751G.5 MSP/1–754: Telegram

The Chargé in France ( Joyce ) to the Department of State

secret
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2535. Repeated information Saigon 264. Deptel 2391 (Saigon 1175) January 5.1 Embassy estimates French courses of action over next three to six months:2

1.

General. Retention Laniel government at least until after fourpower conference significant in sense we may count on government’s resistance any attempt modify present IC policy for immediate future when further Viet Minh military successes may possibly occur. Militarily, the government is committed to implementation of Navarre Plan which has been defined as designed improve Franco-Associated States military position IC to a point where a settlement of IC conflict [Page 946] can be obtained through negotiations on best possible terms France and Associated States. Just what would represent a sufficiently strong military position from which negotiations might commence has never been defined by government and may well be assumed to be an imprecise concept that would be subject adjustment in terms future development and events. Diplomatically, the government is committed to explore in conjunction such international talks as occur the elimination Chinese Communist aid IC. Hence, if a Korean political conference or a five-power conference is held this would have bearing on future course French policy IC. The government has also indicated that it would consider in conjunction Associated States any “official” proposals emanating Viet Minh although it would not, as parliamentary minority advocated during recent parliamentary debates, take initiative to negotiate with Viet Minh. Ho could, of course, submit an “official” proposal for conversation at any time which the government could hardly ignore without in any way implying acceptance Ho’s terms.

In general, Embassy is of opinion that the outcome of current military campaign will exert a determining influence on the future course of French policy IC, and that the end of the present dry-weather fighting season will involve a taking of stock and an over-all review of France’s basic position at that time. Embassy concluded following recent parliamentary debates that, barring military disaster and adoption of an unreasonable attitude on part of Associated States (neither of which is presently contemplated by French officials here), the government gained time—at least until end present dry-weather fighting season—to exploit and evaluate the military and political aspects of IC policy.

2.
Possible French course of action over next three to six months if:
(a)
Military situation remains roughly as at present. If relative military balance remains unchanged by end current dry-weather fighting season, Embassy of opinion that there will be increased pressure exerted politically in France to reach a negotiated settlement IC conflict on theory Viet Minh may also be more inclined negotiate. However, we consider it better than even chance that no parliamentary majority could be mustered to face consequences of possible negotiation Viet Minh under these circumstances and that end result would be acceptance path least resistance, i.e., continuation present situation at least until some additional important development occurred to precipitate a decision. Example latter could be possible Viet Minh proposal designed give added impetus to French sentiment favoring negotiated settlement on best terms obtainable.
(b)
Viet Minh obtain further military successes. If the Viet Minh obtain significant military successes then Embassy would consider situation critical and would anticipate that French would feel impelled seek allied troop assistance as an alternative to engaging in [Page 947] negotiations which might be construed as a Viet Minh victory. The nature, duration and significance of any such Viet Minh “successes”, however, would have to be taken into account this regard.
(c)
Navarre regains a real initiative. Entire situation would be altered. Pressure of French public and parliamentary opinion in favor of negotiation would be reduced in direct ratio to extent Navarre victories.

Joyce
  1. Telegram 2391 to Paris, Jan. 5, requesting estimates of French courses of action under various circumstances, is not printed. (751G.5 MSP/1–554)
  2. A more detailed analysis was transmitted in despatch 1788 from Paris, Jan. 14. (751G.5 MSP/1–1454)