Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

740.5/3–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, March 10, 1954—7 p.m.

3293. Repeated information Saigon 373, London, Moscow unnumbered. Embassy telegram 3238 (Saigon 361, London unnumbered) March 6. Embassy’s analysis Assembly IC debate follows:¹ National Assembly IC debate, which resumed at 4 o’clock March 9, concluded near midnight in adoption of government-accepted ordre du jour (text Embassy telegram 3285)² which had been modified principally to make more specific Assembly’s charge to the government with respect to Geneva and to clarify Assembly’s views on French Union concept in view of current Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. Although debate resulted as anticipated in passage of government accepted ordre du jour, and in that sense constituted government victory, it was preceded by what proved to be unexpectedly stormy session touched off and highlighted by Pierre Mendes-France’s appeal for direct negotiations with Viet Minh. The true significance of governments victory, however, is not entirely reflected in wording of the ordre du jour adopted (which is much more explicit than that of October 27),³ nor in number of votes cast for government ordre du jour.

Desirability of reaching negotiated settlement of the IC conflict was not at issue in this debate, nor was this objective questioned by either side. When reduced to its simplest expression, fundamental issue of debate was whether to try to reach settlement with Viet Minh now or whether to first wait and see whether settlement could be reached at Geneva. And it is in this context that the ordre du jour adopted must be viewed. Course of debate as observed does not, on the other hand, permit conclusion that members of Assembly voting for government-accepted ordre du jour were in effect approving continuation of war in IC without certain definite reservations as regards factor of time.

Government, without promising in so many words, made it crystal clear to all present that it intended to make every effort to reach satisfactory settlement of IC conflict at Geneva. Government, as anticipated, with Geneva conference “in hand”, was able to carry the day; but it was victory that perhaps ought to be limited by the caveat all-too-implicit in course of debate: Let government beware if settlement is not reached at Geneva. Government obviously bought time in IC with Geneva conference but Assembly only extended credit on short-term basis. As consequence, Embassy cannot stress too strongly importance of implications apparent in this Assembly IC debate and to emphasize that Government victory of March 9 is one that will be subjected to searching and critical review if French Government unsuccessful finding IC solution Geneva. If latter fails produce tangible results, it is all too apparent that whatever French Government may be in power at that time will find itself confronted with almost insurmountable task to counter Assembly pressures to initiate steps looking toward negotiations with Viet Minh on theory that once attempt to reach agreement Chinese Communists and Soviets unsuccessfully exploited only alternative of direct negotiations remains.

As on Friday,⁴ effective speakers yesterday were mostly on side of opposition. However, with government holding all trumps in form of Geneva conference, opposition was unable to convince Assembly majority that immediate exploration of more nebulous possibility of negotiations with Viet Minh was preferable to more concrete and palatable possibility of reaching agreement at Geneva. Government did not promise Assembly that it would reach an agreement at Geneva, but since it hinged its entire case on possibilities and hopes inherent in Geneva situation, there was no doubt that Assembly, in substantially going along with present French IC policy until Geneva, would take critical view of failure to reach such agreement at Geneva. Laniel, who spoke briefly at beginning of afternoon and before Mendes-France (see separate telegram),⁵ stated that “the only thing that government can promise you is of defending tomorrow, with will of succeeding, cause of peace and that of France”.

It was Pierre Mendes-France (see separate telegram),⁶ who touched off storm in Assembly debate which did not subside until passage of ordre du jour at midnight. He was followed in course of debate by Lussy (Socialist), Mitterand (USDR), and Daladier (Radical Socialist), all of whom tellingly supported his thesis. In contrast with his reticence on IC in his June 1953 investiture speech, Mendes-France underlined without equivocation his wholehearted and unreserved support for immediate and direct negotiations with Viet Minh. “There is only one solution, solution difficult, painful, cruel and in certain respects unjust. It is direct negotiation”. He termed Geneva clever diplomatic maneuver to prolong war in hope of obtaining US military intervention, and termed government policy on Geneva incomprehensible in asking whether government thought Communist China would cease aiding Viet Minh gratuitously. “If China does not obtain satisfaction on Korea and Soviets on Germany, why would they concede on Vietnam?” In dramatic exchange with Bidault, who corrected Mendes-France for referring Geneva conference as “five-power” conference and for implying IC phase conference would be subordinated Korean phase, Bidault stated in conclusion: “You say our negotiations will fail; I reply: That is what (I meant by saying earlier) one will see”.

Assembly’s views on the French Union concept as set forth in fourth paragraph ordre du jour are of particular significance when related to present Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. The Assembly has now said that if Associated States repudiate any provision of constitution relative for French Union, France is relieved of its obligations toward these states. This provision, if applied, could foredoom to failure present negotiations⁷ since Vietnamese position is and has been that French Union concept as defined constitution is unacceptable. Additionally, as Embassy has indicated previously, government’s only hope short of constitutional revision lies in disregarding certain French Union provisions title VIII constitution and in defining relationship in bilateral instrument along considerably broader lines.

Dillon

1. The Embassy provided additional analysis of the debate in the National Assembly of Mar. 5 and 9 regarding Indochina in despatch 2398, Mar. 18. (751G.00/3–1854)

2. The text as transmitted in telegram 3285 from Paris, Mar. 10, read as follows:

   “Assembly pays tribute to heroism of combatants of French Expeditionary Corps Indochina and bows before sacrifices of those who, for 8 years, have gloriously fallen for a just cause,

   “Expresses satisfaction with reunion, April 26, 1954, at Geneva, of a conference having objective of defining the proper means of putting an end to painful IndoChinese conflict,

   “Takes account of statements of government reaffirming its will to seize and to explore all solutions capable of bringing about as rapidly as possible (le plus rapidement possible) the cessation of the conflict and of assuring the peace and liberty in the Associated States indissolubly united within French Union,

   “Recalls solemnly that France supports the armed struggle in Indochina by virtue of the provisions of the constitution relative to the French Union to which the Associated States have already voluntarily adhered and that any repudiation of those provisions by the aforesaid States releases France from its obligations with respect to the latter in letting it judge measures that would be dictated by its interest inseparable from that of free world.”

   The Embassy reported that the first paragraph was adopted unanimously, with the exception of the Communists. The second and third paragraphs were adopted 349 to 263, with the fourth paragraph being approved 377 to 235. (751G.00/3–1054)

   For the record of the debate on Indochina which occurred in the National Assembly on Mar. 9, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1954, Débats, pp. 754–762, 764–774, and 788–795.

3. For a summary translation of the motion adopted on Oct. 27, 1953, see footnote 1, p. 853.
4. Mar. 5.
5. A summary of the remarks delivered by Premier Laniel was transmitted in telegram 3298 from Paris, Mar. 10, not printed. (751G.00/3–1054)
6. The Embassy transmitted a free translation of the highlights of the statement delivered by Mèndes-France in telegram 3312 from Paris, Mar. 11, not printed. It was noted that the applause registered during the presentation split the National Assembly hemicycle exactly at the center. (751.00/3–1154)
7. In telegram 3256 from Paris, Mar. 8, the Embassy reported that French-Vietnamese negotiations had opened that morning. (751G.00/3–854)