Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 18, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
The following were present at the 189th meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Mr. Kyes for the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Civil Service Commission (for Item 3); the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (for Item 4); Admiral Carney for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; Ralph N. Stohl and John G. Connell, Jr., Department of Defense (for Item 3); Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 4); the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
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5. Significant world developments affecting U.S. security
The Director of Central Intelligence, referring to a detailed map of the battle area at Dien Bien Phu, indicated that as of March 13 the Vietminh had lost the equivalent of five battalions in battle, the French of two battalions, which, however, had been largely replaced. It was impossible to predict the eventual outcome, since the French Union forces were still outnumbered by more than two to one. The latest information from G–2 was that the French had about a 50–50 chance of holding out.
[Page 1133]The President inquired whether the French were making good use of the planes which were available to them, and whether they were using napalm against the enemy artillery battalions which were shelling the airfields. The President further commented that in the present circumstances it was difficult for him to understand General Navarre’s earlier statements hoping that he would be attacked by the enemy at Dien Bien Phu since he was sure of defeating them. Moreover, the President commented that the odds of two to one in numbers were not really very heavily against the French, in view of the fact that they were fighting from prepared and heavily fortified positions.
Mr. Dulles suggested that the pessimistic French reports from Saigon might be designed as a build-up to exaggerate the extent of their final victory.
Governor Stassen inquired whether the present operation did not constitute the biggest military commitment that the Vietminh had made to date in the Indochina war. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, and said that the whole operation was obviously a Vietminh preparation for the Geneva Conference.
Secretary Dulles added that while he was at Berlin he had warned Bidault, on the basis of American experience in Korea, that if Indochina were put on the agenda for the Geneva Conference it would be the signal for violent Vietminh attacks on the French Union forces in Indochina. This was precisely what had happened.
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- Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Mar. 19.↩