S/S-NSC files, Iot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Paper prepared by JCS and CIA for submission by Secretary of Defense to NSC in response to NSC Action 1005-c on the subject of “All feasible further steps short of the overt use of US forces in combat which the US might take to assist in achieving the success of the ‘Laniel-Navarre’ Plan” in Indochina.2
Admiral Radford will present this paper at the Jan. 21 NSC meeting. The steps proposed may be divided between (a) measures desired by the French covering immediate matériel and personnel requirements in the present combat situation, and (b) measures urged by the US as likely to improve the over-all military-political situation. With regard to the French requirement for 400 American specialized personnel in civilian capacity to service B–26s and C–47s, the paper takes the position that US military or civilian personnel should riot be provided “except in certain highly specialized categories”. It is understood, however, that this matter is being further explored in Defense.
[Page 986]Recommendations
It is recommended that NSC take affirmative action on short term requirements and provide for prompt further handling of longer term concepts advanced. Specifically, it is recommended:
- 1.
- That State endorse decision providing funds making 35 B–26s available in Indochina prior to March 1st and heartily support proposed streamlining of MDAP procedures.
- 2.
- That matter of 400 additional mechanics be handled by (a) asking Gen. Gruenther to report on whether these can be obtained from French sources by reducing French NATO requirements or otherwise; and (b) by asking Defense to make necessary preparations for the provision, if necessary, of these 400 mechanics on temporary duty basis (in civilian dress?) in Indochina by March 1.
- 3.
- That further study be given the proposed organization of a volunteer air group for service in Indochina. (Perhaps NATO Standing Group could be helpful.)
- 4.
- That further effort be made to persuade French to step up unconventional warfare activities. CIA might be asked to provide Secretary with briefing paper so that this can be discussed with Bidault at Berlin.
- 5.
- That State concur in recommendation that “proposed re-examination of current national strategy regarding Indochina” be submitted to NSC Planning Board for further study.
- 6.
- That OCB ensure appropriate action on proposals to step up informational activities and psychological warfare activities in Indochina and on a regional basis.
- 7.
- That State take a negative position regarding two declarations proposed in the paper. The French Government will not now make a public declaration that it will pursue the war to a successful conclusion; the French have done all they can be required to do on the matter of independence of Associated States. A further declaration by the US on what we would do in the event of outside aggression against Indochina would tend to depreciate the value of such declarations.