751G.00/1–1954: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
priority
2668. Repeated information Saigon 284. Following is free translation of letter signed by Prime Minister and received at Embassy January 18 under covering letter from Foreign Office (Embtel 2663).1
Text follows:
“Mr. Ambassador, I had the honor several days ago to ask you to be good enough to inform your government on an exceptional basis, of a request for aid in reinforcing each of the two groups of B–26 bomber aircraft at present in Indochina (by raising the number of planes in each group from 16 to 25).
“Following that request, of primary urgency, I ask you to note, as set forth here below, a group of new requests which, taking into account its obligations in Europe and the overseas territories, the French Air Force is not able to satisfy and for which the aid of the Government of the US appears to be indispensable.
“The Navarre plan, in assuring the defense of the Tonkin delta, has made it necessary for the Viet Minh High Command to give up its original plans and share its efforts between the Thai country and the Mekong. In dealing with these two zones, which are at the moment extremely sensitive, both the distance and the difficulties of the terrain [Page 984] make it necessary for us to use air transport. There, therefore, results a great increase in the demand for transport aircraft
“On the other hand, the rebel forces move now only at night. They are now supplied with antiaircraft armament of a greatly increased efficiency. These two factors combine in rendering the action of our fighter-bombers less effective and more expensive. There follows the necessity of increasing the amount of bombing which can be done at night while at the same time attacking well-defensed objectives from the air by day.
“Toward this objective the following aid is asked from the Government of the US.
“That part which concerns transport: The maintenance at the disposition of General Navarre, for the length of the present campaign, of 12 C–119 aircraft already loaned to the French High Command in Indochina and the supplying of the necessary technical support which the planes require (specialized personnel and spare parts) to the exclusion of the crews. This detachment would be used for heavy transport over long distances and would make it possible to devote the four groups of C–47 aircraft to operational transport and, in particular, to the spreading of airlifted reserves to which the Commander-in-Chief attaches the greatest importance.
“As concerns bombing: Experience has shown that the operational results of the B–26 at present in Indochina can be improved by a considerable margin if their supply spare parts coming from the US, at the present time the only place where they can be obtained, is assured in a manner which is both more ample in quantity and more regular in delivery. It is, therefore, asked that your government be good enough to take the necessary steps to assure that this supply is effected more promptly than in the past.
“On the other hand, the High Command considers that its military strength will be considerably increased and will make it possible for us to face the present situation if the High Command has at its disposal a third group of 25 B–26 aircraft, under condition that the technical support of the group can be assured favorably. Thus the problem of personnel for this third group arises. As far as the crews are concerned, the French Air Force will be able to furnish them after a period of instruction in B–26 in Europe or North Africa, but it is necessary that the American Government supply the specialist ground force personnel which is indispensable to the placing in operation of this formation. These specialists, who will not be employed on operational missions, should be sent to Indochina as civilians.
“The evolution of the war in Indochina leads us to believe, for the reasons indicated at the beginning of this letter, that the air branch of our forces will, within the next three months, take on a much greater importance than it has had in the past. It is thus indispensable to make a new effort to obtain the maximum service from all air matériel at our disposal in the theater. In this regard I ask you to submit to the appropriate American authorities the following suggestion: Would it be possible for the American Government to place at the disposition of General Navarre a force of approximately 400 specialists in the maintenance and repair of B–26 and C–47 aircraft [Page 985] according to the detailed specifications which will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief directly to MAAG Saigon? These specialists, serving as civilians, would not take part in any operations. Their service together with the reinforcement of French specialists who have already been or are designated to be sent will make it possible to increase the efficiency of the transport and bomber units in Indochina at the present time to the extent of approximately 30 percent.
“It is finally pointed out that the aid in personnel asked of the American Government is of a purely temporary character and that this personnel will be restored to the American authorities as soon as possible.
“In closing, I beg your attention to the question of the urgency of these measures which I ask you to pass on to the American Government with the least delay possible.
“I attach importance to the fact that the other requests for technical matériel and ammunition which have already been passed to the MAAG at Saigon by General Navarre be fulfilled with priority because of the pressing necessities of the current battle.
“Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration. Signed Joseph Laniel.”
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In telegram 2663 from Paris, Jan. 19, not printed, Achilles reported that the letter from Premier Laniel had been received from Maurice Schumann, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the previous afternoon. Achilles pointed out that U.S. crews were not being requested. (751G.00/1–954) The Embassy transmitted the texts of the letter, dated Jan. 18, and the Embassy’s note of acknowledgment of receipt, as enclosures to despatch 1840, Jan. 20. (751G.00/1–2054)
In an aide-memoire of Jan. 18, the French Embassy in Washington advised the Department of State of the communication from Premier Laniel to Ambassador Dillon and summarized its contents. (751G.5/1–1854)
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