Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/2–2254: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Saigon, February 22, 1954—9 a.m.

1506. Eyes only Dulles and Smith and Wilson and Kyes and Rand² from Stassen. At Pleven’s request, accompanied by Ambassador Heath, I had a two-hour conference with Pleven—and DeJean at Dalat this morning February 21.

General Navarre and General Ely joined conference for the final half-hour.

Pleven has been in Indochina two weeks and intends to remain another week. There were a number of plus and minus factors disclosed and I would characterize the total as encouraging but requiring highest priority continuing attention and including some points of major danger to objectives.

Pleven emphasized that there must be no leak of what he told me as it would make more difficult his task.

The following is a summary of major points:

1. Upon Pleven’s return to France he will report to the Cabinet and subsequently, either through a policy motion in the House during the first 10 days of March or through the consideration of the defense budget beginning the middle of March the issue of the Indochina war will be tested.

2. He will make a strong case. We reviewed the many factors involved. The difficulties of French public and parliamentary opinion will be very great. He referred to Naegelen’s³ recent adverse address on the subject. It will be necessary to exert extraordinary efforts of persuasion. A program of the way out over the next two years involving increased commitments and efforts of the Vietnamese Government, follow-through commitments of matériel and finance from the US Government, and a see-it-through policy of the French Government will be the trilateral essentials.

3. French casualties in recent weeks have been severe, in their view, including excessive casualties caused by a new plastic mine of Chinese make which cannot be detected by present methods and which the Viet Minh sow liberally in the immediate path of French Forces and French vehicles. General Trapnell will obtain samples for analysis by US technicians for countermeasures. Presume we may have Korean experience with the same mine. This is high priority.

4. The top Vietnam leadership is weak and Bao Dai failed to come up to the Hanoi Delta area for an agreed trip there with Pleven. Bao Dai has also broached an unsound mass evacuation plan from the delta area. But the new Vietnam Cabinet has a number of members with intelligence and spark and drive including the Minister of Defense and this is a real asset.

5. Pleven and the French here are now convinced that they can build a real Vietnam Army and their views on this have changed in the past six months from experience. The difficulties are still great but there is now a confidence that an effective fighting force of Vietnam can and will be built.

6. Navarre is completely confident of his position for the remainder of this fighting season in his principal installations including Dien Bien Phu and the delta and Luang Prabang. Dien Bien Phu is a veritable jungle Verdun which he hopes will be attacked as it will result in terrific casualties to the Viet Minh and will not fall. His concentration now is on the French-Vietnam offensive to start in October.

7. In this respect Navarre and Pleven speak of long delays in essential US equipment. It would appear to me that US procedures have not been adapted to the fact of war and that the back-up of the war should be placed in CINC Far East who has on hand practically everything needed and could supply it promptly with subsequent payment by MDAP funds and subsequent replacement to his stocks from the States. The delays of requisitioning to Washington, or San Francisco, or Pearl when the equipment is all out here in the Japan, Okinawa, Korea area cannot be accepted for the offensive war contemplated by Navarre beginning in October.

8. The Vietnam Government needs further economic and technical assistance especially in the care of the displaced villagers and urgently in the case of those who desert or flee from the Viet Minh side of war who then need resettlement as a matter of top importance in the winning of the support of the people. I concur in this view and suggest that a fund of $7,000,000 for this purpose be transferred from general reserve and be placed at Director McReynolds’ call for these purposes without detailed Washington advance approval of projects. The fact of war should also be recognized in FOA Washington and top priority on recruitments of necessary technicians for this new and inexperienced government should be given.

9. Navarre contemplates a change in his TO for greater mobility and fire power. He wants to increase the automatic arms of his battalions from 45 to 65. Long rifles are too slow and useless in the jungle where enemy fire opens up at 10 meters distance. His special request now is for light armor, amphibious light armor, light observation planes and a new request which he will soon make for more automatic arms are considered by Pleven to be of top importance.

10. They urgently wish to expand the counter-guerrilla effort and for these and other mobility purposes request early action on their helicopter requests and will want by September 1 an American ground crew of 80 to help initial maintenance and to train their technicians.

11. Washington statements at high level if first coordinated precisely with Paris which would express attitude of confidence in French and back-up of their requests for material, and would note the affection for France of millions of loyal Vietnamese would be helpful. Washington’s statements can be harmful in Paris if the wrong things are said or the right things in the wrong way.

12. Pleven anticipates agreement on final negotiations on Vietnam independence to take place in Paris beginning early March and no serious obstacle to satisfactory completion.

13. Relations of France with Cambodia are improved and internal security in Cambodia is good with only 8,000 Viet Minh remaining in remote areas and the recent surrender of two bands of 1,000 each.

14. Pleven understands that qualification of subject to Congressional approval will apply to all Executive Branch commitments for future follow-through and this is not an obstacle as he has confidence in President Eisenhower’s effective leadership.

15. He further explained that both time and political psychology made it impossible for him to return to Paris via Washington. He hoped I would report his discussion with a strong cautionary note against leaks to the press and that I would convey the background thoroughly on my return. My response was one of broad encouragement, pledge of prompt report to Washington, personal belief that essential action for expediting deliveries and for future follow-through in matériel and finance would be forthcoming, and confidence that his incisive informed leadership would carry this significant case in Paris and that the break-through to a clear victory next year was in the making with deep value for France and the free world.

My comment now to Washington is limited to these points:

1. There is no real danger in Indochina of major reverse during this fighting season.

2. Top priority is the political issue in March in Paris.

3. Second priority is getting our matériel back-up reorganized in the Far East to prepare for an offensive in October.

4. Third priority is expanded high caliber technical assistance to the new government of Vietnam particularly for those ministers who show spark and spirit and in mass methods of economic action which will win the Vietnam people.

5. All Washington statements on the Indochina war should be cleared in Paris especially between now and the parliamentary test.

. . . . . . .

Ambassador Heath has read this message and may send supplementary reactions. General Trapnell has read the military portions and Director McReynolds the economic and technical portions.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. William M. Rand, Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.
3. Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, Socialist member of the French National Assembly.