751G.00/2–2154: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1504. Repeated information Paris 457. Prior to his talk with me (mytel 1501, February 20) General Navarre briefed Governor Stassen on military situation. Navarre insisted that schedule and lines of his plan were unaffected by recent military developments Laos. He had always foreseen that Viet Minh might invade Laos. He had expected present campaign season, ending May, to be difficult since opposing forces were more or less in balance. Only point his plan necessary postpone for moment was clean-up of south due to necessity of sending reserves from that region to withstand Viet Minh push in Laos. He had not had to sacrifice, however, his more important point of cleaning up center in order, next autumn, to throw expanded battalions against Viet Minh in north. Initial operations in center were proceeding extremely satisfactorily.
He rehearsed past six month’s military developments. He said that they had absolutely exact intelligence that last October Viet Minh planned to make main offensive against Tonkin delta. Plan involved infiltration by 320th division of center of delta and then attacks in center and from north and south of delta. This plan was suddenly changed, he felt certain, because of Chinese Communist orders, but was in part due to fact that he, Navarre, had conducted “spoiling operation” making Viet Minh plans against Tonkin delta extremely difficult. Suddenly in October Viet Minh transferred attention and troops to operation against Laos. To counter that, Navarre had conducted parachute operation, occupying Dien Bien Phu, key to Thai country, the one section with large rice production, and crossroads of the various trails leading to Luang Prabang and Laos. He had confirmed [Page 1064] intelligence that as late as January 25 Viet Minh planned attack Dien Bien Phu. Two or three days later they had abandoned idea provisionally. This due, he thought, to Viet Minh realization that Dien Bien Phu had been greatly strengthened by change in French defensive layout there and also because Viet Minh realized they had not enough munitions conduct sustained siege. Suddenly Viet Minh main division struck out for Luang Prabang. Although their forced marches were extraordinary—seven days normal marching in four days—French advantage of air transport enabled them to move more quickly still. When division arrived found Vientiane too strongly fortified and garrisoned to attack with single division, and on their flank at Muong Sai French had moved seven battalions. In these circumstances the Viet Minh obviously hesitating as to next step. They could not attack Luang Prabang with any chance of success; might attack Muong Sai, but place of no strategic value to them and they would suffer heavy losses if they did. They were beset by food and logistic problems. Had only about two months during which could conduct operations before the rains started. He felt rather certain that before long main Viet Minh forces would be recalled for another attack on Dien Bien Phu. Viet Minh making strenuous efforts increase stocks of munition and food at Dien Bien Phu. He hoped greatly that they would attack Dien Bien Phu because he felt certain of holding it and inflicting costly losses to Viet Minh there. If Viet Minh going attack Dien Bien Phu, would have to do it in next two months before rains started for would be impossible to feed and maintain their invading force of two or three divisions during rains.
Some, perhaps bulk, of Viet Minh would have to go back to their stations around Tonkin delta during this period.
In conclusion Navarre said he felt it was settled Chinese Communist policy for Viet Minh to infiltrate northern Laos, not necessarily by military operations, and lay foundations for Thai confederation, establish control of Thai peoples in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, and establish basis or point of departure for eventual taking over of Burma—and Malaya.