751G.00/1–1254: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
2597. Limit distribution. Repeated information Saigon 272. Embassy has had three significant conversations on Indochina with members [Page 955] cabinet in last few days. First with Barrachin1 was in connection with internal politics (Embtel 2571)2 but was extended to Indochina at his instigation.
He stated that unfavorable reports had been received recently from Navarre, that his requests for non-com and officer reinforcements had been turned down, prospect of improving military situation to extent that negotiations could be undertaken two years from now was poor and that altogether France’s position in AS was hopeless and that she would have to give up struggle somehow. He blamed government (of which he is member) for concealing nature of France’s plight from US for reasons which were presumably concerned with fear we would reduce our aid. We informed Barrachin that as far as we knew, full facts of Indochinese military situation were known to us, but if we were mistaken, prompt steps should be taken to inform us for if Franco-US cooperation in Indochina were not based on mutual confidence, trust and understanding, the hopelessness he spoke of would be indisputable. Barrachin stated he would so inform his colleagues. It is to be remembered in considering Barrachin’s remarks that he is Gaullist (ARS) and has no direct responsibility for Indochinese affairs. For these reasons his views on Indochina are colored and he is generally less well informed on the subject than others of his cabinet colleagues.
We then called on Jacquet to check Barrachin’s statements. He stated that letter in question was one from Navarre to General Ely, written in mid-November. About 100 additional officers and non-coms had been requested and turned down because they would have had to come from NATO units, which was not considered feasible. Estimate of two-year period before negotiations could be undertaken was accurate, made by Navarre last July and dates from that time. It was qualified, however, by conditions that (a) Chinese aid to Viet Minh remains at level it was at time and (b) Navarre receive certain men and equipment (which he did as part of conditions for US 385 million aid).
He now wished to give most up-to-date report from best source. He then read military portions Navarre’s last top secret report to government of late December 1953, main features of which are (together with Jacquet’s added comment on subsequent events):
- 1.
- Chinese aid to enemy has now increased considerably, particularly in (a) logistics equipment (trucks, etc.,) (b) heavy artillery, and (c) anti-aircraft, including 37 mm.
- (2)
- Laos campaign will be important one. Jacquet added that situation now relatively secure with French enjoying numerical and strategical superiority and enemy having suffered heavy losses.
- 3.
- Dien Bien Phu is, however, crucial area. Major if not decisive battle will be fought there. Victory or defeat will radically affect course of entire war.
- 4.
- Key to Dien Bien Phu is ability of French use their air force. Threat to it represented by Viet heavy artillery and anti-aircraft is of vital importance and might be decisive factor in campaign.
- 5.
- Navarre must have additional men, equipment and services.
To specify nature equipment and services being requested from US (in addition to reinforcements being requested from France) Jacquet, at Prime Minister’s instruction, has asked Achilles to call tomorrow. Bonnet being instructed carry out similar démarche with Department at same time. Request will be for additional B–26 aircraft and US Air Force mechanics (in civilian clothes) to service them and possibly other planes.
Jacquet added that present rate of French losses is heavy but not when considered in light size operations. Between 50–70 officers had been lost since opening of active operations. Success of Dien Bien Phu battle vital not only for reasons stated in relation to other French Union offensive plans. Jacquet leaving for Saigon January 17.
Third official seen on Indochina was Pleven whose talk with Achilles subject immediate following telegram.3 Detailed memos conversation Barrachin-Jacquet talks being forwarded by pouch.