751G.11/3–254: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
3151. Repeated information Saigon 348. Embassy wishes point out to Department that if plan to bring Bao Dai to United States (Department’s 1552 to Saigon, repeated Paris 2968)1 is carried out it will involve unfavorable and potentially harmful repercussions in France.
As previously reported, specter of United States in role of Pied Piper in Indochina is anathema to virtually all political groups and individuals most closely concerned with Indochina in France. While it is generally and gratefully recognized that United States aid has made it possible for French to continue their efforts in Associated States and without it the growing sentiment for negotiation or even withdrawal could probably not be restrained, there is sharp line drawn between what is considered as aid and what could be interpreted as interference. While accepting aid gratefully and admitting dominating influence it has in formation policy, French insist that reins be held in their own hands and any strong indication that direction is threatened would, we are convinced, foster attitude of “if United States wants to run the show let us hand it over to them lock, stock and barrel”.
This reaction was most recently evident in O’Daniel incident. At that time we were read extracts by Jacquet of Navarre’s cables to him on O’Daniel question and what we heard reinforced our impression that if matter had been pushed it would have constituted to French mutation from “aid” to “direction”, and would have brought on a general review here which might have led to the very thing we seek to avoid.
French have always held doubts about Bao Dai and they are no less prevalent now than before. Rumors circulating this week on nature of Pleven’s report which will be delivered to Prime Minister, Assembly Commissions and possibly the Assembly itself within the week include allegation it will recommend review of whole “Bao Dai experiment”.
If it were announced now that Bao Dai was to go to the United States this would add considerable encouragement to opponents of present government’s policy of carrying on the fight in hopes of improving prospects of negotiation, if not of victory itself. We cannot envisage that anything could result from Bao Dai’s being subjected to United States influence on the spot which would be productive enough to counteract ill effects such a plan would have here.
[Page 1092]We are inclined share view of most Frenchmen here who have been closely associated with Bao Dai that he is as he is and it is useless to attempt make him over in a mould of our own creation. We know of no one here who seriously considers it likely that he will take more active role in leadership of his people. Rather, do they think he would welcome excuse to chuck whole affaire and retire to Switzerland “or the United States” to live on his considerable fortune.
As Department is aware, Bao Dai now plans come to France next week to be present during Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. His presence here will not be questioned unfavorably; on contrary, it might help in furthering the success of negotiations. On other hand, his absence in Dalat hunting would give the opposition reason to ask why, if he is indeed Chief of State, he is not here leading his country’s delegation at such vital time. If he were neither here nor in Vietnam but rather in United States, the fire would really rage.2
- Dated Feb. 26, p. 1083.↩
- In telegram 1621 from Saigon, Mar. 8, Ambassador Heath stated the following: “I find the arguments put forth in Paris telegram 3151 to Department March 2 are compelling and believe that we should not ask Bao Dai to make trip to the United States for medical examination and treatment as suggested Department telegram 1552.” (751G.11/3–854) Telegram 1628 to Saigon, Mar. 8, also sent to Paris as telegram 3074, read as follows: “In view comments contained Paris tel 3151 rptd Saigon 348 and Saigon’s 1579 rptd Paris 481 and in view your recommendation Department agrees that project of bringing Bao Dai to US for health reasons may be shelved for present.” (751G.11/3–354)↩