Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5 MSP/5–1252: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, May 12, 1952—3 p.m.
[Received 7:31 a.m.]

2224. Sent Paris unn, Phnom Penh unn, Vientiane unn, Hanoi unn. Re Musto 429.²

1. Letourneau‘s arrival in Saigon³ as first Fr resident Min of State occasion for fresh approach Vietnamese problem. Continued lack polit dynamism in Viet, snail’s progress of govt in popularity, auth, and fiscal econ or social reform causes grave concern particularly when contrasted with unyielding will and drive of Ho Chi Minh. Unless this situation improves rapidly it may undo any milit effort or accomplishment against VM. This is apprehension of Fr and Leg.

The Bao Dai camp has infinitely greater advantages but has not been able so far to win nor demonstrate that it will ever win decisively. Bao Dai and Ho each have roughly 11,000,000 Viets in their respective zones. Former has practically all good rice lands, rubber plantations, coal mines, ports, cement factories and major facilities. Ho Chi Minh lives in malarial foothills at bare subsistence levels. Bao Dai has more men under arms than Ho Chi Minh, is helped by the elite of Fr regular forces; Fr spends billion dollars a year here and US will have spent something over billion by end FY 53. Fr Union forces have aircraft, warships, tanks, heavy artillery, napalm; the Commies have had only trickle of Chi light arms aid.

VM losses, even if only half French estimates, are about five times those of Fr Union and many times greater than those of France. Yet, in spite of this Franco-Bao Dai numerical, material and fin superiority, bulk of Fr Union troops are still hemmed in Tonkin perimeter and are devoting themselves (with some success) to operations against the enemy who have penetrated their stockade.

There are several causes for this situation. One is fact that a fanatically indoctrinated guerilla force possessed of mobility, a privileged sanctuary (China) and increasing foreign (Chinese) assistance can always prolong resistance even against even greatly superior reg forces.

But in addition are these facts: (a) Ho‘s Govt is apparently more efficient, dedicated, disciplined and harder working than legal govt. (b) Ho, because of stronger police power, better propaganda and Communist “community sense” can both force and to some extent even persuade his people to pay heavy taxes—generally to devote possible ½ of GNP to war effort (no factual data available and personal evaluations differ) and to keep on fighting in spite of tremendous privationS (c) There is a mistrust and even hatred of Fr accumulated thru colonial subjection and founded on racial differences and which has not been allayed by effective or timely French action or propaganda.

In this situation of near-stalemate there are three basic and dangerous problems which must be attacked. First is continuation of Franco-Viet tensions which sterilize progressive plans; another is insufficiency and unpopularity of Huu Govt. Him has to his credit foundation of Viet Govt apparatus. He has not been able to form an effective govt of natl union including respected Natl elements on present polit bases. I believe in his sincerity but too many Viets do not. In part, his inability to attract better element to his govt is due to failure of Fr to convince Viet intellectuals—and the peasants—that France really means to get out of Vietnam once hostilities cease and that meanwhile they are fighting Vietnamese battle of independence against secret Chi invasion. Another cause lies in Huu‘s inability to share auth. He insists on retaining essential powers and major decisions in his own hands. His Ministers are merely subordinates. His is a mistrustful one-man show and on such terms he is unable to attract the ablest men to govt.

Third problem is refusal of Bao Dai to accept consistent active responsibility for conduct of govt. One is almost inclined to doubt that Bao Dai, despite protestations to that effect, really wants an efficient popular govt. He clearly does not want such a govt which wld be dominated by a politician of republican tendencies in whom he will see arival.

With regard to first problem, Letourneau and his closest advisors now see the urgent necessity of doing something dramatic to dispel hatred and distrust of French. They are prepared to see nationalist elements with anti-French records figure in a new Viet Govt. They are ready to reorganize the High Commissariat in a more acceptable form, to initiate certain economic aid actions and to improve French propaganda in IC. Our role is to encourage French in this new approach and for our information service to help theirs.

With regard to second and third problems, French have been endeavoring, and we have supported their efforts, to persuade Bao Dai to order the formation of an efficient representative govt which wld promptly undertake necessary reforms and action. Letourneau‘s view is, and rightly, that he must not be placed in position of demanding either the dismissal of Huu or a fundamental change of govt. This must be done on initiative of Bao Dai. However, Letourneau‘s present opinion is that it is in fact impossible at moment to find proper successor for Huu as Premier of Govt of National Union; that only effective solution is for Bao Dai himself, as an interim measure, to take over presidency of Council of Ministers with men like Tri, possibly Ngo Dinh Diem perhaps one or two others serving as vice presidents. I believe this solution shld be attempted. I am not, however, sanguine that even adding our exhortations to those of French will persuade Bao Dai to accept such an increase in activity (small as it wld be), decisions and responsibility. Without a convincing, well-publicized French action program giving Vietnamese more confidence in future it is uncertain that Bao Dai cld be lured from his retreat, or that nationalist elements wld now rally to his leadership.

