Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

651.51G/4–852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn)¹ to the Department of State

secret

Paris, April 8, 1952—5 p.m.

6173. Rptd info Saigon 364 London unn. Saigon tel 1857, Mar 23 [24], rptd Paris unn.²

In para number 9 reftel Saigon raises perennial and to date unanswered question: What wld be the effect French Govt statement that at some future date (either named or described as at end hostilities) Assoc States wld be given choice remaining in Fr Union or complete independence or that at this future date there wld be complete revamping March 8 accords and Pau conf resolutions to achieve revision status Assoc States?

While it is obviously impossible to give direct and clear-cut answer to this ques, it is possible to set forth some of the factors involved. If a Fr Govt cld be prevailed upon to make such a statement, particularly if it promised choice of complete independence for Assoc States at such and such a date, ques wld then arise whether Nat Assembly and Fr public opinion wld any longer be prepared support continued drain in manpower and money for effort, end result of which wld be to cut IC loose from metropole. If, however, such a statement cld be related to an “internationalization” of IC problem, that is, in absence Chi attack and UN action parallel to that in Korea, an internatl sharing of and responsibility for burden, Nat Assembly and Fr public reaction might be different. Such “internationalization” cld only flow from a much greater US participation thru increased mil, econ and fin aid and might lead to Fr expectation also of direct US mil participation in conflict. In brief, such “internationalization” of burden wld mean US assumption of undetermined share as there are no other possibilities in sight unless Australia and New Zealand might be persuaded in self-interest to contribute. Such contribution wld likely be little more than token at best. UK responsibilities Malaya and Middle East militate against any appreciable Brit contrib.

On other hand, effect such statement among elements in IC seems to be equally difficult to appraise with real certainty. Logically, it should cut ground out from under feet Viet Minh and cause ralliement to Assoc States non-Commie elements now supporting Ho Chi-Minh. It shld cause attentistes to throw in their lot with Assoc States Govts. It shld provide answer to Nehru and other Asian leaders and give grounds for recognition Assoc States Govts. But, wld it do these things and, if it did, wld these results be sufficiently decisive to bring about eventually virtual elimination Viet Minh as serious threat? Para 8 reftel does not indicate prospects are particularly bright for mere evolutionary type statement.³

In summary, it seems probable Fr Govt wld not be willing make statement re choice complete independence unless it cld demonstrate to Parliamentary and public opinion that burden IC conflict wld no longer be borne largely by France. It also seems probable that advantages wld flow to cause of free world thru issuance such statement because of its effect both within Assoc States and elsewhere in Asia, but degree to which these advantages wld play decisive part is not susceptible of accurate appraisal from here. It can only be said, with some degree of certainty, that moral position France and her free world supporters Assoc States wld in eyes Asiatics be placed in much better light.

Dunn

1. James Clement Dunn succeeded David K. E. Bruce as Ambassador in France on Mar. 27, 1952.
2. In telegram 1857 from Saigon, Mar. 24, not printed, Minister Heath addressed the question of encouraging the Philippines to recognize the Associated States of Indochina and discussed statements which might be made by France to promote Asian acceptance of the Associated States as independent entities. Paragraph 9 read in part as follows: “Embassy Paris might suggest limits it [the French Government] cld go without losing parliamentary majorities essential to IC defense budgets. We suggest possibility that statement clearing air might consolidate rather than weaken majority.” (751G.02/4–2452)
3. Paragraph 8 of telegram 1857 read as follows: “We do not believe such evolutionary statement will make much dent on VM or transform situation; at best, it might clear way for installation of Associated States govts with more dynamism and take some wind out of stubborn natl sails.” (751G.02/4–2452)