PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Indochina”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)1
Subject:
- Indochina
Participants:
- Defense
- State
- Dean Acheson
- David K. Bruce
- H. Freeman Matthews
- Charles E. Bohlen8
- John M. Allison
- Paul H. Nitze
[Here follows discussion of the question of action which might be taken in the event of Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina.]
Mr. Lovett said that he would like to turn to the problem of Indochina under the assumption that there was no overt Chinese intervention.
Admiral Fechteler said that General Salan and Admiral Ortoli9 wanted to impress the U.S. that the French are in Indochina to see the thing through to the bitter end.
Mr. Acheson said that he thought the French Government was impressed with the difficulty of the French extricating themselves from [Page 142] Indochina. Also, if they were to abandon that position it would make their north African situation worse. The French Government realize that they should stay in Indochina, but they feel they cannot afford to stay. If we don’t do anything to help, the French may weaken all along the line. It seemed to him that we should look to see what can be done to strengthen the Vietnamese army. It may take approximately $250 million more.
Mr. Lovett said that we have justified our past MDAP presentations on the basis that 84% of the manpower would be paid for by others. He said we cannot maintain French manpower on U.S. funds.
Mr. Bruce said that the important thing was the desirability of eventually getting the French out of Indochina. This would mean the need of a native force double of what is there. France is now paying approximately $200 million for the native forces. They will need approximately $250 million additional if the native army is to be doubled. He asked whether it would be possible to make a direct contribution to the native army. It might be doubtful whether a native army could maintain itself alone, but this was our only hope. There would be a problem in handling the phasing out of French forces. Would it be possible to accelerate the training of native non-commissioned officers and instill a higher sense of responsibility in Vietnamese leaders?
Mr. Lovett questioned whether it would be possible to get all of the French out of Indochina. He thought it would be better to leave a substantial number there. He thought that Congressional appropriations were an uncertain base on which a native army would have to depend.
Mr. Foster said that one cannot omit the problem of colonialism. The French have tried to hold on to many things contrary to France’s own basic interests. The only hope is to change the political balance in Indochina. In the past we have failed to influence the more effective people. We have been too prone to accept the people and the point of view in Indochina as something you can’t do anything about, and no progress has been made in the last two years.
Mr. Allison said that he thought the French had made progress in the last two years, and recent telegrams indicated that Letourneau was prepared to go much further than he had in the past.
Mr. Foster said that nothing much had been done in training native leaders or in getting the support of the native populace. He thought that Letourneau was saying the same things now that he had said two years ago.
Mr. Acheson said the fence sitters in Indochina don’t want to get down from the fence until they can see which side will win. It is, therefore, important to build up the native army if we expect to make progress in the political field. Can’t we improve the training of the [Page 143] native army and equip it in a much more economical way than our own divisions are equipped?
Mr. Pace said that they certainly could be equipped far more cheaply than our own divisions.
Mr. Bruce pointed out that French expenditures for Indochina had gone up year by year from $400 million to $1,200 million. Of this, some $205—$210 million is for the native forces. There is a very direct interrelationship in Indochina between native morale and security. We can’t cure the morale situation in Indochina by hopeful statements. The way to cure it is through concrete accomplishments. We also have the problem of the morale of the French [Vietnamese?] national army. The greatest thing that would improve the Vietnamese morale would be for them to have the feeling that through their own efforts they can provide for their own security. The real weakness is in leadership. Wouldn’t it be possible to train officers and non-coms?
Mr. Pace said we could start now.
General Bolte pointed out that General Brink doesn’t want to get into the training game since it would take about 4,000 men to do it.
Mr. Pace said that we had made great progress in south Korea. Van Fleet is using the same methods that were successful in Greece10 Some U.S. participation in training the Vietnamese army would be valuable. Our great job is training and we had better recognize it.
Mr. Acheson attempted to summarize the sense of the meeting in the following terms. We should agree as to what it is we want to do. We want to keep both the French and the Vietnamese in the battle. In order to accomplish that it will be necessary to enlarge the Vietnamese army so that there is some hope both for the Vietnamese and for the French. It will require intensive study to see how this will be done. Where are we going to get the money and other things to get started. We might make some progress with the French if the U.S. assists in their training program. The second part of the problem concerns the possibility of Chinese overt intervention. There should be a warning. It should indicate that aggression would be followed by action which would be painful to the source of aggression. What are the elements on which we can agree. The French should put out of their minds the possibility of U.S. ground forces participating in Indochina. We are prepared to give naval and air support. What is the first thing that needs to be done. We should obviously attack those things which are supporting the aggression. We should attack the communications to the area of aggression. Then we might take up the problem of a blockade. We should have thoroughly thought-out answers to the problems which would then arise. Probably it will be necessary to go further. [Page 144] We can probably agree that, unless there is also trouble in Korea, we should not go into Manchuria.
Mr. Foster said that he thought any such program should be accompanied with measures of the type Mr. Bruce mentioned. The noncooperative French functionaries should be removed. The necessary political and economic measures in Indochina must go right along with the military measures Mr. Acheson had outlined. This may require putting considerable pressure on the French. What we need is action—not words.
Mr. Lovett suggested that Mr. Noyes and a representative of the State Department and the JCS prepare a paper which could be used by Mr. Acheson when he goes to Paris.11 He also suggested that it may be necessary to screen our position preliminarily on the Hill. Many of our friends think we are now a fat boy with a bag of candy who is in danger of having the whole bag taken away.
Mr. Pace said he thought that the proposition which had been developed was a salable and affirmative proposition.
- The portion of this memorandum not printed here is included in documentation on general United States policies with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii. That compilation also contains material pertaining to the background of this meeting and on the continuing development of policy concerning the defense of Southeast Asia of which this meeting was a part.↩
- Deputy Secretary of Defense.↩
- Department of Defense Deputy Representative to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council.↩
- Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.↩
- Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, United States Army.↩
- Chief of Naval Operations.↩
- Rear Admiral Edmund T. Wooldridge, Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Senior Staff, National Security Council.↩
- Counselor of the Department of State.↩
- Vice Admiral Paul Ortoli, Commander of French Naval Forces in the Far East.↩
- Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, in Korea, had served as Director of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece, February 1948–July 1950.↩
- Acheson left Washington for Bonn and Paris on May 22 to participate in the signing of contractual agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France; and for discussions with the Foreign Ministers of Britain and France concerning Germany, NATO, EDC, other European matters, and Southeast Asia. He was in Paris from May 26 to May 29 and arrived back in Washington on May 30.↩