Whether or not present Huu government is changed and Bao Dai can be persuaded to live up to his responsibilities there are certain measures which in our opinion must be undertaken promptly—(1) by French, and (2) by Viet Govt. They are specified in this and immediately succeeding telegram. If Dept agrees, we shall urge them on Letourneau and his advisors, and on Viet Govt and Bao Dai. If, as it now seems probable, Letourneau elects to make trip to Washington in June they can be discussed with him there.

I. A French action program.

A. French bona fides: Letourneau has assured AS of France’s faithfulness to its mission. Yet rumors of French plans to negotiate with Ho Chi-Minh and Sino-Commies are multiplying. Huu himself believes them. The French shld do what they can to remove these suspicions officially and publicly. Neither Viet nor ourselves can be expected to give utmost to solution which may be abandoned without warning. In meantime, until west has made up its mind about what it wld do in case of Chinese invasion, French can be expected to consider channels of escape or negotiation.

B. An evolutionary statement: A statement of French plans for IC independence made during a war of uncertain duration cld hardly name a date or set a timetable; at the least, it might say that when and as peace is restored the position of Associated States within French Union cld be reconsidered. (This wld be much more cautious declaration than that of General Templer in Malaya in not wholly dissimilar circumstances.) It shld be accomplished by a series of French acts and statements which wld testify to French desire for evolution within French Union. French have such statement under consideration; Letourneau is dubious and Offroy is in favor. Many of arguments against an evolutionary statement have now been removed. Since the Pau agreements, there exists the armature of Viet Govt, however imperfect: there are now 37 Viet battalions as compared to 5, two years ago; Viet balance of payments is now favorable (due, it is true, to French military expenditures); Viet people are less deceived about the character of Viet Minh; French Union forces wld no longer be shocked by such statement; and (subject to Paris views) it seems possible the French public and Parliament wld accept it. French position wld seem to have moved far enough so that such declaration wld catch up with facts.

C. Reorganization of French representation in IC: Letourneau has given me heartening assurances of progressive plans in this respect. At present the High Commissariat too closely resembles the instrument with which France governed its colonies. It ought now to be remodeled in direction of its final form as a mission to Associated States govts, with a group of attached aid missions. French regional commissariats shld be “phased out.” The rolls of French functionaries shld be more rapidly reduced. Statements on the numbers who remain and their justification shld be more candid and less defensive; bureaucrats of “old colonialist stripe” shld be despatched to colonies.

D. French aid to Associated States: At present, except for very small advances to Laos, French aid is in form of heavy military expenditures, including major costs national armies, and subsidies to French institutions and firms. French shld be encouraged to set up separately in French budgets a direct IC economic aid allocation together with French military aid to native armies. This wld be identified as French aid. The recommendation Letourneau has already made to Paris in this respect shld be encouraged in order to give the French Union affiliation a positive value in Vietnamese eyes rather than a negative tutelary character.

E. Fr Union and AS Dipl representation: Internal Fr Union relations shld move toward Commonwealth model, with exchange HI COMMs among AS and with Fr. Letourneau tells me this has already been decided but it has not yet been publicized. AS shld be encouraged open diplomatic relations with more countries. Mar 8 agreements not withstanding (including Jap).

F. Mar 8 and Pau accords: Various provisions Mar 8 accords such as some those with respect fon relations have already been outdated; those provisions which exclude fon technicians needed carry thru program described in our fol tel must surely be relaxed in practice; the stipulation that no Viets decree or law which affects Fr interest cld become law unless and until it is promulgated by Fr HICOMM appears incompatible with loyal relations among AS and should be changed. It appears, however, premature for US urge major alterations in either Customs Union or central banking arrangements established after bitter discussion at Pau. Altho AS and Fr both appear believe that quadipartitism or even bipartitism unworkable in long run due polit separatist tendencies, this does not appear moment to upset only recently established organisms with unfavorable result on shaky econs of AS. More conservative position appears be urge all parties continue endeavor make Pau organisms work without attempt by any party use their veto power to secure preferential power positions.

G. The organs of the Fr Union: Fr shld by this time have devised formula for operation governing organisms of Fr Union, and interpretation Fr constitution which does more honor to principle of independence AS while preserving paramount metropolitan influence still necessary to common cause. There may be other details which are outmoded and restrictions which are no longer desired by the Fr. Letourneau shld not be in position of being forced by events into making piecemeal rulings but shld be able think himself now and expound any liberal interpretation these basic instruments which it safe to make, or which are already constructively in effect.

