751G.5622/1–2354: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
niact
1307. Repeated information Paris niact 401. Re Department telegram 1271;1 Paris telegram 287, sent Department 2686;2 and Embassy telegram 1284, sent Paris 391.3 De Jean told me today that French Government had modified its decision not to employ American civilian pilots from CAT. French High Command Indochina is now authorized contract such pilots to operate 12 C–119s presently on loan to French Air Force in Indochina but they may fly these planes only over regions which are not scenes of actual military operations. In other words, they may not be employed to fly C–119s to Dien Bien Phu at present.
French Command still expects and hopes that Viet Minh will attack Dien Bien Phu but no longer believes that they will attack as soon as January 25 which was date French intelligence had heard had been fixed by Viet Minh.
De Jean insisted on urgency and importance of US agreeing to complete list of planes and temporary loan of 400 American maintenance [Page 997] personnel for present and spring campaigns and expressed hope that loan or gift of 10 B–26s could be made immediately to increase French defense possibilities in Dien Bien Phu.
De Jean stated that next month or two would be anxious period because of near-equilibrium of forces but that Navarre had not in any way modified his opinion that a year or 15 months from now Franco-Vietnamese forces could inflict decisive military defeat on Viet Minh. Thereafter, Viet Minh menace should be a police clean-up operation. One thing he worried about was increasing opposition and lassitude in France over continuance of Indochina war. He thought this opposition and lassitude would disappear with a substantial French victory but he was not sure that one could be produced in next few months, although he believed thoroughly there would be local successes in center or south. If Viet Minh decided not to attack Dien Bien Phu but to try to push on to Luang Prabang, French Command could have opportunity to attack their rear and communications and, by reason of its augmented air transport, transport troops to Plaine des Jarres and Luang Prabang. He felt certain that Viet Minh would lose, and rather heavily, in such operations but clashes might not be spectacular. He remarked that Franco-Laotian forces had discovered several small caches of gasoline and rice between Samneua and Luang Prabang, which they had destroyed or taken.
- In telegram 1271 to Saigon, Jan. 18, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy that according to Civil Air Transport officials in the United States, 12 pilots had completed C–119 training in Japan and were ready to move. An additional 12 pilots would be ready shortly. (751G.00/1–1854)↩
- Telegram 2686 from Paris, Jan. 20, read as follows: “Departments attention is invited to provision in Prime Minister’s letter transmitted Embassy telegram 2668 [p. 983], to effect that no United States crews are requested for C–119 aircraft. French are most explicit on this subject and Embassy has impression that they are particularly determined avoid use CAT pilots on premise this one of most delicate problems related to over-all policy avoid any action which might be interpreted by Chinese as excuse increased intervention their part on behalf Viet Minh.” (751G.00/1–2054)↩
- For partial text, see footnote 1, p. 990.↩