Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–1054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)¹

secret

[Washington,] April 10, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• Sir Percy Spender—Ambassador of Australia
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur II—Counselor
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

The Ambassador said there appeared to have been some misunderstanding in Australia about the Secretary’s proposal regarding Indochina. He said that it was his understanding that the proposal merely emphasized the urgency of assistance to the French in Indochina and called for a coalition of interested states to give such aid as might be required to prevent further deterioration of the military situation there. He had so reported the proposal to his government but it now appeared that the Australian press was interpreting the proposal as an “ultimatum” directed against the Communist Chinese. It was his impression that these stories had their origin in the United Kingdom.

The Under Secretary confirmed the Ambassador’s understanding of the Secretary’s proposal. He said that while the conclusion is inescapable that such a coalition might find itself in conflict with the Communist Chinese as a result of an intensification of Chinese intervention in Indochina, the President had pointed out in his communication to Churchill that the proposal did not constitute a declaration against Communist China. Its intent was to boost French morale which appeared to be waivering and to discourage the Communist Chinese. It is not inconceivable, given the proper circumstances, that the Communist Chinese might be impelled to pull the rug out from Ho Chi-Minh. Any grouping of states formed pursuant to this suggestion would have to reflect the determination of those states in the general area which would be primarily affected. Admiral Radford had expressed the opinion that the use of carrier-based U.S. aircraft at this point might result in turning the tide at Dien Bien Phu. Congress, however, could only go along with the granting of such aid if a coalition of interested states declared their united intent and determination to prevent the further spreading of Communist penetration in the area. The Under Secretary assured the Ambassador that we have no intention of being dragged into a war against China—a course which no soldier would recommend.

The Under Secretary mentioned an additional political factor of which the Australian Ambassador seemed to be aware, to the effect that the French had been, or were about to, talk privately to the Soviets regarding a compromise in the Indochinese situation. The Ambassador said that he had informed Mr. Merchant only that the Australian Government’s impression was that the French had reached a point where they were possibly thinking in terms of a deal with the Soviets which would involve ceding territory in Indochina in return for a Big-Five guarantee. There is no evidence that the French are actually engaged in any such negotiation. The Under Secretary said that, while the United States is not intransigent and will approach the Geneva Conference with an open mind, it does not appear at the present that a transfer of territory will solve the problem in Indochina. With this the Australian Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador then outlined the steps which he considered to be involved in the execution of our proposal as follows: (1) the issuance of a declaration of common intent on the part of the nations involved; (2) staff discussions regarding the kind of contribution that can be made; (3) the establishment of some intergovernmental machinery on an ad hoc basis. He wondered if such machinery would enable the coalition to act quickly enough. The Under Secretary said that if we can obtain a Congressional resolution as a result of this common declaration of intent, he believed that the United States could offer emergency aid without delay.

The Under Secretary said that he saw no end of the fighting, as was commonly believed, with the advent of the monsoon. He said that the rains would make it difficult to supply the Communist troops but that conditions would probably be even worse for the French who were relying upon the airlift for their supplies. With the Geneva Conference coming up he felt that the Communists would continue their offensive for its political and psychological effect. On the other hand, an announcement by the interested countries of a declaration of intent to support the French in Indochina would undoubtedly give renewed hope to the garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

In reply to the Ambassador’s question, the Under Secretary said that the Secretary is still considering the terms for such a declaration but that we have no fixed ideas as to its form and had not prepared a draft. He felt that this would be a matter for consultation with the other parties to such a declaration.

The Ambassador then raised the question of arrangements for the Geneva Conference and asked particularly whether we had any ideas on the chairmanship of the Conference. He was told that we had given this matter a great deal of thought and that our chief concern was to avoid any arrangement which might give the appearance of a Big–Five conference. We could accept the rotational chairmanship by the Big Four but we felt that all participating nations should take part—a point with which the Ambassador emphatically agreed. The Under Secretary said that if we agreed to a procedure which would allow the Communist Chinese and Ho Chi-Minh to occupy the chair at Geneva we could expect a very sharp reaction from our Congress. On the other hand, we would doubtless find it difficult to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet on a single chairman for the entire conference. The Ambassador said that on our own side it would probably be practicable and desirable to set up a steering group of the Big Three plus four or five other countries. The Under Secretary said this would probably be necessary and spoke particularly of the importance of the other ANZUS powers taking part in such a steering group. He reminded the Ambassador, however, that Korea was the main attraction at this Conference and we should not lose sight of this fact as a result of the attention that is being paid at present to the Indochinese problem.

As the Ambassador was leaving, the Under Secretary suggested that it might be profitable to have a meeting of the ANZUS deputies some time next week when he could inform them of the course of the Secretary’s conversations in London and Paris. He said that the Canadian Ambassador had expressed great interest in this matter and he felt that he might also attend such a meeting. The Australian Ambassador agreed that this might be very profitable.

1. This conversation was summarized in telegram 180 to Canberra, Apr. 10, repeated for information to Wellington as telegram 142 and to London by pouch. (396.1 GE/4–1054)