Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 186th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, February 26, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; Mr. Smith for the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant [Page 1080] to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the report and discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. Meeting of the four Foreign Ministers2
Secretary Dulles indicated that he would not make his report in narrative form, even though this would be the most interesting way, but would single out those elements in the picture which would be of particular interest to the National Security Council.
. . . . . . .
The single most difficult issue with regard to Asia was, of course, Indochina. The French felt that it was politically indispensable for them to secure some reference to the possibility of a truce. Most of the French can’t or won’t understand why they must persevere in their struggle against the Communists after we have achieved an armistice in Korea. Bidault, however, clearly understands the great difference between the conditions for an armistice in Korea and those in Indochina. He has no illusions on this subject at all, but he also knows that the Laniel Government will fall if he cannot make some kind of gesture.
Molotov himself had not put forward any proposal for negotiations on Indochina. Indeed, for a long time he refused even to refer specifically to Indochina, and chose to play “very hard to get” on this subject. He played the game very smart, and at the end it was Bidault who was trying to force Molotov to include a reference to Indochina. Molotov had finally suggested that the formula include reference to Indochina in parentheses. When Bidault complained that it would be no use to take Indochina back to Paris in a parenthesis, Molotov finally agreed to remove the parentheses. Secretary Dulles had made an earnest effort to include in the terms of reference for the discussion of Indochina, conditions relating to the good behaviour and decent intentions of the Chinese Communists prior to the meeting. These statements were acceptable enough to Bidault, but Eden became a problem. He did not wish to have the resolution contain any language which appeared to impugn the good faith of the Chinese Communist Government. In the end, the language with respect to Chinese behaviour was omitted from the resolution, although the condition can be read implicitly in the language if not explicitly. Secretary Dulles said he believed it to be apparent that if Bidault had not gone back to Paris with something to show on Indochina, the Laniel Government would [Page 1081] have fallen at once and would have been replaced by a government which would not only have a mandate to end the war in Indochina on any terms, but also to oppose French ratification of EDC. In general, said Secretary Dulles, the French are divided into two main categories—those who are prepared to write off Indochina but want France to join EDC, and those who wish to have France remain in Indochina, more or less as a colonial power, and are opposed to EDC. Furthermore, Secretary Dulles couldn’t see the makings of a French government which would replace Laniel and continue the fight in Indochina. Accordingly, if we had vetoed the resolution regarding Indochina, it would have probably cost us French membership in EDC as well as Indochina itself. Our present position, therefore, at least offers the fair probability of salvaging both French membership in EDC and the continuation of the struggle in Indochina.
There had been no agreement, said Secretary Dulles, on the exact composition and form of the discussion on Indochina at the Geneva conference. It was his guess that we would encounter difficulties in this matter every bit as bad as those we have experienced in the past with regard to the composition of a conference to settle the Korean problem. For example, the French desire to keep out the representatives of the Associated States, lest their presence at Geneva also bring in Ho Chi-Minh. Accordingly, both Bidault and Secretary Dulles are approaching the forthcoming Geneva conference with considerable equanimity. Secretary Dulles didn’t believe that the French would push too hard for a negotiated settlement provided there was no real military disaster in Indochina prior to and during the conference. Moreover, the heat would be off when the fighting season ended in May. If the present French Government can hold on, and there was no serious military reverse or apparent military reverse, Secretary Dulles did not anticipate too much difficulty.
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- Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Feb. 26.↩
- For the full record of the report made by Secretary Dulles at this meeting, see volume vii.↩