PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Vietnam Correspondence”
The Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs ( Bonsal ) to the Ambassador at Saigon ( Heath )
eyes only
Dear Don: A good deal has been going on in the Indochina field lately. I have been unsuccessful because of “circumstances beyond my control” in keeping you fully advised. In fact, the only specific information you have had so far is contained in our message regarding Mike O’Daniel’s plans.1 Getting that one out was not simple. I am [Page 993] therefore writing you in this personal, eyes only, fashion to see if I can give you at least the flavor of what is happening here.
We have been struggling on the preparation of a new NSC paper to take the place of NSC 124/2.2 That paper has now been approved by the President and I am seeing to it that copies are forwarded to you. It fully covers our present policies toward Indochina and in fact gives added support to the vigorous prosecution of the “enterprises” within present lines.
Recent military developments, however, have caused serious soul-searching in the highest quarters as to whether the present general approach is sufficient and also as to whether we should or can make any preparations for what we would do in the event of a failure of the “enterprise” due to military or to political factors. There have been a number of top level conversations on this subject. My information in regard thereto is incomplete.
The first result of these conversations was the NSC action with regard to General O’Daniel which I have already reported to you. This action was taken with no advance warning to or consultation of the lower echelons in Defense or State so far as I am aware. I saw Mike O’Daniel briefly here last week. He does not have a very clear idea as yet of what he is going to do but relies on his personal ability to persuade Navarre that he ought to remain in Indochina on an indefinite basis. One formula might be to have him become the head of MAAG/Saigon. (Incidentally, I am extremely sorry that Trap is leaving. I think he has done a remarkable job under most difficult circumstances. His replacement, General Dabney, is very highly spoken of. I have met him once; he makes an excellent impression. He does not of course speak French.)
In addition to the action on General O’Daniel the NSC, early this month, requested Defense and CIA to come up with a paper on things which might be done to promote the success of the Laniel–Navarre concept short of any engagement of US combat troops in the area. You will note that State was not asked to participate in this job although we did do a little informal work on it. Concurrently, the French emergency requests with which you are familiar came in (the additional B–26s and the maintenance personnel).
I am sending you herewith for your strictly personal information a copy of the paper submitted to the NSC by the Secretary of Defense, a copy of an analytical memorandum which I wrote on the subject and a copy of a one-page memorandum which Mr. Robertson sent to the Secretary in anticipation of NSC consideration of the [Page 994] paper.3 At the risk of unnecessary repetition, I wish to stress that these are purely for information and should not be referred to in any official correspondence since they are being extremely closely held here.
You will note that so far as the furnishing of additional B–26s and the finding of necessary funds to expand our end-item program for Indochina are concerned there is general agreement. We have not, however, come up with a practical answer as yet on the question of personnel. I think the French should be asked again to supply this personnel even if it means a reduction of their NATO commitments. This, however, may or may not be possible. It should in my judgment be actively explored through Generals Gruenther and Norstad. I hope this course will be adopted. Simultaneously, I think we should make preparation for sending US Air Force ground personnel, perhaps in civilian clothes, to Indochina on a temporary duty basis in order to make sure that the French air lift does not break down. They should, however, only be assigned in the event we conclude that the French cannot supply the necessary personnel after exhausting every possible resource. If we do send our own personnel, we should see that conditions under which they work are as secure as possible and involve a minimum of risk of their involvement in combat, guerrilla or sabotage by the enemy.
You will note that the Defense-CIA paper covers a wide variety of other possible projects. Great emphasis is placed by CIA and also by Defense on the intensification of unconventional warfare activities. …
Similarly, questions on psychological warfare and intensified propaganda come back into the picture. We are taking a generally affirmative attitude here.
With regard to the “declarations” which it is proposed the French and US Governments issue, we are for reasons stated in my memoranda taking a negative stand and I do not think we will hear much more about this.
Then, too, we have the rather vague statement that there should be a general review of the national strategy with reference to the entire area. This means in part to try to develop a regional appreciation of the threat of Communist imperalism. It is a line of thought influenced to a large extent by Ambassador Donovan’s ideas. … [Page 995] It reflects in my judgment, far more a general feeling of dissatisfaction and frustration with the dragging out of the war in Indochina than it does a constructive and well-knit concept of what can be done about the free world position in Southeast Asia. It is something which we here will be laboring with during the coming weeks.
Now as I see it, there are distinct advantages in this renewal of high level concern with Indochina. It is partly based upon a pessimism with which I disagree. To the extent, however, that it results in concrete help to the people who are doing the fighting on the military, political and psychological fronts, it is all to the good. If there is a danger, it lies in the temptation which some of our friends here are undoubtedly experiencing: namely, to make the provision to the French of certain items of military hardware which they urgently require contingent upon the adopting by the French of notions, ideas, activities and strategy which we here think should be adopted. I am all for maximum persuasion but I do not think that it is wise or useful for us to attempt to get the French to adopt, for instance, a US program for unconventional warfare activities as a condition precedent to giving them things which they need in order to carry on their planned offensives against the enemy. Such an attempt will build up resentment and will also tend to destroy the self-confidence which is so necessary to the success of the Navarre concept. This sort of bargaining will also accelerate the day when the French will in effect say to us: “Well, if you are so smart you take care of the baby”. I am confident that we will be able to counteract this tendency here and that you will help us at your end. I do not mean, of course, that we should not go after the French to do things which we earnestly believe can and should be done by them but I wish to avoid a situation where their reluctance to do these things results in delay in providing things which they and we have agreed are urgently needed.
The latest I have is that we are going ahead on the short range items from the JCS–CIA paper, i.e., that we will do our best on the B–26s and that we will go to work actively on the question of personnel, first exhausting the possibility of securing this personnel from French availabilities even at the expense of a reduction of French NATO commitments. I do not know who will be charged with working this out with the French but I hope that it will be Generals Gruenther and Norstad.
The longer range items are to be considered by a special high level committee which will apparently be chaired by Bedell Smith. I will try to keep you informed. (In fact this letter may well become obsolete by the time it reaches you but it will at least I hope show you that my heart was in the right place.)
[Page 996]I am lunching with Joe Alsop very shortly and will repeat to him your various messages some of which I have already conveyed by telephone. He has become extraordinarily pessimistic about the military situation. He thinks that Dien Bien Phu will turn out to be a hopeless trap because the enemy will be able to cut off the French air lift. I hope and believe he is wrong. I cling to my confidence in the courage and good sense of Navarre, Bodet, Gambiez, Cogny, Castries and company. I wish there were less pessimism here.
You know how anxious I am to be of assistance in any way possible. We here think that all of you are doing a grand job and that goes double for Louise and yourself.
Yours as ever,
- See telegram 1269 to Saigon, Jan. 17, p. 977.↩
- Reference is to NSC 5405, Jan. 16; for extracts, see p. 971.↩
- The enclosures do not accompany the source text. In a typewritten notation, they are identified as the memorandum from Robertson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20 (p. 985); a memorandum from Bonsal to Robertson, Jan. 19, not printed (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”); and the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 15 (p. 968).↩