751H.5/1–1254: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

confidential

1234. Repeated information Paris 377, Hanoi, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Over weekend, I had long talks with King Sihanouk and Chan Nak, Cambodian Prime Minister. I found the King full of confidence, moderate and satisfied that his personally-led operation against Viet Minh in Battambang had been both a military and political success. He said he realized that his military problem was much less important and serious than that of Vietnam, but he argued that Cambodian situation nevertheless merited slightly more military assistance from the United States and France than had so far been contemplated. He needed several thousand more men and provision should be made for giving Cambodia a few planes for strafing and light bombing and to build up a Cambodian air force. The French had loaned him planes for his recent operation, but he could never be sure that he could have them precisely when he needed them. Furthermore, bombing by French planes with French markings were used by the political opposition to allege that the King was calling in the French to kill Cambodians. I asked the King whether he had made a definite request to the French High Command for additional assistance and he answered “not yet”.

I reminded him that under our present pentapartite accord, it was necessary first to present requests for military assistance to the High Command. We, of course, would be consulted by the French and I felt that any reasonable request would receive sympathetic treatment within the limits of our appropriations. I remarked, however, that while the United States had increased its financial support of the war effort in Indochina, that the $385 million additional we had promised had already been budgeted almost in its entirety. I said that at some future date we might deal separately with the three states or the [Page 958] French Union Forces but for the present we were bound by the terms of the five-part agreement and that it would not be practical even if determined that it was the best thing to do to deal separately with the Associated States. Under the existing system I thought their justified requirements could be met.

As regards setting up a separate air force, this was a difficult, lengthy and expensive business. I suggested as a possible solution that when they borrowed planes from the French the planes, during the operation, might be marked with the Cambodian colors. I told him that we had occasionally loaned planes to the French Union Air Force and during the period of the loan allowed them to be painted with French markings.

To my inquiry as to the progress of his negotiations with the French, the King stated he would send a delegation to Paris the end of January for final negotiations. He said he would have negotiated earlier but that, frankly, he and his negotiators were having to reconsider their previous stand that Cambodia would secede from the Quadripartite Customs and Currency Union. They had discovered it would be very difficult and costly to set up a separate Cambodian customs organization. He indicated he would like to remain in the present quadripartite system but that Cambodian public opinion was dead set against it. I observed that Cambodian public opinion could hardly be so unintelligent as not to understand one could not inaugurate a separate customs and currency system overnight. I suggested for the good of Cambodia that as a practical matter they remain on in the present system for some time, I also observed that the US generally regarded customs unions with approval and pointed out that the Benelux arrangement was meeting with success.

The King said he was quite prepared to conclude some form of future association with France, but both he and the Prime Minister evaded indicating whether Cambodia would remain in the French Union or seek a purely bilateral arrangement.

During our conversations, there was no word of criticism of the French, but both the King and the Prime Minister complained with some bitterness over President Tam’s action in withholding Cambodia’s share of customs collections in Vietnamese ports. The arrears due Cambodia now amounted, they claimed, to 800 million piastres. I agreed warmly that Vietnamese action was unjustified but reminded them that a pretext for Tam’s action had been given when the Cambodian Government stated last summer that they intended to drop out of the Customs Union. The King rather ruefully agreed and told me that DeJean made a suggestion that Vietnam might pay its arrears over a period of two years. The Prime Minister argued that in such [Page 959] an arrangement Vietnam should pay interest. I remarked that recovering the principal was more important than the interest.

The King made no reference to the fact that STEM has not approved its final program for Cambodia for fiscal year 1954, but the Prime Minister rather wistfully asked me whether this approval could not be rendered without further delay. I replied that I hoped STEM would be able to make final arrangements in a short time. I took General McReynolds, STEM Director, with me on my calls to both the King and the Prime Minister. On my return, I authorized STEM to grant certain funds for war refugee relief in Cambodia but am still requesting STEM to hold off final approval of the Cambodian program until a little clearer whether Cambodia will cooperate with the other states and the French Union Forces in this military emergency.

DeJean, French Commissioner General, today went to Cambodia to consult with the King. DeJean tells me he thinks it will be possible to increase the French military subsidies to the Cambodian Government and also make some initial arrangements toward setting up a Cambodian air force.

Heath