396.1 GE/3–1054: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
1640. Repeated information Paris 508, Hanoi unnumbered. Saigon vernacular press has been gazing with fearful fascination at forthcoming [Page 1102] Geneva conference since Berlin meeting and attention can be expected to remain riveted on Geneva during remaining weeks. Distillation of editorial comment available to Embassy reveals several clear lines of reaction in midst of general nervousness.
- (1)
- Emerging clearly and strongly is deep desire for peace. Little interest is shown in prosecuting war to successful conclusion and most papers show resentment at thoughts of “intervention” of other powers, expressing forebodings that war may thereby be enlarged or internationalized rather than ended. Suggestion of Korean troops for Indochina evoked strong adverse reaction and talk of direct US participation in war is viewed with alarm. Recurrent theme is “let Vietnamese settle their own affairs”. Connected with this is charge in certain quarters that US is bent on prolonging war and is compelling France and AS to continue fruitless and bloody conflict from which only US can benefit.
- (2)
- Prevailing view is one of pessimism and doubt that Geneva conference will succeed. Feeling is expressed generally that only success, if there is one, will be in possible working out of balance of interests among big powers with Vietnam’s interests disregarded. In particular, Korean case and especially “division” of Korea is regarded as dangerous precedent.
- (3)
- Third strong theme is fear of being “sold down the river”. France is suspected of double dealing and wishing to “negotiate with both sides”, namely with Vietnamese representatives in Paris and with Viet Minh supported by Chinese Communists in Geneva. This has led to statements, especially in north, that present negotiators in Paris do not represent Vietnam and that only true representatives would be those named by National Assembly to be based on general elections which should be held before Geneva. (See Embtels 1624 and 1625 repeated Paris 502, 503.)1
Press attitudes can be regarded as reflection of general uneasiness and anxiety which will continue until results of Geneva become clear. Reluctance of press to take strongly anti-Communist line has been noted and “attentism” will certainly grow. Expression of these views, made easier by recent relaxation of press censorship, may serve in part as catalyst provoking further thinking on current problems.2
- Telegrams 1624 from Saigon, Mar. 7, and 1625 of Mar. 8, neither printed, concerned a press report of Mar. 6 that nationalist elements had presented Bao Dai with an ultimatum demanding the immediate establishment of an elected national assembly. (751G.00/3–754; 751G.00/3–854)↩
- Telegram 1653 from Saigon, Mar. 12, read as follows: “Re last paragraph Embtel 1640, repeated Paris 508. USIS has noted since decision at Berlin discuss Indochina at Geneva conference that Saigon Vietnamese press has ceased making use of normal supply of anti-Communist editorial material and factual stories. This material accepted from USIS but not published.” (396.1 GE/3–1254)↩