711.551/3–1554: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1687. For special handling. S/S to control distribution. I am deeply disturbed by the fact that General O’Daniel’s appointment as Chief of MAAG in Saigon is firmly connected in the French mind with repeated press reports of US intentions to take a more direct hand in the Indochina war, especially in the training of the National Armies. There has been strong French reaction, both public and private, against these reports and no amount of denial will effectively dispel French suspicion and mistrust on this subject.
General Navarre has stated publicly and with great firmness in connection with earlier press reports that O’Daniel would head an American training mission to Indochina that he would oppose US participation in the formation of the National Armies. Navarre’s somewhat reluctant agreement to the assignment of O’Daniel as Chief of MAAG was given with the specific condition that there would be no change in MAAG’s terms of reference. Navarre has told me politely [Page 1121] and firmly that if O’Daniel wishes to make suggestions he will listen, but he makes clear that he intends to keep full freedom of action.
Navarre, while personally getting along well with O’Daniel, has a very low opinion of his understanding of the peculiar problems of this war and of his solutions for overcoming them. He has told me that O’Daniel has a “complete lack of comprehension” (incomprehension parfaite) of this war. French High Command has regarded as ridiculous some of suggestions already made by O’Daniel. I believe it possible that O’Daniel, whom I like as a person and admire for his record as a soldier, has, in his sincerity and directness, mistaken French courtesy for approval and French evasiveness for agreement.
In view of the politely hostile French attitude which awaits O’Daniel and in light of Navarre’s present opinion of him, believe that the chances are very slight for O’Daniel to influence the conduct of the war here or to improve the situation through informal advice or suasion. As a matter of fact, knowing “Iron Mike’s” energetic, aggressive and forthright personality, I am convinced that there is considerable danger that he may irritate rather than influence the French. This would have the most damaging effect upon our over-all objectives.
O’Daniel’s “advance guard”, Lt. Colonels Rosson and Clark and Commander Josephson, whom he had expected to be integrated into respective French staffs, was received with lack of enthusiasm which is an indication of the French attitude toward the General himself and forecast of the way in which he also may be treated. Navarre and his staff greeted these officers correctly, but have succeeded in keeping them at arms length, with almost nothing to do, since their arrival. The close working relationship with the French which these officers had anticipated has not materialized and, I believe, will not materialize at least in the immediate future.
I earnestly suggest that, since O’Daniel’s appointment has already been confirmed the Acting Secretary or the Under Secretary take this matter up with the appropriate high level of the Defense Department to have General O’Daniel instructed before his departure to refrain for the first few weeks or even months from action which might be interpreted by the French as intervention and to confine himself to the administration of MAAG. Later, if he succeeds in winning the confidence of the French High Command, he may be in position to make suggestions with some hope of their acceptance. I stress, however, that in the beginning he must tread softly.
In the last analysis, it is my firm conviction that, if the conduct of the war is to be stiffened and improved, it must be done in Paris, not in Saigon, and not on the level of one military commander to another.