651.51G/3–1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

Participants:

  • Admiral Radford
  • Mr. Murphy, G
  • Mr. MacArthur, C

Following the State—JCS meeting this morning, Admiral Radford asked Mr. Murphy and Mr. MacArthur to join him in his office for a few moments.

He said General Ely was arriving in Washington tomorrow to discuss Indochina. General Valluy, who had been called back to Paris, had returned to Washington yesterday and had seen Admiral Radford this morning. Although Admiral Radford had only seen General Valluy briefly, General Valluy had indicated that General Ely would tell Admiral Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it was the conclusion [Page 1134] of the French authorities that victory could not be obtained in Indochina in 1954 or 1955 and that France could only carry on the campaign in 1956 if the U.S. contributed military forces to the Indochina campaign. It was not clear whether this represented the views of the French military or the French Government, but it may well reflect the views of Pleven and some other members of the French Government.

General Valluy had also seen M. Bidault while he was in Paris, who had asked that a personal message from him be passed by Valluy to Admiral Radford to the effect that M. Bidault intended to hold the line at Geneva so that negotiations would not be terminated there but would be strung out. (Note by Mr. MacArthur: It is not clear exactly what this means, but presumably it indicates that the French will not be able to have a clean break if they hold the line at Geneva and that some form of French negotiations with the Communists or possibility thereof will have to continue after the Geneva Conference.)