PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
Subject:
- Steps Which the United States Might Take to Assist in Achieving Success of the Navarre Plan.
- 1.
- In response to the action taken by the National Security Council (NSC) on 8 January 1954 on NSC 177,1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for your consideration the actions shown hereafter, Appendix “B” of which was prepared in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to assist in achieving the success of the Navarre Plan.2
- 2.
- The actions are considered to be feasible within the framework of existing national policies and will not involve the overt use of U.S. forces in combat. However, in view of the continuing changes in the military situation in Indochina, together with their influence on existing national politico-military policies and commitments in other areas, the actions should be reviewed and re-evaluated on a continuing basis.
- 3.
- Appropriate agencies of the government should undertake the following
actions:
- a.
-
Place renewed emphasis upon the attainment and maintenance of the full support by the government of France of the Navarre Plan and United States measures in support of it. This full support by France of the Navarre Plan should include the augmentation of the French Air Force, Indochina, with maintenance and air crew personnel from military and/or civilian resources available in metropolitan France or elsewhere. The U.S. supporting measures should include necessary matériel and financial support but should not include military and/or civilian personnel except in certain highly specialized categories.
Discussion: The French government is under strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce the French military commitment in Indochina. French national sensitivity continues-particularly upon points of prestige. Although General Navarre has adopted many of the recommendations of Lieutenant General John D. [W.] O’Daniel, USA, other recommendations pertaining to training, tactics, strategy, and logistics have not yet been fully implemented. In some cases the reasons for this lack of cooperation may be political in nature, and therefore beyond General Navarre’s control. In summary, a renewed [Page 969] effort to obtain full support of the Navarre Plan and U.S. measures to support it, including those hereafter recommended, is essential.
- b.
-
Approach the French with a proposal to organize a volunteer air group composed of personnel from various anti-communist nations or groups to serve with the French Union forces in Indochina as outlined in Appendix “A”.
Discussion: This examination was directed by the President at the NSC meeting of 8 January 1954. While the President emphasized participation by U.S. volunteer personnel he also mentioned the inclusion of other nationals. Since this is a definitive means by which the French can increase the Indochinese air effort as desired by them and thereby increase their over-all air capability this step is militarily desirable. Its feasibility is limited only by the provision of sufficient U.S. funds.
- c.
-
Assign additional technical specialists to MAAG, Indochina, in accordance with the recommendations of the November O’Daniel report, so as to maximize technical assistance to the French Union forces.
Discussion: Additional technical advisory personnel are needed for MAAG, Indochina, to provide guidance and training to the French.
- d.
-
Convince the French military authorities that it is imperative to increase unconventional warfare activities as suggested in Appendix “B”, the substance of which is a broad general concept, for the use of guerrillas and can be used as the basis for discussions between General O’Daniel and authorities in Indochina in order to appropriately influence the French.
Discussion: The present French unconventional warfare effort in Indochina is considered to be relatively ineffective.
- e.
-
Re-examine current national strategy with respect to Indochina, taking advantage of any unifying forces existing in Southeast Asia as a whole in opposition to the spread of Soviet Communism, and treating Southeast Asia as a unit with due regard to the long term objectives of the U.S. and France in the area. For further discussion, see Appendix “C”.
Discussion: The Soviet Communist campaign in Southeast Asia is waged on a regional and coordinated scale, rather than separate attacks on individual countries. By forming new coalitions of Western oriented countries, certain opportunities can be expected to open up which will directly support operations in Indochina.
- f.
-
Increase the pace and scope of the U.S. information program, and the U.S. advisory activities in furtherance of the French and Associated States military psychological warfare effort in accordance with the recommendations of the senior U.S. officers on the ground. (See Appendix “D”.) Consideration should be given to both unilateral action and action in conjunction with colonial French military and civil authorities, as well as indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia. The objectives should be to increase:
- (1)
- The willingness of the people of France and the U.S. to support the prosecution of the war.
- (2)
- The anti-Communist attitudes and active participation of the native populations.
- (3)
- The morale of the French forces in Indochina.
Discussion: To secure the maximum benefits of our program of assistance to Indochina and, simultaneously, Southeast Asia by the cumulative and cooperative efforts of all propaganda media at the disposal of the Allies.
- g.
-
To render maximum and expeditious assistance in providing matériel and training to the French and Associated States Forces engaged in the Indochina war, the Services should be directed to accomplish (1) and (4) below and authorized to accomplish (2) and (3) below:
- (1)
- Expedite shipment of undelivered items on FY 50–54 Programs in accordance with priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deliveries of MDAP.
- (2)
- Make changes in current programs as requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina, and make deliveries against such changes and, if deemed necessary, without prior reference to or approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (3)
- Increase monetary value of FY 54 MDA Programs for Indochina, as may be necessary and feasible to provide additional matériel and/or training requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina.
- (4)
- Undertake the implementation of these instructions through such organizations and by such procedures as are considered necessary to insure prompt and effective response to valid requests for assistance.
Discussion: To date, restrictive criteria and procedures have seriously handicapped the administration of MDAP assistance in the support of the effort in Indochina. MDAP assistance is normally used to support a training and re-equipment program. In Indochina, however, such equipment is being used to support an active campaign. The purpose of the above is to free the Services of all restrictive criteria other than final legal limitation of available funds in order that prompt and effective response may be achieved in meeting all valid requests received from Chief, MAAG, Indochina.
- h.
-
Give consideration to interim revision of French NATO commitments in Europe in order to allow provision of additional French air personnel to Indochina.
Discussion: Shortage of air personnel has been one major factor in prolonging the war. A reappraisal of French NATO commitments should be considered with a view toward releasing additional French air personnel for Indochina.
- i.
-
Insure that personnel assigned to MAAG, Indochina, are qualified to advise the French Union forces on U.S. tactics and techniques.
Discussion: This would provide the benefit of U.S. battle experience for use in Indochina.
- j.
-
Consideration should be given at Governmental level to the proposition of declarations as follows: [Page 971]
- (1)
- By France: A declaration of intention to prosecute the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion and looking toward the more complete independence of the Associated States of Indochina.
- (2)
- By the United States: A declaration to the effect that positive action will be taken to prevent the conquest of Indochina by aggression originating outside of Indochina.
Discussion: A declaration of intent, as outlined above, would in general raise the morale of all peoples in Southeast Asia and in particular would increase the determination of the Indochinese to fight the war to a successful conclusion.
Lieut. General, USAF,
Director, Joint Staff