arrangement would not require reference to the United Nations.
In the event that the collective defense group should decide at some future date that military action is necessary to save Indochina, the United Nations undoubtedly would come into the picture in one form or another. Two alternative courses of action might be considered:
- 1.
- Prior to any military action the countries concerned might invoke the Uniting for Peace Resolution procedure in the Security Council in order to obtain a recommendation that all members support such action. Of course, we would be faced with the Soviet vote in the Security Council which would necessitate action in the General Assembly. The problem would be to obtain the necessary support for a satisfactory resolution without such a delay as would defeat our purpose in Indochina.
- 2.
- Another possibility would be for the collective defense group to take military action in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter and simultaneously report such action to the Security Council as provided [Page 1346] in that Article. We might then initiate United Nations action under the Uniting for Peace Resolution with the idea of obtaining broadest possible support and additional contributions for the action in Indochina. We might also ask for observation teams to go to Indochina.
Viewing the problem hypothetically the second alternative would appear more advantageous but any decision on the precise type of action in the United Nations would obviously depend upon the circumstances.
We are aware of the possibility that some other government might raise the Indochina situation in the United Nations whether we do or not.
I am attaching a staff study on the various possibilities for United Nations action which might be of some interest to you.3 I shall keep you informed of further developments.
Sincerely yours,