751J.00/3–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1692. Repeated information Paris 525. I had a long talk yesterday evening with DeJean who returned 13th from Paris.
He still professes optimism, although a troubled optimism, that opposition in French Parliament to continuation French military effort in IC will not succeed in forcing present French Government to negotiate directly with Viet Minh. He still insists, and asserts that Laniel agrees, that there is no possibility of and no basis for an armistice with Viet Minh except on terms of a shameful sell-out or surrender to Communists. On other hand, he thinks there is some possibility that Communist China or Russia or both might agree to stopping Chinese Communist aid and support of Viet Minh. He says that Bidault thinks there are three reasons that might induce Communists to cease supporting Viet Minh: (1) It does not suit Russian’s book to have Communist China attempt to take over IC and Southeast Asia at this time; that would make China too strong a partner; (2) China needs time to inaugurate its vast program of industrialization, consolidation of government control, and military build-up and in return for foreign credits and materials might stop helping Viet Minh; and (3) Communist China fears that a continuation of war here may result in its internationalization and expansion of [to?] China. DeJean indicated that this fear might be usefully intensified were warning American statements made prior to Geneva Conference.
He asked my reaction to Bidault’s reasoning. I replied that I thought Bidault’s first argument was utterly unfounded. I didn’t believe there was any such rift between Moscow and Peiping at present time, nor did I believe that Moscow would object to seeing IC and Southeast Asia Communized even if it had to be done wholly by Chinese Communist force. As regards arguments two and three, speaking personally, I thought there was only a slight possibility that Communist China was thinking that way.
DeJean said there had been a very definite shift in French Parliamentary thinking regarding continuation of effort in IC. Before November government had majority support for continuing struggle. Since then (this was largely brought on by Ho Chi-Minh’s ridiculous peace offer) Parliamentary opinion had crystallized on desire for negotiated end to IC war. About two-fifths of Parliament, this of course, included Communists, but also Socialists and some radicals and independents, were for immediate negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh. Fortunately other three-fifths were willing to await outcome of Geneva conference. Staging of that conference was perhaps a good thing if [Page 1123] only that it bought time for government. Whole IC problem had become a problem of internal French politics. Present pressure for negotiated peace might be relaxed if France were to inflict a bloody defeat on Viet Minh who are making an all-out attack on Dien Bien Phu, which DeJean felt would hold. One occurrence that had greatly helped opposition was Bodard’s exaggerated despatch on alleged “ultimatum” to Bao Dai to set up a representative government.1 There had been suspicion and distrust of Bao Dai’s regime in French Parliament for a long time but this was greatly intensified as a result of that despatch. Actually people behind “ultimatum” were in no way representative of majority or general nationalist sentiment here in Vietnam. Those behind it were Bao [Cao] Daists and some dissident Dai Viets, factional groups, all probably egged on by ex-President Tam. Nevertheless, newspaper stories had done their work and French Parliamentary doubt as to representative capacity of Bao Dai and Buu Loc Government was result. This feeling would complicate and prolong present negotiations of Vietnamese delegation in France since opposition was opposing concessions to Vietnam on grounds that delegation was not truly representative.
DeJean is seeing Bao Dai today and will urge on him some action which would convince Vietnamese people that his regime and government would become truly representative and responsible to Vietnamese public opinion. He thought that Bao Dai should call in leaders of all various groups to get from them a clear statement that they support government in its negotiations in Paris. He, DeJean, was fearful of any attempt to stage elections at this time, particularly in view of fact that Buu Loc Government was so new and had been so taken up with preparations for negotiations in France that it had not had time to establish its authority in country at large. An alternative to elections would be for Bao Dai to set up immediately the Privy Council, formation of which had been promised in Buu Loc’s inaugural address some two months ago.
He, DeJean, intends to see as many Vietnamese as he can during his stay in Saigon (he expects to return to Paris in a week or so) and tell them that these attacks on Buu Loc Government were just playing Viet Minh game, and he hoped that I would impress this on Vietnamese with whom I came in contact. I said I intended to see ex-President Huu and Tam and intended to talk to them along lines he suggested.
DeJean indicated he took philosophically attacks made on him personally in Paris. He said they mainly proceeded from two-fifths minority in Parliament who wanted negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh at any price and recognized DeJean as a consistent defender of continuation [Page 1124] of French military effort here. I remarked that General Navarre and DeJean and certainly General Trapnell and I believed that stalwart carrying out of “Navarre plan” would result in substantial victory for Franco-Vietnamese forces year or 15 months from now and inquired how it was that ranking military men like Generals Blanc and Fay on basis of a short stay here could reject Navarre’s conviction of victory. DeJean said that trouble is that IC had become so much a matter of internal French policy and politics that even high-ranking French generals were unable view problem with military objectivity.
- See footnote 1, p. 1102.↩