H. The Viets Army: In Viet opinion its tardy creation owes as much to VM pressure on Fr and threat of world war as to Fr good-faith. Yet Army in principle evidence and hope of statehood and proof that dialogue does lead to independence for Vietnam. If good share measures proposed in this brace tels are carried thru by Fr, Viets Army may be developed into patriotic and reliable instrument. Fr cld abandon present reserves about speeding up officer procurement and formation of staffs and services (Letourneau has said he for speed up). Dalat School intake cld be doubled or number schools increased. Training of more officers in Fr and US cld be accepted. US aid cld be applied to problem.

I. Viets foreign trade: Assuming that Fr do not demand unduly preferential regime at current Paris interstate econ talks, reasonableness Fr position cld be exploited here. Letourneau might well say that whereas Fr Union is a mutually supporting assoc which aims maximize benefits and security of all, Fr is not insensible to particular problems and concerns which geography imposes on the several members. Fr and Vietnam have only advantages to gain in protecting and advancing their trade by reasonable measures; at same time Fr aware that Vietnam member Asian as well as Fr community. Increase in trade with non-Commie Asia and Jap, with due safeguards to Fr concerns and established trade channels, shld be Fr as well as Amer and Viets goal.

J. Viets capital: Fr shld favor and declare themselves in favor Viets capital formation, consistent with needs war and orderly development. Fr shld encourage development Viets banking facilities and shld not oppose measures to foster reasonable amt reinvestment in Vietnam of the large profits made by fon firms.

II. Propaganda projects and methods.

1. If above program adopted, maximum publicity gains shld be made in its execution. It shld be unfolded in closely-timed speeches; and applied in stages designed for cumulative effect accompanied by telling propaganda gestures.

2. The Norodom Palace: Perhaps most important these wld be transfer this symbol Fr hegemony. As isolated gesture it wld have slight effect. As part orchestration described above, it wld compound effect Fr action program.

3. Bao Dai: In his torpid mood, His Majesty has little impact on sitn. Even adrenal spurt will on his part wld not transform sitn without basic program. We shld back any measures Letourneau can suggest to present him as more responsible, dynamic, persevering, self-denying and popular. If Fr give him Palace, he shld bring his family live in it.

4. “Austerite”. Vide Letourneau‘s airport speech;⁴ this all to good.

5. “Amabilite”. Plan promote amity between Fr and Viets at all levels by public campaigns and official directives and conduct.

6. “Clarte”. Fr goals and intentions will never be understood so long as 95 percent output vast Fr and Viet info services is in Fr and addressed solely to “evolue” levels. They must get down to the rice roots.

III. A Viets action program.

This chiefly set forth in second tel;⁵ on polit front it must include early formation Assembly and gradual increase its powers; elections in areas where these are possible; formation responsible trade unions; wide area civil liberties; progressive relaxation police state controls consistent with state of war; increased efficiency in govt and campaign against corruption; concentration on task of developing courageous and resourceful resident regional and provincial cadres, and finally the transformation of large and costly Viets informational service into effective instrument.

In many these fields responsibility is of course still shared with Fr. Fr shld make clear they favor reform.

Even if all restraints were removed Viets wld not automatically produce results. Our leverage must be continuously applied.

Fr action program as above outlined shld be met with concrete gestures appreciation by Viets: specifically, perhaps Viets recognition Viet obligations to Fr Union.

IV. Conclusion.

Above seems minimum program if underbrush is to be cleared away for new structure which will assure to greater degree than present apparatus that US aid will not have been given in vain. On part Fr it calls chiefly for new attitude or at least better exhibition their true attitudes, and on Viet side it means reorientation and toughening of only legal govt thru which US can work.

Great thing in Franco-Viets relations is to be forehanded. Unfortunately very real concessions made by Fr have followed rather than preceded such events as arrival Chi Commies on frontier; collapse Fontainebleau, defeat at Cao Ban [Bang], world war threat at beginning Korean campaign; and Fr disappointment Hoa Binh.

This time Fr and Bao Dai shld make supreme effort announce and execute timely program. Otherwise there seems nothing left try except dubious alternatives of negot with enemy; or internationalization, with its unpredictable results for IC politics and calls on US Forces; or continuance of stalemate which may be inching toward solution but which is sure handicap to Fr world.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in six parts.
2. Musto 429 is described in footnote 3, supra.
3. Letourneau arrived in Saigon on Apr. 21.
4. In an address on the occasion of his arrival at Saigon, Apr. 21, Letourneau emphasized the continuity of French policy based on the independence of the Associated States within the French Union, stressed the importance of the rapid development of the national armies, denounced internal quibbling and obstructionism, and appealed for austerity in the face of the common enemy (Joint Weeka 17 from Saigon, Apr. 27, 1952; 751G.00(W)/4–2752).
5. See telegram 2218 from Saigon, May 10, supra.