751G.00/3–254: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
469. Repeated information Saigon 363, Paris 194. Paris limit distribution. General Cogny said yesterday that Viet Minh threat to Luang Prabang and Muong-Sai has disappeared and that he is now recovering some of the parachute battalions which he lost to operations in Laos. This movement, which began February 28, will tie up civil air transport in Indochina through March 4.
Cogny said that Viet Minh division 308 has definitely withdrawn toward Dien-Bien-Phu. Enemy intentions with regard to latter strongpoint are still not clear, but Cogny believes that since Viet Minh continue to move munitions into area, they may yet launch major attack against it.
Within delta, conditions have been relatively calm past two weeks. Viet Minh division 320 continues exert pressure against southwest delta, although not all its units have infiltrated. One battalion of regiment 48 was caught north of Phu-Ly two days ago and heavily punished. Mine warfare, long serious, is coming to assume even more [Page 1090] dangerous proportions and spreading into areas, such as Sontay, which had been generally free of it (Cogny’s Cabinet chief says that during past six months 80% of officer losses this command have been attributable to mines.)
While little of spectacular nature has occurred in delta since onset of operations in Laos, Cogny continued, there has been gradual loss of ground and initiative which it will take considerable time to make good. From point of view of French domestic politics, however, it is vital that end of spring campaign find France-Vietnamese forces in comparatively favorable position, and to enhance French position at Geneva conference, it is desirable that some major coup be executed before April 26. Whether this coup take the form of major clean-up operations within delta or of large-scale raids outside, it is indispensable that lost initiative be demonstrably regained, even though time is short.
Cogny said Viet Minh have recently formed new independent regiment (254, at present outside delta and southwest of Phu-Ly) in manner he thinks should be adopted for formation of National Army units:
Regiment is constructed around core of one good regular battalion, to which were added regional elements already experienced in local military activities. He reiterated his strong endorsement of proposal to provide militia with effective weapons, as part of a progressive program to put guns in the hands of all those on this side ready and competent to use them. Viet Minh have adopted sensible procedure of building their pyramid from the base upwards, whereas on this side the base has been neglected in favor of the apex.
At Cogny’s request, General Navarre intervened to cause suspension of order issued from Dalat to Governor Tri to send 3,000 National Guardsmen to aid in defense of mountain plateaux (Contel 453).2Navarre asked that execution of this order be “delayed” two or three months, realizing situation may so far have evolved by that time as to render plan obsolete. Cogny does not know with whom this idea originated, but he is tempted to see in it evidence of a scheme to move troops south against an eventual hypothetical division of country at sixteenth parallel. Latter notion, which he says makes him “see red” both literally and figuratively, represents most efficient way he can conceive of losing war and all of Indochina.
As for plan of National Army General Staff to incorporate National Guardsmen into Army, that too had been taken under advisement and it will be effected, if it is effected, only over a period of time.
- Telegram 453 from Hanoi, Feb. 24, is not printed. (751G.00/2–2454)↩