751G.00/1–1554: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
[Received 8:49 a.m.]
389. Repeated information Saigon 279, Paris 166 (Paris limit distribution).
General Cogny said yesterday that anticipated Viet Minh attack on Dien-Bien-Phu, which he had said earlier should not be expected before January 15 (Contel 363)1 appears now to have been delayed further as result intensive French air attacks on Viet Minh communications [Page 965] lines. Asked how long delay might be, Cogny replied, “Several days at the least”.
Patrols have proved Dien-Bien-Phu to be surrounded on all sides by enemy forces lying just outside artillery range. Reconnaissance in any direction now provokes strong Viet Minh reaction. Cogny said it is certain that divisions 308 and 316 are in vicinity of strong point; there are strong indications, but not proof, that division 312 is likewise in area. Viet Minh appear be making maximum logistic effort in that country, operating on scale hitherto unknown during seven years of war, using tens of thousands of coolies for transport as well as trucks which have been sighted in convoys numbering as many as 40. Regarding Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns, Cogny said pilots have reported bursts of shells fired at them indicated weapons to be of 37 or possibly 40 millimeters. General said Viet Minh might attempt ring Dien-Bien-Phu with anti-aircraft, but terrain is such that if guns were most favorably placed they would offer good target for French artillery.
Meanwhile, Dien-Bien-Phu continues to be sustained and strengthened by average of 60 DC–3 and 20 flying boxcar flights daily. Airfield has been covered with 800 meters of pierced steel planking and made solid enough to take emergency landings of flying boxcars (of which there have been two this week). M–24 (Chaffee) light tanks have been flown in, dismounted in Bristol aircraft and re-assembled in few days. 155-millimeter Howitzers have been flown into strong point, first such air movement made here, to offset 105-millimeter guns Viet Minh are believed to be bringing up. Thus far, Dien-Bien-Phu outposts have been brought under only light mortar fire by enemy.
Cogny says there is still no indication Viet Minh will by-pass Dien-Bien-Phu and advance on Luang Prabang. He thinks Viet Minh attack on middle Mekong has been heavily overplayed and does not regard it as having more than political significance. He said information he has received indicates French could retake Thakhek at will, but he added he does not know what Navarre’s plans for the area may be.
Within Tonkin delta, Cogny is still hampered by absence of his parachute battalions (Contel 363). If they were available, he said, he could not only take advantage of lessened enemy pressure on delta perimeter to clean out zones which remain heavily infested with Viet Minh regular and regional troops, but could also make raids on large enemy rear bases, going as far afield perhaps as Yen-bay and Thainguyen. Meanwhile, a somewhat new tactic imposed by his relative poverty in reserves has been yielding acceptable results in delta; this tactic consists of establishing groupes mobiles for considerable periods [Page 966] in positions near known enemy bases and ultimately provoking attack. Operation “Gerfaut” against Viet Minh regiment 50 in Thai-Binh is an example of this procedure, and Cogny commented that he is now beginning to see his way to the end of it. A similar operation is underway in Hung-yen against regiment 42, already badly battered as result of its attacks on strongly resisting posts in recent weeks. Viet Minh regiment 46 remains on right bank of Red River in south delta but at present is not very threatening.
Comment:Cogny appeared less confident during interview with regard to outcome of an eventual attack on Dien-Bien-Phu than he has been hitherto, tending to qualify his statements with such remarks as “at least I think so.” There is no doubt that if three enemy divisions, supported by artillery and anti-aircraft, are thrown against Dien-Bien-Phu, strong point’s position will be critical.
- Telegram 363 from Hanoi, Dec. 3, 1953, which reported observations by General Cogny on the military situation, is not printed. (751J.00/12–3153)↩