751G.00/3–2054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
1752. Repeated information Paris 548, Tokyo 50, Manila 161, Singapore 41. Situation at Dien Bien Phu is still fairly quiet. This morning Navarre’s Chief of Staff showed DCM battle plan with developments up to midnight. Gambiez anticipates an all-out Viet-Minh attack on position “Isabelle” whose artillery fire of 105’s zeroed-in in support of main redoubt has proved unusually galling to enemy. Furthermore, “Isabelle” is isolated from main center of resistance at southern end of drop zone. It is defended by three battalions, in one of which Gambiez’ only son serves.1
Gambiez said that Viet-Minh were now in some force in portions of drop zone between central defensive positions and “Isabelle”. They had likewise undertaken some entrenching activity to west of “Isabelle”. An attack had been expected nightly, but he thought present bright moon was reason for enemy having deferred his onslaught. Gambiez said that, as a former commando himself, he would prefer some hours of darkness in order to advance his troops before taking off against “Isabelle”.
On broader aspects of battle of Dien Bien Phu, Gambiez said that no one had any illusions as to its primary political importance. He described Navarre as being convinced that if French [lost?] Dien Bien Phu, political repercussions, particularly in France, would be disastrous. Navarre pointed out, however, that from purely military aspect, even if he lost all twelve battalions, his capacity to remain in Indochina war would not be greatly impaired, and even if he lost his twelve battalions at Dien Bien Phu, price paid by enemy would be so heavy that at best Viet-Minh could but win a Pyhrric victory. Naturally, if French won at Dien Bien Phu, Giap would have suffered such losses in trained regulars as practically to put him out of fight.
Gambiez expressed personal opinion that Dien Bien Phu would have decisive influence on US thinking re future developments in south-east Asia. He mentioned specifically possibility of US giving up Indochina and forming its main line of resistance to communist advance in Burma and Thailand. DCM told Navarre’s Chief of Staff with great emphasis that US Government firmly believed that Indochina must be held at all cost and that explained very tangible efforts of US to sustain Navarre in his war plan.
- In telegram 515 from Hanoi, Mar. 24, Sturm reported that the son of the general had been killed in the crash of a helicopter shot down while evacuating wounded. (751G.00/3–2454)↩