751G.00/4–1054
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State
Subject:
- Conversations with Colonel Brohon, Assistant to General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff
- 1.
- On 8 April Colonel Brohon, Assistant to General Ely, arrived from Paris following a hurried trip to Indo-China, where he reported to General Navarre on my recent conversations with General Ely.
- 2.
- The major points made by Colonel Brohon on behalf
of General Ely were:
- a.
- The French Government was most grateful of the prompt action taken by the U.S. to meet their requests for B–26, C–47 and Corsair aircraft. The request for B–29s was made by the French Government without reference to General Ely, who realizes that it was not a sound request from the military standpoint.
- b.
- General Navarre will make more effective use of U.S. staff officers and will accept 25 to 50, or even more, U.S. officers to instruct the Vietnamese army. General Navarre retains the responsibility for training. Details are to be worked out between General Navarre and General O’Daniel. General Navarre hopes that General O’Daniel will arrive as a major general1 and have the same mission as his predecessor. I informed Colonel Brohon that I agreed, but that I expected that the relationship would be much more intimate and mutually helpful than heretofore. This is no time to worry about personal sensitivities, but I will brief General O’Daniel on this score.
- c.
- General Ely now has reservations and grave doubts that the combination of French and native forces and only U.S. material assistance will any longer be adequate to carry out the Navarre Plan. He now [Page 1304] feels that, in the absence of a settlement at Geneva, “internationalization” of the Indo-China war will be necessary. The reason stated is “the increasing rate and scope of Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh”.
- d.
(1) General Ely was disappointed and embarrassed by the negative response of the U.S. to the French request for intervention. He had gained the impression from conversations with me that such a request would have received a prompt and affirmative reply. Now the French Governmental opinion is that they made a “blunder” in making the request. Instead of immediate help, they received from the United States a proposal for long range political action which would be too late to save Dien Bien Phu.
(2) I informed him that I was at a loss to understand how General Ely could have obtained such an impression. Such was not the intention and I considered both you and I had made that case absolutely clear to him. Incidentally, I am informed that General Valluy had no such illusion and I suspect the French of political machinations later to justify their actions.
(3) I also informed him of the action we were taking to render all possible assistance, short of intervention, to influence the outcome of Dien Bien Phu; and of the action you were taking, with great urgency, to obtain the full collaboration of the nations with vital interests in the area.
- 3.
- For your information, I have just received word from General Trapnell in Indo-China that the French air effort is not limited by either the number of planes or lack of spare parts. Rather, the shortages are acute in flight crews for B–26s and properly qualified personnel for key supervisory positions in supply and maintenance. These must be provided from Metropolitan France.
- O’Daniel held the higher rank of Lieutenant General.↩